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Abstract
Secure multi-party computation is a conceptual framework in which distrusting parties engage
in a protocol to securely perform a computational task. Depending on the precise model of security,
different sets of tasks admit secure protocols. We take a complexity-theoretic approach to studying
the inherent difficulty of securely realizing tasks in various standard security models.
• We give the first alternate characterization of secure realizability in the framework of uni-
versally composable (UC) security. This is the first characterization in any model to consider
completely arbitrary computational tasks and completely arbitrary communication channels.
• The most long-standing class of computational tasks studied are those in which two parties
evaluate a deterministic function. For these tasks, we give the first complete, combinatorial
characterizations of secure realizability in the passive, standalone, and universally composable
security models, against computationally unbounded adversaries.
• Say that a task G has “as much cryptographic complexity” as another task F if there is a secure
protocol for F that uses access to a secure implementation of G. We show that there is an
infinite hierarchy of tasks with strictly increasing cryptographic complexities, with respect to
computationally unbounded security. We also show that there exist tasks whose cryptographic
complexities are incomparable.
• In contrast, we show that under a standard cryptographic assumption, there exist only two
distinct levels of cryptographic complexity with respect to polynomial-time security. Every task
either has a trivial protocol using plain communication channels, or is complete (i.e., given
access to a secure implementation of this task, there are secure protocols for all other tasks).
This is the first result to derive a characterization of completeness for a class of arbitrary
interactive tasks.
In light of these characterizations, the only tasks which are securely realizable in the demanding
framework of universal composition are those related to secure communication. Indeed, the
framework has been used to define the security of encryption schemes, which has allowed for
modular design and analysis of protocols. We consider a similar approach for homomorphic
encryption schemes. A homomorphic scheme is one in which anyone can obtain an encryption
of f(m1, . . . ,mn), given only the encryptions of unknown messages m1, . . . ,mn, for a specific set of
functions f .
• We give a construction of a homomorphic encryption scheme in which the allowed homomor-
phic operation is as full-featured as possible — namely, one can derive a correctly-distributed
encryption of f(m) given an encryption of unknown message m, for some functions f — yet
it is computationally infeasible to generate a ciphertext that is related to other ciphertexts in
any other way. Our contributions involve developing new appropriate security definitions as
well as new constructions.
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• We show that schemes with such powerful security guarantees can be used to build conceptu-
ally simple, efficient, UC-secure protocols for verifiable computations on encrypted data. We
show protocols for two tasks related to aggregating encrypted data.
v
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
How can several mutually distrusting parties perform a computational task together on the Inter-
net, without compromising the security of their information? This very general question is the focus
of secure multi-party computation (MPC), introduced by Yao [96]. For example, the computational
task in question may be something as simple as implementing a private communication channel in
the presence of an eavesdropper, or evaluating a function on the parties’ combined datasets. Or
the task might be randomized and interactive, like an Internet poker game, to be played without a
trusted dealer.
Security guarantees for MPC protocols are formulated using the real/ideal paradigm, introduced
by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [41]. In this paradigm, we consider a real world in which
parties engage in a protocol (in the presence of an adversary) as well as an ideal world in which
parties simply send their inputs to a trusted party who performs the task on their behalf (also in
the presence of an adversary). For example, in the case of secure communication, the trusted party
simply relays messages to the desired recipient; in the case of evaluating a function, the trusted party
receives inputs, performs the desired computation, and gives outputs to each of the parties; in the
case of a poker game, the trusted party is the dealer who shuffles and deals cards, elicits and verifies
actions from the parties, and determines a winner. We say that the protocol is a secure realization of
the task if the real world is “as secure as” the ideal world; or, more formally, if for every adversary
attacking the real world interaction, there is a corresponding adversary attacking the ideal world
interaction that achieves the same effect. How the details of this definition are specified determines
a concrete model of MPC security.
Note that the behavior of the trusted party (formally defined as an interactive computer program)
completely specifies an MPC task and all of its implicit security guarantees. For instance, implicit in
the function evaluation example is that all parties’ inputs are chosen independently of other parties’
inputs, and that each party learns no more about another party’s input than can be legitimately
inferred from that party’s output. Implicit in the poker example is the requirement that no party can
influence how the cards are dealt, or have an unfair advantage in guessing another player’s cards.
Thus, multi-party computation provides a unified way of modelling many kinds of cryptographic
security requirements.
1.1 Cryptographic Complexity
In this dissertation, we classify MPC tasks using an approach inspired by modern computational com-
plexity theory. Instead of studying the inherent complexity of solving decision problems, we study
the complexity of securely realizing MPC tasks. Like computational complexity, our cryptographic
complexity approach classifies tasks according to two main themes: alternately characterizing com-
plexity classes, and comparing tasks using reductions.
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1.1.1 Understanding a Model via Complexity Classes
Whether a cryptographic task has a secure protocol depends on the precise security model being
considered. For instance, every MPC security model must address the following important questions:
Tasks: Which possible tasks are considered in the model? Can tasks be randomized or must they
be deterministic; general multi-party or only two-party; interactive or only non-reactive (i.e.,
simply evaluating a single function)?
Resource bound: Are adversaries and protocols allowed to have unbounded computational power,
or must they be computationally bounded? In the latter case, probabilistic polynomial time is
usually considered.
Adversarial capabilities: What are adversaries allowed to do? Can they deviate from the protocol
(active corruption) or are they bound to follow it (passive corruption)? Can they choose which
parties to corrupt “on the fly” (adaptive corruption), or must they choose once and for all at
the beginning of the interaction (static corruption)?
Context: In what context is the protocol’s security analyzed? Can the protocol be executed in the
presence of arbitrary other protocols, on possibly correlated inputs (universally composable
(UC) setting); can it be executed only in the presence of other copies of the same protocol
(concurrent self-composition); or can the protocol be executed only in isolation of other
concurrent instances (standalone setting)?
Each concrete security model naturally defines a “complexity class” consisting of the tasks which
have secure protocols in that model (the securely realizable tasks), analogous to how computational
complexity classes consist of the decision problems computable within a particular machine model.
The expressivity and limitations of a security model are better understood by finding alternate
characterizations of its associated complexity class, and by comparing its complexity class with those
of other security models.
Related work. Some of the first results related to the complexity of MPC were to show that in
some security models, all tasks have secure protocols.1 Yao [97] and Goldreich, Micali, and Wigder-
son [41] constructed protocols for every multi-party task, secure against passive, computationally
bounded adversaries, under standard cryptographic assumptions. Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson
also gave protocols for every task secure against active adversaries in the standalone setting. Ben-Or,
Goldwasser, and Wigderson [9] and Chaum, Cre´peau, and Damga˚rd [25] constructed protocols for
every MPC task, secure against unbounded adversaries that are allowed to corrupt a strict minority
of parties. Since secure realizability is a trivial property of tasks in these models, research in these
models has focused more on efficiency than on feasibility.
In security models where not all tasks have secure protocols, there are far fewer complete
characterizations known. Kushilevitz [67] and Beaver [4] independently gave a combinatorial
characterization of the symmetric-output secure function evaluation (SFE) tasks that have perfectly
secure protocols against computationally unbounded, passive adversaries. In the same setting, Chor
1Technically, only well-formed tasks can have secure protocols, in any model. For example, the task of determining which
parties are corrupted is not well-formed. To simplify the exposition in this introduction, we consider only well-formed tasks.
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and Kushilevitz [28] also showed an alternative characterization for the special case of boolean-
output functions.
In the UC framework, Canetti [15] demonstrated in the seminal work on the framework that
not all tasks are securely realizable. Canetti, Kushilevitz, and Lindell [22] showed several broad
impossibility results for many classes of two-party SFE in the framework. For several of these special
classes of SFE tasks, their results provide a complete characterization of realizability. Beyond these
results, there were no complete characterizations known for realizability in the UC setting.
1.1.2 Comparing Tasks via Reductions
In addition to comparing whole classes of tasks, it is often instructive to compare specific individual
tasks. As an example, one might wonder whether bit-commitment is a more sophisticated task than
coin-tossing (these two tasks are defined formally in Section 2.4). We can compare the cryptographic
complexity of individual tasks, just as in computational complexity, by demonstrating a reduction
between the two. The most natural reduction in the context of cryptographic complexity is whether
there is a secure protocol for one task using an ideal black-box (i.e., access to a trusted party) which
securely implements another task.
Reductions also provide a succinct way to understand larger complexity classes, by identifying
complete tasks. A task is complete if all other tasks reduce to it; thus, complete tasks embody the
essence of a complexity class.
As before, the precise reduction depends crucially on the security model enforced on the secure
protocol. A more restrictive security model yields a reduction that can make finer complexity
distinctions among tasks. In this work, we consider two reductions, both defined using the strongest
natural security model available: security in the universal composition framework. We say that F
reduces to G (written F v G) if there is a UC-secure protocol for F which uses access to an ideal
G functionality (or in standard UC parlance, a secure protocol for F in the “G-hybrid” setting). We
obtain two natural reductions of different strengths by considering the UC security requirement
against computationally unbounded and computationally bounded (probabilistic polynomial-time)
adversaries. We refer to these two concrete reductions as vu and vp, respectively. Being based on
a composable security notion, these reductions are both symmetric and transitive, and are therefore
useful tools for comparing complexity.
Related work. Strictly speaking, feasibility results in a security model can be viewed as a reduction
to a base task like a simple communication channel, which is usually provided “for free” in the
model. We call a task trivial if it reduces to the model’s basic communication channel. In some
security models (for example, standalone or passive security against polynomial-time adversaries),
all tasks are trivial (under certain cryptographic hardness assumptions), and thus are all equivalent
under the kind of reduction we consider.
Even in security models with more than one level of complexity, almost all previous work has
focused on the extremes of complexity: namely, identifying trivial tasks and complete tasks. The
related work described in the previous section can be interpreted as classifying the trivial tasks in
several security settings. Intermediate levels of complexity have rarely been considered, apart from
demonstrating that such levels do exist. Furthermore, most of the results on completeness have not
considered a strong reduction based on UC security. One notable exception is Canetti et al. [23], who
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showed that the bit commitment and coin-tossing tasks are complete under thevp reduction. Kidron
and Lindell [60] also showed that the impossibility results of Canetti, Kushilevitz, and Lindell [22]
for secure realizability in the UC model can be extended to show impossibility of a v-reduction to
several natural key-registration tasks.
One of the first tasks observed to be complete against active adversaries (though not in the UC
framework) was oblivious transfer (Section 2.4), as shown by Kilian [61]. Later, Ishai, Prabhakaran,
and Sahai [56] showed that oblivious transfer is also complete under the more demanding vu
reduction. Many other variants of oblivious transfer were studied and found to be equivalent to the
original [32, 14].
Kilian [62, 63] also gave a combinatorial characterization of the two-party SFE tasks that
are complete against computationally unbounded, active adversaries. His result for deterministic
functions was later extended to the vu reduction by Kraschewski and Mu¨ller-Quade [65].
In some security settings, there are only two levels of complexity: the trivial tasks and the
complete tasks. Kilian et al. [64] (building on [62, 68]) showed this to be the case for secure
evaluation of boolean-output, symmetric functions, with respect to unbounded, passive adversaries.
They also show an example of a non-boolean function which is neither complete nor trivial. In the
case of two-party SFE in which only one party receives output, Kilian [62], and also Beimel, Malkin,
and Micali [5], showed that every task is either trivial or complete with respect to unbounded active
adversaries. However, the completeness definition in [5] is unique in not being based on black-
box reductions. Harnik et al. [50] gave a characterization for completeness for the same class of
functions, but against bounded, passive adversaries.
1.2 Our Results
In this dissertation, we present several new results furthering the understanding of cryptographic
complexity for MPC tasks.
1.2.1 Structural Cryptographic Complexity
Universally composable (UC) security [16] is a strong notion in which a protocol can be safely used
regardless of the context (i.e., other protocol instances) in which it executes. It was previously
known [15, 17, 22] that this very strong security requirement precluded secure protocols for most
tasks. However, no complete characterization of UC security was known for any class of tasks apart
from several subclasses of SFE tasks.
In Chapter 3, we give the first alternative characterization of UC security. Intuitively, a task is
securely realizable in the UC setting if and only if it is possible to “synchronize” two independent
instances of the task. Most importantly, the characterization does not rely on any internal properties
or representation of the task; instead, the characterization treats an MPC task as a black box,
and secure realizability is determined based on the task’s input/output behavior. As such, this
characterization is the first in any non-trivial security model (let alone the demanding setting of
UC security) to classify realizability of arbitrary multi-party, interactive tasks. We call this general
characterization a “structural” result since it depends only on the structure of interactions among
parties in the UC framework, and not on the details of the computational model. Indeed, this general
characterization can be specialized to either the computationally unbounded or the probabilistic
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polynomial-time setting.
By applying this characterization, we can re-derive elementary proofs for all previously known
impossibility results in the UC framework, as well as extend these impossibility results to more gen-
eral communication channels. For the special case of 2-party tasks, we give the first characterization
of UC-secure realizability for non-reactive tasks, as well as a completely combinatorial characteriza-
tion for the special case of (deterministic) SFE tasks.
This result is joint work with Manoj Prabhakaran, and appeared in CRYPTO 2008 [84].
1.2.2 Unbounded Cryptographic Complexity
In Chapter 4, we give several new results classifying cryptographic complexity of two-party
symmetric-output secure function evaluation (SSFE), in several different security settings involving
computationally unbounded adversaries. SSFE tasks are the most fundamental class of tasks, having
been studied since the first MPC paper by Yao [96].
A SSFE task is completely specified by a function F : X × Y → Z, where X, Y , and Z are finite
sets. The task is for Alice, who holds input x ∈ X, and Bob, who holds input y ∈ Y , to both obtain
the value F(x, y).
Unifying all of our results for SSFE tasks is a new technical tool for proving the impossibility of
secure realization in a variety of settings. Namely, we show that F is securely realizable in any of
the security settings we consider if and only if a very simple “canonical” protocol for F is secure in
that setting. Thus, we are able to give conceptually simple proofs of impossibility for SSFE tasks
by simply showing an attack against a single canonical protocol that violates security in the desired
setting. More specifically, we give new results for the following security settings:
• Against passive adversaries: Recall that a passive adversary is one that is not allowed to deviate
from the prescribed protocol, but is “curious” and tries to infer as much as possible about the
other party’s input, based on what it sees during the interaction. Although this model has been
studied for over 20 years, no complete characterization of SSFE tasks was known. However,
Beaver [4] and Kushilevitz [67] independently gave a complete combinatorial characterization
of the functions that have a secure protocol in a variant of this model, when the protocol is
required to be error-free. We show that their characterization extends to the more natural case
where the protocol is allowed to have negligible error.
We also show an alternate characterization of this class in terms of the vu reduction. Namely,
an SSFE task F has a secure protocol against passive, unbounded adversaries if and only if
F vu FCOM, where FCOM is the bit-commitment functionality, a natural cryptographic task.
• Against active adversaries in the standalone setting: In this model, adversaries are allowed to
arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed protocol, but the protocol is assumed to execute in iso-
lation of all other protocol instances. We give the first complete combinatorial characterization
of the SSFE tasks with secure protocols in this model.
• Against active adversaries under concurrent self-composition: In this model, we analyze the
protocol in a setting where each party may be participating in several concurrent instances of
the same protocol. Lindell [70] showed that for a large class of tasks (including all SSFE tasks),
security under self-composition implies UC security (security in the presence of arbitrary other
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protocols). We give a simpler and tighter proof of Lindell’s result for the SSFE case. In
particular, we show an optimal result: that security against two concurrent protocol instances
is equivalent to UC security.
Finally, we also use our main technical tool to show that the vu reduction (defined in terms of
UC security against unbounded adversaries) can make very fine distinctions among cryptographic
complexities. We prove a completely combinatorial sufficient condition for SSFE tasks F and G
which implies that F 6vu G, and use it to show the following results:
• There exists an infinite hierarchy of strictly increasing cryptographic complexities. That is,
there is an infinite sequence of tasks G1,G2, . . . such that Gi vu Gj if and only if i ≤ j.
• There exist tasks with incomparable complexities — that is, tasks F and G such that F 6vu G
and G 6vu F .
All previous results relevant to cryptographic complexity (in any security setting) focused on
the extremes of complexity: the securely realizable tasks and the complete tasks. In some settings,
intermediate complexities were identified but not studied in detail. Our new results are the first to
make fine distinctions among these intermediate levels of complexity. Indeed, these distinctions are
visible only using the extremely strong vu reduction, which was never previously studied in great
detail. As we show in Chapter 5, even the slightly weaker vp reduction cannot make any of these
fine complexity distinctions.
Interestingly, one theme underlying our results is to incorporate ideas from the passive security
setting, and apply them to much stricter settings. We show in our main new technical tool that
“canonical” protocols, which are defined very naturally in terms of passive security, also play an
important role in active corruption settings. One of our two results classifying passive security
shows that passive security has a natural characterization in the seemingly unrelated language of UC
security. Finally, we show that if G has a lower round complexity than F against passive adversaries,
then F 6vu G; again, a consequence in a much more demanding security setting.
These results represent joint work with Hemanta Maji and Manoj Prabhakaran, and appeared
in Theory of Computation Conference 2009 [73]. The combinatorial characterizations for passive
security and standalone security were also independently discovered by Ku¨nzler, Mu¨ller-Quade, and
Raub [66], who also extended the characterization to non-symmetric SFE tasks.
1.2.3 Polynomial-Time Cryptographic Complexity
In Chapter 5, we study cryptographic complexity in the setting of computationally bounded (prob-
abilistic polynomial-time) adversaries. In particular, we explore the complexity of MPC tasks under
the vp reduction. As alluded to above, the vp reduction cannot resolve as many fine distinctions
between tasks as the stronger vu reduction.
Any results demonstrating the different resolution strengths of the vp and vu reductions must
necessarily depend on a cryptographic hardness assumption. We show that under a reasonable and
natural hardness assumption, the two reductions are astonishingly different in their power: all of the
diverse cryptographic complexities evident under the vu reduction collapse under the vp reduction.
More formally, there are only two distinct levels of cryptographic complexity: the trivial tasks (those
that have a UC-secure protocol using simple communication channels) and those which are complete
under the vp reduction. We call this result the zero-one law.
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We prove the zero-one law for deterministic, finite, two-party tasks. Importantly, our results are
the first to consider completeness for arbitrary, interactive tasks, in any security setting. We model
such arbitrary tasks as finite automata, and one important technical contribution is to develop new
automata-theoretic tools. In particular, we identify cryptographically non-trivial behaviors of an
arbitrary task, which leads to the first combinatorial characterization of interactive tasks in the UC
framework. However, to show that a task is complete, we also construct new protocols which exploit
the non-trivial behaviors of arbitrary tasks.
Interestingly, the hardness assumption that we consider is not only sufficient but also necessary
for the zero-one law. That is, if the zero-one law holds, then the hardness assumption is also true.
This result is joint work with Hemanta Maji and Manoj Prabhakaran, currently in prepara-
tion [74].
1.2.4 Reconciling Non-Malleability & Homomorphic Encryption
Although most tasks do not have UC-secure protocols, tasks related to secure communication have
proven a useful way to define security for encryption schemes and signature schemes [15, 81, 19].
These definitions in the UC framework are important for motivating the use of standard encryption
schemes and signature schemes as modular components in a larger protocol. In Chapter 6, we
explore this avenue for the case of homomorphic encryption schemes.
In a homomorphic encryption scheme, given encryptions of unknown messages m1, . . . ,mn,
anyone can obtain a “fresh” encryption of f(m1, . . . ,mn) for some functions f , as a feature of the
scheme. Perhaps surprisingly, homomorphic encryption schemes are not frequently used as modular
components in larger protocols, even though they appear well-suited to the task of manipulating
encrypted data. This discrepancy stems from the fact that all existing security definitions for
homomorphic encryption — and indeed, schemes themselves — address only the question of
which homomorphic operations are possible as features; they do not consider preventing additional
homomorphic operations that might be possible as vulnerabilities.
Intuitively, an ideal homomorphic encryption scheme should provide both guarantees: first,
that certain homomorphic operations f are available as features, and second, a guarantee of non-
malleability, that it should be infeasible for an adversary to generate ciphertexts that are related
to other ciphertexts in any way other than the provided features. Previous security definitions for
encryption could not capture such sharp requirements — they either disallowed all homomorphic
features, or left open the possibility for arbitrary homomorphic vulnerabilities.
In this work, we develop new ways to define and achieve such robust security for homomorphic
encryption.
• We give several new security definitions, of both the standard game-based variety and in terms
of MPC tasks defined in the UC framework. We show the equivalence between these two kinds
of definitions, and also show how our new definitions unify all previous definitions of non-
malleability.
• We construct the first public-key encryption schemes satisfying our strong definitions, and
show how such schemes can be used to construct simple, yet UC-secure protocols that involve
computation on encrypted data. Previous comparable protocols that used homomorphic
encryption were forced to employ costly zero-knowledge proofs to prevent adversaries from
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manipulating ciphertexts in undesired ways. However, our new security definitions on the
encryption scheme already limit an adversary’s capabilities in manipulating ciphertexts; thus
our simple protocols can provide security against active adversaries without costly zero-
knowledge proofs.
• We show that a large desirable class of homomorphic operations are impossible to achieve in
any encryption scheme, under our strong security definitions.
These results represent joint work with Manoj Prabhakaran which appeared in CRYPTO 2007 [83],
ICALP 2008 [85], and ASIACRYPT 2008 [86]; and also unpublished joint work with Anna-Lisa
Ferrara and Manoj Prabhakaran.
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CHAPTER 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we present some preliminary notions and definitions. Even readers who are
already familiar with the UC framework may wish to quickly skim our summary of the framework
given below — some of our conventions differ slightly from the original work of Canetti [16]. For
convenience, we have provided in Section 2.2.2 a brief summary of these technical differences. We
recommend reading the subsequent sections, however, which describe important terminology and
notation used throughout this work.
2.1 Basic Notation
We say that a function ν : N → [0, 1] is negligible if ν(k) = k−ω(1); that is, if ν approaches zero
asymptotically faster than any inverse polynomial. We write ν ≈ µ to mean that |ν(k) − µ(k)| is
a negligible function in k. We say that a probability p(k) is overwhelming (in k) if 1 − p(k) is a
negligible function in k (i.e., p ≈ 1).
When X is a finite set, we write x← X to mean that x is chosen uniformly at random from X.
When D1 and D2 are two discrete probability distributions with supports in the set S, we write
∆(D1,D2) to denote the statistical distance between them, defined as:
∆(D1,D2) = 12
∑
x∈S
∣∣∣D1(x)−D2(x)∣∣∣ = max
T⊆S
∑
x∈T
(
D1(x)−D2(x)
)
.
We say that two probability ensembles D = {Dk | k ∈ N} and D′ = {D′k | k ∈ N} are statistically
indistinguishable if ∆(Dk,D′k) is negligible in k. We say that the two ensembles are computationally
indistinguishable if for all polynomial-time algorithms M ,∣∣∣ Pr
x←Dk
[M(x) = 1]− Pr
x←D′k
[M(x) = 1]
∣∣∣ is negligible in k.
2.2 Universal Composition Framework
The Universal Composition (UC) framework was first introduced by Canetti [16] as a realistic model
for analyzing protocols in complex network environments like the Internet. The full details of the
framework are well beyond the scope of this work. We provide a self-contained overview of the
relevant technical details of the model, and refer the reader to [16] for the a complete treatment.
Entities and their interaction. The network is a collection of interactive Turing Machines1 (ITMs),
who communicate with each other by writing on shared communication tapes. For simplicity, we
1The choice of the interactive Turing Machine model is not crucial. One may define an equivalent model using, say, I/O
automata, as in [87].
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assume that communication tapes are write-once, and that all messages written to communication
tapes have unambiguous delimiters, and that ITMs do not take action on a message written to a
communication tape until the message is complete, and that only one machine can write to the tape
at a time.2 We say that a communication tape is linked to two machines in an execution if both have
access to it; i.e., if the two machines can use it to communicate.
We identify 4 different types of entities:
Functionalities model trusted parties in the network. The code of a functionality completely defines
a MPC task (e.g., the functionality may be the dealer in a poker game, or a party that performs
a particular fixed computation on given data).
An n-party functionality has a communication tape for each of the n parties, and a commu-
nication tape for the adversary. The functionality also has an input tape which contains a list
of which of the parties (if any) are corrupt. Sometimes it is convenient to consider function-
alities which also receive a security parameter as input, though we most frequently consider
functionalities which do not.
We call a functionality non-reactive if it simply waits for inputs from each of the parties, then
gives output to one or more of the parties, then stops responding. Otherwise we say that the
functionality is reactive.
Protocols prescribe a way of interacting with a functionality. A protocol ITM has a communication
tape for the environment and another communication tape for a functionality. A protocol also
has an input tape on which it will receive a security parameter and an index (i.e., the identity
of the party).
An important protocol in the framework is the dummy protocol, denoted pidummy. It prescribes
the same behavior for each party, so we do not need to specify the number of parties. pidummy
simply keeps its two communication tapes synchronized; it relays every message appearing on
one communication tape to the other, and vice-versa. In essence, pidummy effects a channel for
the environment and functionality to directly communicate.
Environments model arbitrary contexts in which a protocol might be asked to execute. An
environment has a communication tape for each party, as well as one for the adversary. An
environment also has an input tape and a (without loss of generality) single-bit output tape.
Adversaries model arbitrary deviation from protocols by corrupt parties. In this work, we exclu-
sively consider a setting where corruptions are chosen statically. That is, an adversary is
parameterized by the indices of parties that it wishes to corrupt. An adversary that corrupts
m parties has m + 1 separate communication tapes for communicating with the functionality
(i.e., on behalf of the m corrupt parties and on its own behalf), and a final communication
tape for communicating with the environment. An adversary also has an input tape on which
it receives a security parameter.
An important specific adversary is called the dummy adversary. Like the dummy protocol,
a dummy adversary relays all of its communication with the functionality to/from the envi-
ronment. It expects inputs from the environment to be labeled with the index of one of the
2One may wish to model each communication tape as a pair of tapes, one for each direction of communication, with
appropriate read/write privileges. For simplicity, we consider each communication line to be a single tape.
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adversary’s many communication tapes with the functionality. Similarly, it labels its outputs to
the environment with the index of the communication tape on which it received the message
from the functionality. Alternatively, it is sometimes convenient to consider that the adversary
has m+ 1 communication tapes shared with the environment as well.
Execution. Let Z be an environment, A be an adversary, pi be a protocol, and F be a functionality.
We define EXEC[Z,A, pi,F , k] to be the random variable of the environment Z ’s output when
executing the collection of machines as described above, with security parameter k.
More formally, EXEC[Z,A, pi,F , k] is defined as follows. Each ITM in the system is initialized with
the security parameter on its input tape, where appropriate. The functionality F is initialized with a
list of indices of the parties corrupted by A. For each uncorrupted party, an instance of pi is included
in the system, initialized with the corresponding party’s index. The shared communication tapes
of the ITMs are linked as described above. Finally, the system is executed until the environment
Z writes to its output tape. The environment’s input tape is provided to allow non-uniform
computation to be considered.
We do not formally define the order in which individual ITMs are activated during the execution;
the details are not crucial to our results.
Resource bounds; admissible machines. We consider two different variants of the UC frame-
work, to model computationally unbounded settings and polynomial-time settings. In the un-
bounded setting, the entities defined above are allowed to be arbitrary ITMs; we say that all ITMs
are admissible.
In the probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) setting, defining admissibility is a non-trivial task
whose subtleties are beyond the scope of this work. We adopt the definition given by Hofheinz,
Unruh, and Mu¨ller-Quade [53], which we summarize as follows:
• An environment is admissible if it runs in (a priori) probabilistic polynomial time3 in the
security parameter.
• A functionality F , adversary A, and protocol pi are jointly admissible if, for all admissible
environments Z, the execution considered in EXEC[Z,A, pi,F , k] halts in polynomial time (in
the security parameter k) with overwhelming probability (in the security parameter).
Even though these admissibility requirements seem complicated, we mostly focus on subclasses of
functionalities which perform a constant amount of work in each activation. Thus it is usually quite
easy to see that a particular adversary or protocol is admissible for all such functionalities.
Secure realization. Let pi be a protocol and F and G be functionalities. We say that pi is a secure
realization of F in the G-hybrid setting if for all admissible real-world adversaries A, there exists
another admissible adversary (called a simulator) S such that for all admissible environments Z, we
have
Pr
[
EXEC[Z,A, pi,G, k] = 1] ≈ Pr [EXEC[Z,S, pidummy,F , k] = 1] (2.1)
We refer to the execution involving pi and G as the real world (where parties run the protocol), and
the execution involving pidummy as F as the ideal world.
3That is, there is a fixed polynomial p such that the environment halts after p(k) steps when the security parameter is k
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Intuitively, the environment’s output defines a condition for an adversarial attack. The definition
implies that no adversary can succeed in a given attack against the protocol pi any more than is
possible in the ideal world. Thus, the real world is “as secure as” the ideal world. Since the semantics
of the ideal world are simpler and easy to interpret from the specification of F , security guarantees
of this form are satisfactory.
For simplicity, we often let the security parameter be implicit, and exclude it from our notation.
Then we simply write:
EXEC[Z,A, pi,G] ≈ EXEC[Z,S, pidummy,F ]
as a shorthand for Equation 2.1.
We note that since we consider only static security (the adversary cannot adaptively decide which
parties to corrupt), the security requirement is trivially true for adversaries which corrupt all parties.
The simulator can simply internally run the real-world adversary and ignore the functionality.
Dummy adversary. We note that, without loss of generality, the definition of secure realization
can be restricted to consider only real-world adversaries A which are dummy adversaries. If Z is
some environment and A is not a dummy adversary, then the effect of executing a protocol in the
presence of A and Z can also be achieved by a dummy adversary and an environment that simulates
both A and Z together.
Universal composition. We have the following fundamental result in the UC framework, due to
Canetti:
Theorem 2.1 (Universal Composition [16]). If pi is a secure realization of F in the G-hybrid world,
and ρ is a secure realization of G in the H-hybrid world, then piρ is a secure realization of F in the H-
hybrid world, where piρ is the protocol pi in which each external interface to an instance of G is replaced
with an instance of ρ.
In other words, no matter how pi might interact with G, it is always safe to replace G with its
secure implementation ρ.
2.2.1 Other Security Models as Special Cases
By appropriately restricting the UC security definition, we can achieve other important security
models as special cases:
Standalone security. Call an environment a standalone environment if it does not interact with the
adversary during the execution of the protocol. If in the definition of UC security, we quantify only
over standalone environments, we achieve the standard notion of standalone security. In practical
terms, standalone security means that the simulator is allowed to rewind the adversary, not just
execute the adversary in a straight line.
Security under concurrent self-composition. In the concurrent self-composition setting [70], we
consider the security of protocols in the presence of other concurrent instances of the same protocol
only. A simple way to define this is to slightly modify the model to allow parties to invoke several
instances of the protocol, and then consider only standalone environments (so that the adversary
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does not communicate with the environment while any of the protocol instances are executing). We
further restrict the multiple protocol instances so that each party plays the same role in all instances
(i.e., each time a party invokes a protocol instance, it runs the protocol’s ITM with the same party
index/identity as input).
Although this natural definition of concurrent self-composition requires a slight modification to
the model and security definition (not just a restriction in its quantifiers), we can achieve the same
effect by simply restricting the standard UC security definition to the class of environments which
internally simulate a standalone environment, a concurrent-self-composition adversary, and all but
one of the protocol instances in the self-composition interaction.
Passive security. Call an adversary passive with respect to a protocol pi if during the interaction, it
runs the pi protocol honestly (in the role of the corrupt party) on inputs provided by the environment,
and reports back the protocol outputs to the environment. Note that we allow the adversary
to interact arbitrarily with the environment throughout the execution, although the environment
cannot influence the adversary’s honest execution of pi.
If in the definition of UC security, we quantify over only passive adversaries and simulators, we
achieve the standard definition of passive security. Note that in the ideal world, the simulator must
be passive with respect to the dummy protocol. It is easy to see that without loss of generality, a real-
world passive adversary simply reports its entire internal state (i.e., the adversary’s view: random
tape and transcript of the pi-interaction) to the environment. Then the corresponding simulator must
run the dummy protocol and output a simulated view of the real-world protocol pi.
2.2.2 Differences from Canetti’s Model
The model presented above is conceptually the same as the one originally presented by Canetti in
[16]. However, for technical reasons, we have deviated slightly from that presentation in some
technical respects:
• In addition to the standard definition, we also consider a variant of the UC framework in which
all entities can be computationally unbounded.
• We use the definition of polynomial runtime from Hofheinz, Unruh, and Mu¨ller-Quade [53].
They point out some deficiencies with the definition of polynomial runtime from [16] and
other works, and also carefully reprove a universal composition theorem for their new notion.
• We allow individual entities in the model (protocols, functionalities, environments, adver-
saries) to communicate via completely ideal, synchronous channels. That is, the adversary
cannot directly control delivery of such communication between honest entities, nor is the ad-
versary even notified of such communication. Instead, we suppose that any adversarial control
of the network is specifically modeled within the functionality itself (i.e., it directly interacts
with the adversary each time it intends to deliver an output or process an input); see the
discussion in Section 2.2.4.
• For simplicity, we avoid the use of session- and process-IDs. We assume that the various
instances of system entities can reliably communicate among each other. One exception is
13
that it is often convenient to allow the environment to masquerade as another entity instance
(provided that this masquerade does not conflict with the actual entities in the execution).
We also do not consider the details of how individual ITMs are activated in the execution, the
precise details of which are not crucial to our results.
• We exclusively consider protocols which use only one instance of a functionality. To simulate
the effect of multiple instances, we consider a “wrapper” around a functionality that provides
an interface to several independent sessions; see the following section.
2.2.3 Cryptographic Complexity Notation
In our model, separate instances of the protocol ITM cannot communicate directly with each
other. Indeed, for maximum flexibility, we assume that all communication must be facilitated by
the functionality. We have also made a restriction that there be only one functionality instance
throughout an execution.
It is most natural to allow protocols to use many independent instances of a functionality, and
to provide a dedicated communication channel for the protocol. We define the private channel
functionality FPVT to have the following behavior:
• On input (P,m) from party P ′, generate delayed output (P ′,m) for party P .4
Let F be a functionality. We define F˜ to be its “augmented” version, which simulates access to
independent (asynchronous) instances of F as well as access to an instance of FPVT, as follows:
• Internally simulate independent instances of F and an instance of FPVT. Associate with each
instance of F a unique session ID.
• Upon receiving an input of the form (F , sid, cmd) from party P , begin internally simulating a
fresh instance of F associated with session ID sid unless one already exists. Then hand input
cmd to that instance of F on behalf of party P .
• On input (FPVT, P,m) from P ′, give output (FPVT, P ′,m) to party P .
• Whenever an instance sid of F produces an output m for party P , deliver output (F , sid,m)
to party P .
Definition 2.2. When F is securely realizable in the G-hybrid setting, we write F vstrict G. When F
is securely realizable in the G˜-hybrid setting, we write F v G.
Thus F vstrict G means that F can be securely realized via a protocol that uses access to a single
instance of G, and without any additional communication channels. F v G means that F can be
securely realized via a protocol that uses access to any number of instances of G, and also access to
FPVT. The v relation is transitive, by the universal composition theorem.
We superscript the v and vstrict relations with either u or p (i.e., vu, vp) when referring
specifically to the unbounded or PPT settings, respectively. We use the bare notations v and vstrict
in results that apply to both settings (including when constructing secure protocols).
4Delayed outputs are defined later in Section 2.2.4.
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2.2.4 Asynchronous Output Delivery & Non-Trivial Protocols
In our model of UC security, the communication between an honest party and the functionality is
completely ideal: private (from the adversary) and instantaneous. In this way, the UC framework
can be used to model important requirements like fairness (namely, that it is not possible for one
party to learn its output without the other party also learning its own output).
However, it is most common to consider communication that is asynchronous, and under the
control of the adversary. Following [16], we use a standard idiom for defining asynchronous delivery
in the description of a functionality. When we say that a functionality generates a delayed output m
for party P , we mean the following:
1. The functionality internally maintains a queue of outputs for every party P . The message m is
entered into the queue at this time.
2. The functionality sends (OUTPUT, P ) to the adversary at this time.
3. Later, whenever receiving an input of the form (DELIVER, P ′) from the adversary, the function-
ality removes the first message in the queue for P ′, and if such a message exists, immediately
writes it to the communication tape of P ′.
We assume that the functionality’s other communication with the adversary does not conflict with
messages of the form (OUTPUT, P ) and (DELIVER, P ). Delayed outputs model a network in which the
adversary has total control over timings, but does not get to see the contents of the communications.
A functionality whose outputs are all delayed provides no guarantee that honest parties will ever
receive any output. Consequently, the protocol which does nothing is a secure realization of any
such functionality. To avoid this undesirable breakdown of the security definition, Canetti et al. [23]
defined the following refinement of secure realization:
Definition 2.3 (Non-trivial protocols). Suppose pi is a secure realization of F in the G-hybrid world.
We say that pi is a non-trivial realization, and write F vnt G, if for every real-world adversary that
corrupts no one and eventually delivers all delayed outputs of G, the corresponding simulator also
eventually delivers all delayed outputs in F .
In a non-trivial protocol, it is still possible that a party does not receive output. However, non-
triviality implies that a party receives no output only when the ideal functionality does not specify an
output, or when the adversary interferes (either by corrupting a party or by refusing to deliver some
messages of the protocol). Note that a corresponding universal composition theorem immediately
holds for non-trivial protocols. Again, we superscript the relation as vunt and vpnt when referring
specifically to the unbounded or PPT setting, respectively.
2.3 Two-Party Functionalities
We highlight two special classes of 2-party functionalities that are relevant for this work. In the
two-party setting, we refer to the parties by their traditional names Alice and Bob.
2.3.1 Secure Function Evaluation
Most works studying MPC have been restricted to the special class of functionalities called secure
function evaluation functionalities, also sometimes called non-reactive functionalities.
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Definition 2.4 (Secure Function Evaluation). A 2-party functionality F is a (deterministic) secure
function evaluation (SFE) functionality if it behaves as follows, for some pair of functions fA, fB :
X × Y → Z, where X, Y , and Z are finite sets:
1. Wait for input x ∈ X from Alice and input y ∈ Y from Bob.
2. When both x and y have been received, send delayed output fA(x, y) to Alice and delayed output
fB(x, y) to Bob.
We often abuse notation slightly and identify F itself with the pair of functions (fA, fB). We note
that F is deterministic and provides only one evaluation of its function. Furthermore, F provides
no fairness guarantee – because of the delayed outputs, an adversary who corrupts a party may
learn its own output and never deliver the other party’s output, so our definition does not provide a
guarantee of fairness.
We restrict our attention to finite functions. One might also consider functions whose complexity
(including input and output domains) depends on the global security parameter. When this is the
case, we state it explicitly.
When fA = fB , we say that the corresponding SFE functionality has symmetric output (SSFE).
The case where one of {fA, fB} is a constant function is (somewhat unfortunately) often called
asymmetric SFE throughout the literature. We instead refer to this class of SFE functionalities as
one-sided output SFE.
We can specify a symmetric-output SFE functionality by its function table. The table is a matrix
with each row associated with an input for Alice and each column associated with an input for Bob.
Each entry in the table specifies the function’s output on the corresponding pair of inputs. The labels
of the inputs themselves are not important, so the functionality is completely specified by its table.
For example, the boolean XOR functionality can be written as 0 11 0 , and the boolean AND functionality
can be written as 0 00 1 .
Definition 2.5 (Redundant Inputs). Let F = (fA, fB) be a 2-party SFE functionality. We say that x is
a redundant input for Alice if there exists x′ 6= x such that:
fA(x, y) 6= fA(x, y′)⇒ fA(x′, y) 6= fA(x′, y′) and fB(x, ·) ≡ fB(x′, ·).
That is, by changing her input from x to x′, Alice learns no less about Bob’s input, but Bob’s output is
unaffected. We define redundancy for Bob’s inputs symmetrically.
It is easy to see that if x is a redundant input, then any ideal-world adversary can be made to
never supply input x to F , without loss of generality.
Definition 2.6 (Function Isomorphism). Let F = (fA, fB) and G = (gA, gB) be 2-party SFE
functionalities. We say that F and G are isomorphic if G can be obtained from F via repeated
applications of the following operations:
• Adding or removing a redundant input (for either party),
• Permuting a party’s input domain,
• Consistently re-labeling the outputs of fA(x, ·) for any x, or of fB(·, y) for any y,
• Reversing the roles of Alice and Bob.
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In the above definition, we say that f is a consistent re-labeling of g if f(z) 6= f(z′) ⇔ g(z) 6=
g(z′); that is, if the outputs have simply been renamed. For example, the symmetric-output XOR
functionality 0 11 0 is a consistent re-labeling of the functionality
1 2
3 4 ; thus the two are isomorphic.
It is easy to see that if F and G are isomorphic, then F and G are equivalent under vp and
vu reductions. Thus without loss of generality, we usually consider only functions that are free of
redundant inputs.
2.3.2 Deterministic Finite-Memory Functionalities
In addition to SFE functionalities, we also deal extensively with reactive functionalities. The
following special class of reactive functionalities plays an important role in our results:
Definition 2.7. A deterministic finite functionality (DFF) is a tuple F = (Q,X, Y, δ, fA, fB , q0), where
• Q is a finite set of states,
• X and Y are finite input sets,
• δ : Q×X × Y → Q is the (partial) state transition function,
• fA, fB : Q×X × Y → {0, 1}∗ are two output functions, and
• q0 ∈ Q is the start state.
The behavior of F as an ideal functionality is as follows:
1. Set variable q to be the initial state q0. Then repeatedly do:
2. Wait for input x ∈ X from Alice and input y ∈ Y from Bob. If δ(q, x, y) is undefined, then simply
stop responding.
3. Send delayed output fA(q, x, y) to Alice and delayed output fB(q, x, y) to Bob.
4. Update variable q ← δ(q, x, y) and repeat from step (2).
For simplicity, we often use the above standard variable names (Q, X, Y , δ, fA, fB , q0) when the
context of F is clear.
It is easy to see that SFE functionalities are special class of DFFs. We point out that in the most
general terms, a functionality need not execute in a sequence of rounds that consist of inputs from
both parties and outputs to both parties. The UC framework allows for more arbitrary functionalities
that take inputs and give outputs without restriction. However, to the best of our knowledge, no
finite-memory reactive functionalities considered in the literature require more generality than our
DFF definition. Also, the constructions in [41, 23] of protocols for arbitrary reactive functionalities
explicitly model functionalities as having “rounds” of interaction as in a DFF.
We also note that even though a DFF induces a kind of synchronous delivery of inputs from
the parties and outputs to the parties, we still consider DFFs within the standard (asynchronous)
communication model. That is, the inputs and outputs are delivered asynchronously between the
functionality and parties; the functionality simply chooses to wait until receiving input from both
parties, and to give outputs to both parties in the same activation.
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2.4 Important Functionalities
For reference, we include here formal definitions of some commonly used ideal functionalities in the
UC framework.
Private channels, FPVT. We have already mentioned the private channel functionality above, but
repeat it here (in its delayed-output formulation), in Figure 2.1.
On input (P,m) from party P ′, give delayed output (P ′,m) to party P .
Figure 2.1: Private channel functionality FPVT.
Oblivious transfer, FOT. Oblivious transfer was first introduced Rabin [88] as a generalization of a
noisy communication channel. It is known to be a complete functionality in many settings [61, 56],
and there are many equivalent variants [14, 32]. Throughout this work we will use the standard
1-out-of-2 oblivious bit transfer, defined in Figure 2.2.
On input (x0, x1) ∈ {0, 1}2 from Alice, and input b ∈ {0, 1} from Bob, give delayed output xb to
Bob, and delayed output ⊥ to Alice.
Figure 2.2: Oblivious transfer functionality FOT.
Commitment, FCOM. The commitment functionality is the cryptographic equivalent of a locked
box, and is defined in Figure 2.3. The sender gives an input to the functionality, which is stored and
not revealed to the receiver until the sender instructs. Once the input is given to the functionality,
the sender cannot change it.
We have defined FCOM to be parameterized by a domain of m-bit strings. However, it is easy to
see that m copies of 1-bit FCOM can be used in parallel to securely realize a single m-bit FCOM. Thus
when showing a protocol for FCOM, it suffices to show a protocol for the single-bit case.
The functionality is parameterized by an integer m > 0.
1. On input (COMMIT, x) from Alice, where x ∈ {0, 1}m, and no value x has yet been recorded,
internally record x and send delayed output (COMMITTED,m) to Bob.
2. On input REVEAL from Alice, if a value x has been internally recorded, send delayed output
(REVEAL, x) to Bob.
Figure 2.3: Commitment functionality FCOM.
Coin-tossing, FCOIN. The coin-tossing functionality samples a fair coin and gives it to both parties
(Figure 2.4).
After receiving input OK from both Alice and Bob, randomly sample a fair coin r ← {0, 1} and
send delayed output r to both Alice and Bob.
Figure 2.4: Coin-tossing functionality FCOIN.
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CHAPTER 3
Structural Cryptographic Complexity
3.1 Overview
The Universal Composition (UC) framework [16] is the most realistic framework for modelling
security of protocols in the presence of malicious adversaries and complex networked contexts like
the Internet. UC security for a protocol implies that the protocol may be safely used in any context.
It is known that the strong requirement of UC security implies that most functionalities do not
have UC-secure protocols, if only simple communication channels are provided for the protocol
(i.e., no additional setup assumption). Canetti and Fischlin [17] showed that the commitment
functionality FCOM is not securely realizable. Canetti, Kushilevitz, and Lindell [22] proved that most
2-party SFE functionalities are also not securely realizable.
The common theme in both of these impossibility results is that the simulator has no advantage
when the protocol uses only a simple communication channel. More formally, any information about
Alice’s input that a simulator can compute by interacting with a passively corrupt Alice could also be
computed by a corrupt Bob interacting in the protocol with an honest Alice. Thus, if the definition
of a functionality requires the simulator to extract more information from Alice than is legitimate
for Bob to learn in the ideal interaction, then that functionality is not securely realizable.
3.1.1 Our Results
In this chapter, we develop and apply a new technical framework called splittability which greatly
generalizes these previous impossibility results in the UC framework. First, splittability provides a
complete characterization of secure realizability, instead of just being useful as a necessary condition
as in the previous results. Next, our new techniques apply to completely arbitrary functionalities,
even multi-party, randomized, and reactive functionalities. Indeed, any functionality which can be
expressed in the UC model can be considered in our framework. Furthermore, our results apply
uniformly to the PPT and computationally unbounded settings. Finally, while the previous works
considered protocols that used only authenticated private channels, we model the communication
channel itself as an arbitrary functionality.
Splittability. We first motivate the definitions of splittability in the simpler setting for 2-party
functionalities of a certain form, which we present in Section 3.2. We say that a 2-party functionality
F is splittable if, informally, there is a way to synchronize two independent instances of F (by
interacting as Alice in one instance and Bob in the other instance) so that together they behave as a
single instance of F . We express this requirement formally in the language of the UC framework by
demanding that no environment can distinguish between a single instance ofF and two independent
instances synchronized in this way.
Our more general definition is as follows. Let F and G be two (m-party) functionalities. We view
G as a potential “communication channel” for a protocol, and say that F is splittable with respect
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to G (written F ≺ G) if no environment can distinguish between a single instance of F and many
independent instances of F appropriately synchronized, where the synchronization must take place
across the channel G. Like our formulation of the UC framework itself, this definition is general and
can be specialized to either the PPT or computationally unbounded setting. Likewise, our results
involving splittability apply uniformly to both computational settings.
Our main technical result is that splittability characterizes secure realizability, for a large class of
channels G. In particular, call a channel G self-splittable if G ≺ G. We motivate self-splittability as
follows. A private channel between Alice and Bob can freely be replaced by private channels between
Alice and Eve, and Eve and Bob, if Eve honestly relays messages. Similarly, the self-splittability
condition implies that a “direct” channel can be decomposed into several “hops” on the same kind
of channel, given the appropriate routing/synchronization. Self-splittable channels are exactly those
for which we characterize secure realizability. More formally, we prove:
Theorem. G is self-splittable if and only if for all F , F vstrict G ⇔ F ≺ G.
Interestingly, the proof of this theorem explicitly reflects the intuition that these natural commu-
nication channels “give no advantage” to a simulator. We use the fact that F ≺ G to construct a
protocol for F whose simulator faithfully simulates an honest instance of G. Thus, we suggest that
self-splittability is a useful formalization of the intuitive requirement of being a “natural” communi-
cation channel.
Our characterization can accommodate functionalities F which interact directly with the adver-
sary. However, when considering functionalities that utilize delayed outputs, we generally restrict
our attention to non-trivial protocols. Recall that a non-trivial protocol provides some guarantee that
delayed outputs will eventually be delivered, provided that the adversary does not interfere with the
protocol execution. Since splittability does not directly imply any such guarantee, we define an
analogous condition for non-trivial splittability. Then we prove an analog of Theorem 3.13, showing
that non-trivial splittability characterizes non-trivial realizability.
Impossibility results. In Section 3.4, we show several applications of splittability to demonstrate
its power. Our first result is to re-derive and extend the impossibility results of Canetti and Fischlin
[16, 17]:
Theorem. There is no non-trivial UC-secure realization for the coin-tossing, commitment, or oblivious
transfer functionalities, using any self-splittable communication channel (in the PPT or unbounded
settings).
Furthermore, there is no UC-secure realization of zero-knowledge proofs for any language in
NP \ BPP, using any self-splittable communication channel, in the PPT setting.
It is easy to use splittability to show the impossibility of securely realizing a functionality, with
respect to all self-splittable channels. These proofs all follow the same general outline of showing
that the given functionality F is not splittable with respect to any channel G. The splittability
definition requires that two instances of F be synchronizable so that they act indistinguishably
from a single instance of F . However, since this statement involves reasoning about only ideal
functionalities, we can easily apply the security properties of the ideal functionality and show that
such a synchronization must fail. For instance, any two independent instances of the coin-tossing
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functionality FCOIN will output differing bits with probability 1/2 by definition, so they cannot be
synchronized to behave like a single instance (which always outputs the same bit to both parties).
We can also easily re-derive and extend the impossibility results of Kidron and Lindell [60].
They generalized the impossibility results from Canetti, Kushilevitz, and Lindell [22], by consid-
ering protocols which used private channels as well as access to various key-registration “set-up”
functionalities. We can subsume their results by simply observing that the set-up functionalities they
consider are all self-splittable.
Characterization of non-reactive functionalities. We use splittability to complete the partial
characterization of 2-party non-reactive functionalities initiated by Canetti, Kushilevitz, and Lin-
dell [22]. We give a complete characterization of secure realizability for this class of function-
alities, which includes randomized functionalities and functionalities whose behavior (including
input/output domain) depends on the global security parameter.
For the special case of SFE functionalities (non-reactive functionalities which are deterministic
and whose behavior does not depend on the security parameter), we obtain the following simple
combinatorial characterization:
Theorem. Let F be a 2-party SFE functionality. Then F vnt FPVT if and only if F is isomorphic to a
function of the form F(x, y) = x. Furthermore, if F is not isomorphic to such a function, then F 6vnt G
for any self-splittable channel G.
Thus, only the absolute simplest SFE functionalities are UC-securely realizable. Again, the proof
of this characterization crucially uses splittability.
Results for multi-party functionalities. We use the 2-party characterization and a well-known
partitioning argument to derive some necessary conditions for multi-party SFE functionalities.
Namely, if F is a securely realizable m-party SFE functionality, then all of its 2-party restrictions
(SFE functionalities obtained by partitioning {1, . . . ,m} into A ∪ B, and collapsing the parties in
each part into a single party) are also securely realizable. From this, we can see that every such
multi-party SFE functionality has one of the following two forms: a party’s output depends only on
that party’s input, for all but one of the parties; or, a party’s input influences only that party’s output,
for all but one of the parties.
We do not know whether this necessary condition is also sufficient for secure realizability. As a
step towards resolving this question, we show that for a special class of 3-party functionalities, this
partitioning argument is both necessary and sufficient.
3.2 Splittability of Regular 2-Party Functionalities
For expositional clarity, first we present a special case of our splittability definitions and results,
which nonetheless captures the essential intuition of our more general results. The simplified case
involves functionalities of the following special form.
Definition 3.1 (Regular functionalities). We say that a functionality F is regular if it does not directly
interact with the adversary (when no parties are corrupted), and its behavior does not depend on which
parties are corrupted.
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More formally, F is regular if its transition function is insensitive to the contents of its corruption
input tape and its communication tape with the adversary, and it never writes to its communication
tape with the adversary.
We now develop the theory of splittability for the special case of regular 2-party functionalities.
Splittability will provide a complete characterization of secure realizability for these functionalities.
Note that this class of functionalities includes even randomized and reactive functionalities, and
captures many functionalities of practical interest, though it does not yet allow us to consider
functionalities that give delayed outputs.
We first define a specific kind of “compound” functionality, which internally simulates the
interaction among several ITMs. This approach of considering such compound entities is used
throughout our more general splittability characterization as well.
Definition 3.2. Let F be a regular 2-party functionality and T be an ITM with two communication
tapes. Define FTSPLIT as the compound functionality that does the following (See Figure 3.1):
FTSPLIT internally simulates an instance of T and two independent instances of F , which we call FL
and FR. The functionality FTSPLIT is a 2-party functionality, and thus has two external communication
tapes, associated with parties 1 and 2.1 We link the external party-1 tape with the party-1 tape of FL,
and the external party-2 tape with the party-2 tape of FR. The other communication tapes of FL and
FR are linked to the two communication tapes of T , respectively.
F
Z
FL FR
T
Z
F functionality FTSPLIT functionality
Figure 3.1: 2-party splittability (for regular 2-party F). The shaded box shows FTSPLIT.
Intuitively, FTSPLIT defines an interaction in which T is playing as a man-in-the-middle between
two instances of F . We define splittability of F in terms of FTSPLIT.
Definition 3.3. Let F be a regular 2-party functionality. We say that F is splittable if there exists
an ITM T such that FTSPLIT is admissible and indistinguishable from F . That is, for all admissible
environments Z, we have EXEC[Z,A0, pidummy,F ] ≈ EXEC[Z,A0, pidummy,FTSPLIT], where A0 is the
dummy adversary that corrupts no one.
We call T the translator corresponding to this splitting of F .
In other words, F is splittable if there is a way to synchronize the two independent instances of
F (i.e., construct a strategy for T ) so that the two instances behave together as a single instance
(i.e., are indistinguishable from a single copy of F).
Our main result is that splittability completely characterizes realizability, though on a stronger
communication channel.
1For uniformity with the subsequent sections, which deal with multi-party functionalities, we do not refer to the two
parties as Alice in Bob in this section.
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Theorem 3.4. Let F∗PVT be the 2-party private channel functionality FPVT, except without delayed
outputs. That is, messages are delivered immediately, and F∗PVT does not interact with the adversary.
Let F be a regular 2-party functionality. Then F v F∗PVT if and only if F is splittable.
The restriction to F∗PVT is natural, and in keeping with our consideration of regular functionalities
in this section. Since regular functionalities do not interact with the adversary, an adversary who
corrupts no one gets no information about the honest parties’ outputs. Thus regular functionalities
cannot be securely realized on FPVT, in which the adversary learns (at least) if and when the parties
are communicating.
Since the definition of splittability can be specialized for either the unbounded or the PPT setting,
the above theorem should be interpreted with vu in the unbounded setting, and vp in the PPT
setting (with the appropriate notion of admissibility substituted into the theorem statement).
To prove the theorem, we first make the following simple but useful observation:
Observation 3.5. Let D be a “dummy” ITM with two communication tapes, meaning that it does
nothing but copy every new message from one tape to the other. In any execution involving two ITMs
M1 and M2 with a shared communication tape, an identical outcome is achieved by executing M1,
M2, and an instance of D, where M1 and D share a communication tape, and M2 and D share a
communication tape.
The standard dummy adversary is such a machine D, but note that so is F∗PVT. In fact, it is for
this reason that F∗PVT has a special status in our results.
Proof (of Theorem 3.4). (⇒) Suppose pi is a secure protocol for F in the F∗PVT-hybrid setting, where
SX is the simulator for the dummy adversary which leaves parties X ⊆ {1, 2} uncorrupted.
Take any environment Z and consider an ideal-world execution defined by EXEC[Z,A0, pi,F∗PVT],
where A0 is the dummy adversary that corrupts no one. Since F∗PVT is regular, it does not
communicate with A0. Since communicating with the functionality is the only role of such a dummy
adversary, we can assume without loss of generality that Z does not communicate with A0.
By the security of pi, this execution is indistinguishable from EXEC[Z,S{1,2}, pidummy,F ]. Again,
since F is regular, S{1,2} does not communicate with F ; nor does it communicate with Z, so without
loss of generality S{1,2} = A0. Thus we have
EXEC[Z,A0, pi,F∗PVT] ≈ EXEC[Z,A0, pidummy,F ].
To complete the proof, it suffices to construct T such that FTSPLIT is admissible and
EXEC[Z,A0, pi,F∗PVT] ≈ EXEC[Z,A0, pidummy,FTSPLIT].
Let Z ′ be the environment that internally simulates Z and the instance of pi executed by party
1. Environment Z ′ uses the external communication tape of pi (designed for communicating with
the functionality) as its communication tape for communicating with an adversary. Let A′ be the
dummy adversary that corrupts party 1 alone. Then
EXEC[Z,A0, pi,F∗PVT] = EXEC[Z ′,A′, pi,F∗PVT],
since in the latter execution, we have simply re-packaged the ITMs, moving party 1 inside the
environment, and replaced a single communication tape with a dummy adversary. By the security
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Figure 3.2: Steps in the proof of Theorem 3.4. Instances of F∗PVT drawn as double arrows.
of pi, we have
EXEC[Z ′,A′, pi,F∗PVT] ≈ EXEC[Z ′,S{2}, pidummy,F ].
Now let us consider an environment Z ′′ which does the following: It internally simulates instances of
Z, S{2}, F , and party 2 executing pidummy. The communication tapes of these instances are linked in
the natural way. The two unlinked communication tapes are: the environment-side communication
tape of S{2}, which Z ′′ uses as its tape for communicating with the adversary; and the party-1
communication tape of Z, which Z ′′ uses for the same purpose. If A′′ is the dummy adversary
which corrupts party 2 alone, then we have
EXEC[Z ′,S{2}, pidummy,F ] = EXEC[Z ′′,A′′, pi,F∗PVT].
As before, the executions are identical except that several ITMs have been re-packaged into the
environment, and a dummy adversary and F∗PVT have replaced a single communication tape.
Again, by the security of pi, we have:
EXEC[Z ′′,A′′, pi,F∗PVT] ≈ EXEC[Z ′′,S{1}, pidummy,F ].
We finally define T as an ITM which internally simulates instances of S{1} and S{2}, linking their
environment-side communication tapes together. T uses the remaining communication tape of S{1}
as its communication tape for FL, and the remaining tape of S{2} as the communication tape for
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FR. Then we finally have that
EXEC[Z ′′,S{1}, pidummy,F ] = EXEC[Z,A0, pidummy,FTSPLIT],
since the latter execution is simply a re-packaging of the former.
Admissibility: We must show that FTSPLIT is an admissible functionality. Admissibility is trivial in
the unbounded setting. In this proof, we have applied the security of pi against dummy adversaries
only, which are always admissible in the PPT setting. By the security of pi, substituting an ideal
interaction involving the simulator for a real-world interaction involving an admissible adversary
preserves the property that the entire system’s execution is polynomial-time with overwhelming
probability. The other steps in the proof involve only repackagings, so indistinguishability holds,
and the running time of the execution is not affected. Thus, the final interaction involving FTSPLIT
executes in polynomial time with overwhelming probability. Since the environment Z was arbitrary,
we have that FTSPLIT is admissible, as desired.
(⇐) Suppose F is splittable using translator ITM T ; then the following is a secure protocol for
F (see Figure 3.3) in the F∗PVT-hybrid setting:
pi1 pi2
F F
T
Z
Figure 3.3: Secure protocol (in the
F∗PVT-hybrid setting) for a splittable
functionality F . Instance of F∗PVT de-
noted by a double arrow.
• Party 1 internally simulates instances of FL and T , with linked communication tape as in the
splittability definition. He treats the unlinked communication tape of FL as his environment-
side communication tape, and the unlinked communication tape of T as his functionality-side
communication tape.
• Party 2 simply runs FR, interpreting its party-1-side tape as the protocol’s functionality-side
tape, and its party-2-side tape as the protocol’s environment-side tape.
It is easy to see that when neither party is corrupt, the execution of this protocol over F∗PVT is
simply a re-packaging of EXEC[Z,A0, pidummy,FTSPLIT]. As such, it is indistinguishable from the ideal
world by the guarantee of splittability.
The simulators for corrupt parties are quite simple: For a dummy adversary that corrupts party 1,
the simulator is also a dummy adversary; for a dummy adversary that corrupts party 2, the simulator
is T itself. It is easy to see that in both of these cases, the simulation is perfect since the ideal world
is a repackaging of the real world.
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3.3 General Theory of Splittability
Protocols in the UC framework are generally modeled to use less idealized channels than the one
considered in the previous section (F∗PVT). For instance, even the standard model of a private channel
reveals to the adversary the fact that a message was sent, and typically its length. The UC framework
also allows one to define functionalities which interact directly with the adversary, or whose behavior
depends on which parties are corrupted. Indeed, this flexibility is often useful in obtaining correct
definitions of functionalities.
In this section, we generalize the theory to apply to secure realizability of completely arbitrary
functionalities, considering completely arbitrary functionalities as the “communication channel” for
the protocol. Furthermore, our theory extends to multi-party (instead of only 2-party) functionali-
ties.
3.3.1 Notational Conventions
In our proofs relating to splittability, we will often construct and manipulate “compound” ITMs which
simulate other ITMs and their communication. In this section, we develop a convenient notation for
reasoning about such compound ITMs, which allows for simple symbolic manipulation. Using this
notation, we can carry out the proof at a reasonably high level.
Let F be an m-party functionality. F has communication tapes for the parties {1, . . . ,m}, as well
as one for the adversary. By convention, we consider the adversary to be the (m + 1)th party to
the functionality. If X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} are the indices of uncorrupted parties in some execution, then
we denote by X = {1, . . . ,m+ 1} \X the indices of the corrupted parties (always containing party
m+ 1).
We use labeled arrows to denote different sets of communication tapes for the ITMs in our
system. For instance, an expression of the form “ a←→ M b←→” will denote an ITM M with its set of
communication tapes partitioned into two sets, labeled by a and b. In our notation, the left-to-right
ordering is significant, and the labels will be arranged so that if ITMM1 has communication tapes
“ a←→” to its right, andM2 has communication tapes “ a←→” to its left, then it will be natural for these
tapes to be linked, allowingM1 andM2 to communicate.
• If F is an m-party functionality, then it has m + 1 communication tapes. For X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m},
we write X:←→ F :X←→ to denote F as initialized in the case where the adversary corrupts parties
with indices X. The arrow “ X:←→” denotes the set of communication tapes for parties indexed
by X; likewise, the arrow “ :X←→” denotes the communication tapes for parties indexed by X.
Thus in our notation, a functionality will always communicate with honest parties to its left
and corrupt parties to its right. The colons in our notation are important to distinguish the
“parity” of communication tapes. More concretely, the colon will always be “in the direction
of” the functionality (or away from the environment). Thus, in N X:←→ M, the ITM M is
expecting to interact externally with parties indexed by X, and N is interacting in the role of
those parties.
• A protocol ITM pi has two communication tapes, one intended for the environment and one
intended for the functionality. We write i:←→ pi i:←→ to denote the protocol initialized with
party index i. The arrow on the left is associated with the protocol’s environment-side
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communication tape, and the arrow on the right with its functionality-side communication
tape. This keeps with our convention of the “:” symbol pointing away from the environment
and towards the functionality.
• An adversary/simulator S has communication tapes intended for the environment and for
the functionality. Let X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. Then we write :X←→ S :X←→ to denote an adversary who
corrupts the parties indexed byX. On the left are its communication tapes for the functionality,
and on the right are its communication tapes for the environment. Note that this follows our
convention of a functionality interacting with corrupt parties on its right side.
• Finally, in our definition of splittability, we introduce a new type of ITM called a translator.
We write :X←→ T X:←→ to denote a translator T . It will have communication tapes on the left
indexed by a set of corrupt parties X, and communication tapes on the right indexed by the
complementary set X.
Compound ITMs. These notational conventions allow us to express compositions and of several
ITMs in the following ways:
• When we have two ITMs a←→ M1 b←→ and b←→ M2 c←→ whose labels b match completely (both
their set of indices and their “parity”), we may write a←→M1 b←→M2 c←→ to denote the natural
“compound” ITM which internally simulates both M1 and M2, linking the communication
tapes labeled by b. The compound ITM leaves the remaining communication tapes (labeled by
a and c) unlinked.
• Let X = {1, . . . , k} without loss of generality, and let b be any label in our notation. When we
have ITMs X:←→M b←→ and { i:←→ pi i:←→| i ∈ X}, we may write:
X:←→

1:←→ pi 1:←→
...
k:←→ pi k:←→
 X:←→M b←→
to denote the compound ITM which internally simulatesM and k instances of pi, and links the
corresponding communication tapes.
Any (possibly compound) ITM M of the form X:←→ M :X←→ has an interface like that of a
functionality, and we interpret the ITM as such. We say that two (compound) functionalities
X:←→ F1 :X←→ and X:←→ F2 :X←→ are indistinguishable if for all environments Z,
EXEC[Z,AX , pidummy,F1] ≈ EXEC[Z,AX , pidummy,F2],
where AX is the dummy adversary that corrupts parties indexed by X, and pidummy is the dummy
protocol. As a shorthand for this definition, we write simply:
X:←→ F1 :X←→ ≈ X:←→ F2 :X←→ .
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Secure realizability in our notation. We can now rephrase the UC security definition in terms of
our notation. Let F be an m-party functionality. We say that pi is a strict secure realization of F in
the G-hybrid setting (that is, F vstrict G) if for all X = {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, there exists a
simulator SX such that the following two compound functionalities are indistinguishable:
X:←→

x1:←−→ pi x1:←−→
...
xk:←−→ pi xk:←−→
 X:←→ G :X←→ ≈ X:←→ F :X←→ SX :X←→ .
Note that we do not need to explicitly mention the dummy protocol. In the traditional definition,
the simulator SX corresponds to the simulator for the dummy adversary that corrupts X.
Repackaging and rewriting. Finally, we observe the following rewriting rule, which generalizes
the technique used in the proof of Theorem 3.4 of repackaging component ITMs into and out of the
environment:
Lemma 3.6. If functionalities X:←→M1 :X←→ and X:←→M2 :X←→ are indistinguishable, then also
Y :←→ML X:←→M1 :X←→MR :Y←→ ≈ Y :←→ML X:←→M2 :X←→MR :Y←→,
for any Y ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} and any admissible (possibly compound) ITMsML andMR.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary environment Z interacting with Y :←→ML X:←→M1 :X←→MR :Y←→.
Let Z ′ denote an environment which internally simulates instances of Z, ML and MR, with
communication tapes linked as they are in the above interaction.2 Clearly, the original execution is
identical to Z ′ interacting with X:←→M1 :X←→.
We may apply the indistinguishability of M1 and M2 with respect to this environment Z ′, so
that Z ′ interacting withM2 is an indistinguishable execution from the original. Finally, it does not
affect the execution to repackage ML and MR outside of the environment, which corresponds to
the original environment Z interacting with Y :←→ML X:←→M2 :X←→MR :Y←→.
3.3.2 General Splittability
Definition 3.7. We say that an m-party functionality F is splittable with respect to another m-
party functionality G if there exist translator ITMs {TX | X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}} such that for every
X = {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, the following two compound functionalities are indistinguishable:
X:←→ F :X←→ TX X:←→ G :X←→ ≈ X:←→

x1:←−→ F :x1←−→ Tx1 x1:←−→
...
xk:←−→ F :xk←−→ Txk xk:←−→
 X:←→ G :X←→ .
When this is the case, we write F ≺ G.
2According to the definition of admissible machines, the composition of these machines with the environment machine is
itself admissible.
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Intuitively, an instance of F interacting with honest parties indexed by X may be “split” into
separate independent instances of F , one for each of the honest parties. The translator ITMs, which
can communicate only via G, must synchronize all of the instances of F so that they behave as a
single instance.
As with all of our results in this chapter, splittability can be specialized to either the unbounded
or PPT settings. We superscript the ≺ relation as ≺u and ≺p to indicate these specific computational
model, respectively.
Example. For comparison with the simpler splittability definition for 2-party regular functionali-
ties, we show the general definition of splittability restricted to the two-party case. For two-party
functionalities, all but one of the requirements in the splittability definition are tautological, leaving
only the requirement for X = {1, 2}. Thus we have:
Definition 3.8. Let F and G be 2-party functionalities. Then F is splittable with respect to G if and
only if there exist translator ITMs T1, T2, T12 such that:
1,2:←−→ F :3←→ T12 1,2:←−→ G :3←→ ≈ 1,2:←−→
{
1:←→ F :2,3←−→ T1 1:←→
2:←→ F :1,3←−→ T2 2:←→
}
1,2:←−→ G :3←→ .
See Figure 3.4 for a visual overview of the two-party case. See also Figure 3.5 for one of the
splittability conditions (X = {1, 2, 3}) for 3-party functionalities.
F
Z
G
T12
F FG
T1 T2
Z
1,2:←−→ F :3←→ T12 1,2:←−→ G :3←→ 1,2:←−→
{
1:←→ F :2,3←−→ T1 1:←→
2:←→ F :1,3←−→ T2 2:←→
}
1,2:←−→ G :3←→
Figure 3.4: Splittability definition for general 2-party functionalities. Dotted lines indicate interactions as an
adversary and/or corrupted party.
As in Section 3.2, we aim to establish a relationship between splittability and realizability. Our
main technical results relating the two notions are proven in the following two lemmas. Again, we
emphasize that the statements of these lemmas can be specialized to the computationally unbounded
and the PPT settings.
Lemma 3.9. If F ≺ G then F vstrict G.
Proof. Suppose that F ≺ G, using translator ITMs {T F≺GX | X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}}. Then we claim that
the protocol wherein party i executes i:←→ F :i←→ T F≺Gi i:←→ (following the notational conventions for
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F G
T123 F
F
F G
T3
T2
T1
123:←−→ F :4←→ T123 123:←−→ G :4←→ 123:←−→

1:←→ F :234←−→ T1 1:←→
2:←→ F :134←−→ T1 2:←→
3:←→ F :124←−→ T1 3:←→
 123:←−→ G :4←→
Figure 3.5: One of the conditions in required by the definition of F ≺ G, for 3-party functionalities, and with
X = {1, 2, 3}. Dotted lines indicate interactions as an adversary and/or corrupted party.
protocol ITMs) is a secure protocol for F in the G-hybrid setting (which uses only one instance of
G for communication). To show the security of this protocol, we must show that the UC security
definition holds. For each subset of parties X = {x1, . . . , xk}, the splittability condition is the
following (with grouping brackets added for emphasis):
X:←→

x1:←−→ [F :x1←−→ T F≺Gx1 ]
x1:←−→
...
xk:←−→ [F :xk←−→ T F≺Gxk ]
xk:←−→
 X:←→ G :X←→
≈ X:←→ F :X←→ [T F≺GX X:←→ G] :X←→ .
Thus, the ITM :X←→ T F≺GX X:←→ G :X←→ satisfies the condition to be the simulator for the dummy
adversary who corrupts parties indexed by X. We conclude that the above protocol is secure.
Lemma 3.10. If F vstrict G ≺ H, then F ≺ H.
Our proof of this lemma generalizes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Proof. Suppose F vstrict G as witnessed by a protocol pi and corresponding simulators {SFvGX | X ⊆
{1, . . . ,m}}; and that G ≺ H using translators {T G≺HX | X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}}.
To show that F ≺ H, we must demonstrate suitable translators {T F≺HX | X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}}X .
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Applying the above conditions, we have that for each subset of parties X = {x1, . . . , xk}:
X:←→ F :X←→ [SFvGX :X←→ T G≺HX ] X:←→ H :X←→
≈ X:←→

x1:←−→ pi x1:←−→
...
xk:←−→ pi xk:←−→
 X:←→ G :X←→ T G≺HX X:←→ H :X←→
≈ X:←→

x1:←−→ pi x1:←−→
...
xk:←−→ pi xk:←−→
 X:←→

x1:←−→ G :x1←−→ T G≺Hx1
x1:←−→
...
xk:←−→ G :xk←−→ T G≺Hxk
xk:←−→
 X:←→ H :X←→
≡ X:←→

x1:←−→ pi x1:←−→ G :x1←−→ T G≺Hx1
x1:←−→
...
xk:←−→ pi xk:←−→ G :xk←−→ T G≺Hxk
xk:←−→
 X:←→ H :X←→
≈ X:←→

x1:←−→ F :x1←−→ [SFvGx1
:x1←−→ T G≺Hx1 ]
x1:←−→
...
xk:←−→ F :xk←−→ [SFvGxk
:xk←−→ T G≺Hxk ]
xk:←−→
 X:←→ H :X←→ .
The steps in this derivation follow due to the security of the pi protocol, splittability of G with respect
to H, simple rearranging/simplification, and the security of the pi protocol again (applied k times),
respectively.
Thus, setting
T F≺HX = :X←→ SFvGX :X←→ T G≺HX X:←→
completes the proof to show F ≺ H.
Corollary 3.11. The splittability relation ≺ is transitive.
Proof. If F ≺ G ≺ H, then F vstrict G from Lemma 3.9. Then Lemma 3.10 implies F ≺ H.
Splittability characterizing realizability. In the simplified exposition of Section 3.2, splittability
provided an exact characterization of realizability with respect to the completely private channel
functionality F∗PVT.
A completely ideal characterization would be a generalization of the form: F vstrict G if and
only if F ≺ G. Unfortunately, this is demonstrably not the case. For instance F vstrict F for all
F , but it is easy to see that F 6≺ F for several functionalities, (for example, FCOM). However, the
characterization does generalize for a certain class of interesting functionalities.
Definition 3.12. Call a functionality F self-splittable if F ≺ F .
When using a self-splittable functionality G as the “channel” for a protocol, splittability with
respect to G completely characterizes secure realizability. Furthermore, the self-splittable function-
alities are the only ones for which this characterization holds.
Theorem 3.13. G is self-splittable if and only if for all F , F vstrict G ⇔ F ≺ G.
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Proof. (⇒) F ≺ G implies F vstrict G by Lemma 3.9. Then Lemma 3.10 shows that F vstrict G ≺ G
implies F ≺ G.
(⇐) Suppose that for all F , we have F vstrict G ⇔ F ≺ G. Then since G vstrict G
unconditionally, we must have G ≺ G.
Interpreting self-splittability. We propose self-splittability as a useful formal definition of what
it means to be a “communication channel.” It can be easily seen that all typical communication
channels (e.g., authenticated or unauthenticated, public or private, multicast or point-to-point),
which are often implicitly incorporated into the network model, are self-splittable.
We see from the protocols constructed in the proof of Lemma 3.9 that the simulator for a protocol
on a self-splittable channel G can, without loss of generality, faithfully simulate an honest instance
of G (in fact, even interacting with this instance of G using the interface for the honest parties).
Indeed, this is a property shared by all standard communication channels — that the simulator
gains no advantage over honest parties by being able to simulate the channel itself.
In our simplified exposition, the functionality F∗PVT had a special status in that it could be freely
inserted in place of any communication tape linked between two entities in the network. Self-
splittability generalizes this important property, since F ≺ F implies that “routing” communication
through an instance of F is indistinguishable from routing communication through three instances of
F . The {TX} ITMs from the splittability definition effect the routing through the different instances.
Note, however, that the self-splittability of a functionality depends crucially on whether consid-
ering unbounded or PPT settings. For instance, a channel which applies a one-way permutation to
its input is self-splittable in the unbounded setting, but not in the PPT setting. Indeed, in the PPT
setting, there is an advantage in simulating such a channel versus accessing it as an honest party —
the simulator gets access to the preimage under the one-way permutation, whereas an honest party
cannot compute the preimage.
3.3.3 Non-Trivial Protocols
As discussed in Section 2.2.4, we are most often interested in functionalities with delayed output,
and protocols which are non-trivial. Recall that a secure protocol for F in the G-hybrid setting is
non-trivial if for every adversary which corrupts no one and eventually delivers all delayed outputs
of G, the corresponding simulator eventually delivers all delayed outputs in F .
We can easily incorporate this non-triviality requirement into our framework of splittability, as
follows. Recall that F vnt G is defined as F vstrict G˜ via a non-trivial protocol, where G˜ is the
multi-session version of G augmented with FPVT.
Definition 3.14. Let F and G be m-party functionalities and suppose F ≺ G using translator ITMs
{TX | X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}}. Recall that in the splittability definition, each ITM TX interacts with an
instance of G (on behalf of the honest parties) and with an instance of F (as the adversary and corrupt
parties).
We say that F is non-trivially splittable with respect to G, and write F ≺nt G, if T{1,...,m} has
the property that when it interacts with an instance of G in which all delayed outputs are eventually
delivered, then T{1,...,m} eventually delivers all delayed outputs of F .
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Note that non-triviality for splittability only involves an additional constraint on one of the
translator ITMs, just as the definition of non-triviality for protocols only involves an additional
constraint on the simulator in one corruption scenario.
Theorem 3.15. G˜ is self-splittable if and only if for all F , F vnt G ⇔ F ≺nt G˜.
Proof. It suffices to show that Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 3.10 hold with respect to the ≺nt and vnt
relations.
In Lemma 3.9, we construct a secure protocol from a splitting of F with respect to G. Suppose F
and G are m-party functionalities. Then the simulator for this protocol in the case where no parties
are corrupt is :X←→ T F≺GX X:←→ G :X←→. Thus if the real-world adversary eventually delivers all delayed
outputs, and the split of F with respect to G is non-trivial, then this simulator will will eventually
deliver all delayed inputs on F .
In Lemma 3.10, we derive a splitting of F with respect toH, given that F v G ≺ H. Suppose that
F vnt G ≺nt H and let X = {1, . . . ,m}. Then the proof of Lemma 3.10 constructs the translator TX
to be :X←→ S :X←→ T ′X X:←→, where S is the simulator for the protocol that realizes F v G, and T ′X is
the translator ITM from G ≺ H. Both of these ITMs have the property that whenever the interface
to their right eventually delivers all delayed outputs, then they eventually deliver all outputs on
the interface to their left. Thus the proof of Lemma 3.10 constructs a non-trivial splitting in this
case.
3.4 Applications of the Theory
In this section, we apply the general theory developed in the previous section to specific settings and
classes of functionalities, to obtain several new, concrete results as easy consequences.
3.4.1 Elementary Impossibility Proofs
A compelling aspect of our splittability characterization is that all previous impossibility results for
the UC model can be re-derived quite easily, because the splittability definition involves interactions
only with ideal functionalities, which give ideal guarantees that are easy to interpret and apply.
Furthermore, splittability allows us to derive with only one argument impossibility results with
respect to all natural communication channels (i.e., self-splittable functionalities).
As concrete examples, we can give elementary proofs that the following functionalities have no
non-trivially secure protocols using any natural communication channel. While these impossibility
results are not new (except for our consideration of arbitrary communication channels), we include
them here to demonstrate how useful splittability is for deriving impossibility results.
Theorem 3.16. There is no non-trivial secure realization for any of the following functionalities, using
any self-splittable communication channel, in either the PPT or computationally unbounded setting:
• Coin-tossing: FCOIN (Figure 2.4)
• Commitment: FCOM (Figure 2.3)
• Oblivious transfer: FOT (Figure 2.2)
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Proof. In all of the following examples, we consider a dummy adversary which corrupts no parties,
and environments which instruct the dummy adversary to immediately deliver all delayed outputs.
For each of the listed functionalities F , we show that F 6≺nt G for any functionality G. Then by
Theorem 3.15, we have that F 6vnt G for all self-splittable G. The 2-party splittability definition
involves a single indistinguishability constraint between two interactions. The first interaction
involves one copy of F and another ITM acting as an adversary. The second interaction involves two
independent instances of F being synchronized by other ITMs. We will simply show an environment
that distinguishes between the two interactions, provided that the splitting of F is non-trivial.
Coin-tossing: Consider an environment that gives input OK to both parties and outputs 1 if both
parties report the same output from FCOIN. This environment outputs 1 with probability 1 in the first
interaction, since all delayed outputs are delivered assuming the split is non-trivial. However, in
the second interaction, the two instances of FCOIN are independent, and regardless of the behavior
of other ITMs in the compound functionality, the two parties will receive different outputs with
probability 1/2.
Commitment: Consider an environment that gives input (COMMIT, b) to Alice for a randomly
chosen bit b, waits for Bob to report output COMMITTED, then gives input REVEAL to Alice and
outputs 1 if Bob reports output (REVEAL, b). Again, in the first interaction, the environment outputs
1 with probability 1 if the split is non-trivial. However, in the second interaction, a bit must be
committed in Bob’s instance of FCOM, independent of the environment’s choice of b since the other
instance of FCOM has not yet revealed b. Thus Bob will eventually report the wrong output with
probability 1/2.
Oblivious transfer: Consider an environment that supplies random input x0, x1 for Alice and
random input b for Bob, and outputs 1 if Bob reports output xb. Again, in the first interaction,
the environment outputs 1 with probability 1 if the split is non-trivial. However, in the second
interaction, input (x′0, x
′
1) is given to Bob’s instance of FOT with at least one bit of uncertainty about
the environment’s choice of (x0, x1) by the properties of the other FOT instance. Thus, Bob will
report the wrong output with probability at least 1/4.
We can also show an impossibility result that is specific to the PPT setting. Let FZK be a
zero-knowledge functionality, parameterized by a polynomial-time computable relation R. It takes
as input (x,w) from Alice, and if R(x,w) = 1 it gives delayed output x to Bob. We denote
LR = {x | ∃w : R(x,w) = 1}.
Theorem 3.17. There is no non-trivial secure realization for FZK when LR ∈ NP \ BPP, using any
self-splittable communication channel, in the PPT setting.
Proof. Following the outline of the previous proofs, we consider a class of environments parame-
terized by pairs (x,w) such that R(x,w) = 1. These environments supply input (x,w) to Alice and
output 1 if Bob outputs x. As before, these environments output 1 with probability 1 in the first
interaction, assuming that the split is non-trivial so that all delayed outputs are delivered. But in
the second interaction, the ensemble of ITMs between the two instances of FZK (which execute in
the same way for all environments in this class) must compute a witness w′ such that R(x,w′) = 1,
given x alone. However, this is not possible for all x ∈ LR by a PPT algorithm, unless LR ∈ BPP.
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3.4.2 Characterization of Non-Reactive Functionalities
We now use splittability for 2-party functionalities to give an explicit, combinatorial characterization
for 2-party SFE (which are regular). This subsumes and completes the characterizations initiated
by Canetti, Kushilevitz, and Lindell [22], who gave broad impossibility results for several large
subclasses of 2-party SFE. We will also strengthen the impossibility results to show that they hold
with respect to any self-splittable communication channel.
The impossibility results of Canetti, Kushilevitz, and Lindell [22] were later extended by Kidron
and Lindell [60] to the setting where certain “trusted setup” functionalities G are also available for
protocols to use. These extensions can also be shown in our framework by observing that these
particular functionalities G are self-splittable.
Since splittability applies to completely arbitrary 2-party functionalities, we are actually able to
characterize a larger class than SFE functionalities; in fact, we will characterize all 2-party non-
reactive functionalities. Note that these functionalities may be randomized and have input domains
of unbounded size. However, we use a similar convention to describe non-reactive functionalities.
Namely, a non-reactive functionality F waits for inputs x from Alice and y from Bob, then it samples
a random tape r and gives delayed output fA(x, y, r) to Alice, and delayed output fB(x, y, r) to
Bob. For simplicity, we write fA(x, y) to denote the distribution of outputs fA(x, y, r) induced by a
random choice of r.
Definition 3.18. Let F = (fA, fB) be a 2-party non-reactive functionality. We say that F has uni-
directional influence if one party’s output does not depend on the other party’s input. That is, if
fA(x, y) ≈ f ′A(x) for some randomized function f ′A, or if fB(x, y) ≈ f ′B(y) for some randomized func-
tion f ′B . Here, “≈” is meant to denote statistical indistinguishability in the computationally unbounded
setting, or computational indistinguishability in the PPT setting. Otherwise F has bidirectional influ-
ence.
Note that unidirectional influence implies that fA(x, y) ≈ fA(x, y′) for all x, y, and y′, by the
transitivity of the ≈ relation.
Definition 3.19. Let F = (fA, fB) be a 2-party non-reactive functionality with unidirectional
influence; say, the first party’s output does not depend on the second party’s input. We say that F
is completely invertible if there exists admissible ITMs R1 and R2 such that for all inputs x, y, the
outcome of:
(y∗, s)← R1; fB
(
R2
(
s, fB(x, y∗)
)
, y
)
is (computationally or statistically, depending on the computational setting) indistinguishable from the
random variable fB(x, y), where the probability is over the randomness of R1 and R2 and of both calls
to the randomized function fB(·, ·).
Note that complete invertibility is essentially a property of fB (the randomized function which
may depend on the other party’s input). It implies that when carefully choosing his input to F ,
Bob’s output from F is sufficient to compute an input x∗ which is “equivalent” to the input x that
Alice used, in the sense that fB(x∗, y) ≈ fB(x, y). This definition succinctly incorporates both the
completely revealing and efficiently invertible properties of Canetti, Kushilevitz, and Lindell [22].
Theorem 3.20. Let F = (fA, fB) be a 2-party non-reactive functionality. Then F vnt FPVT if and only
if F has unidirectional influence and is completely invertible.
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Furthermore, if F 6vnt FPVT, then F 6vnt G for any self-splittable G.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose F has unidirectional influence and is completely invertible. By Theorem 3.13,
it suffices to show that F ≺nt FPVT. Without loss of generality, suppose that Alice’s output is not
affected by Bob’s input (so fA(x, y) ≈ f ′A(x) for some randomized function f ′A). Then the following
is a non-trivial split of F with respect to FPVT: The ITM T1 runs runs (y∗, s) ← R1, then sends y∗
to FL and delivers both delayed outputs on FL. It receives an output z ← fB(x, y∗) and computes
x∗ ← R2(s, z). It sends x∗ across FPVT to T2. T2 simply sends x∗ to its instance of FR and delivers
both delayed outputs on FR.
When T12 is informed that F has generated delayed outputs, T12 delivers the output for Alice
and simulates that a message was sent across FPVT from Alice to Bob. If this message is delivered,
then T12 delivers the delayed output for Bob in F .
We claim that the two splittability interactions are indistinguishable. By the correctness of R1
and R2, Bob’s output is indistinguishable between the interactions. By the unidirectional influence
property of fA, Alice’s output is indistinguishable between the interactions.
(⇒) Suppose F does not have unidirectional influence or is not completely invertible. It suffices
to show that F 6≺nt G for any G. We consider two cases.
First, suppose F has bidirectional influence. Then there exist inputs x0, x1, x2 for Alice and
inputs y0, y1, y2 for Bob such that fA(x0, y1) 6≈ fA(x0, y2) and fB(x1, y0) 6≈ fB(x2, y0). Consider any
environment Z that satisfies the following properties:
• It runs with a dummy adversary that corrupts no parties.
• It chooses random i, j ← {0, 1, 2} and supplies inputs xi and yj to Alice and Bob, respectively.
• Its instructions to the dummy adversary are independent of its choice of i and j, and these
instructions cause both delayed outputs of F to be eventually delivered in both splittability
interactions (if this is not possible, then no split can be non-trivial, and we are done).
• It waits for both parties to return output, and its final output is a function of only one of the
parties’ outputs.
Since we are dealing with an arbitrary channel G, we must make the requirements of Z suitably
generic. We will show that for every T1, T2, T12, some environment of this form will distinguish
between the two splittability interactions.
Consider the first splittability interaction (involving FL and FR). One of {T1, T2} must be the
first to send an input to one of these instances of F , and the choice of the instance is independent of
the environment’s choice of i and j (since FL and FR do not release any output until receiving both
outputs, and since the adversary’s communication is also independent of i and j). By symmetry,
suppose an input y∗ is sent to FL first. With probability at least 1/9, the environment will select
i = 0 and j such that fA(x0, yj) 6≈ fA(x0, y∗); such a j must exist by the choice of x0, y1, and y2.
Then there is some distinguisher with non-negligible advantage  in distinguishing fA(x0, xj) and
fA(x0, y∗). The environment that runs this distinguisher therefore distinguishes between the two
splittability interactions with non-negligible bias /9.
For the other case, suppose that F has unidirectional influence, say with Alice’s output not
depending on Bob’s input, but is not completely invertible. Then consider an environment with
the following properties;
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• It runs with a dummy adversary that corrupts no parties.
• It is parameterized by x and y, and provides input x for Alice, and input y for Bob.
• Its instructions to the dummy adversary are independent of its choice of x and y, and these
instructions cause both delayed outputs of F to be eventually delivered in both splittability
interactions.
• It waits for both parties to return output, and its final output is a function of Bob’s output.
Again we will show that for any purported splitting of F , one environment of this kind can
distinguish between the two interactions in the splittability definition.
Define R1 as the compound ITM which runs T1, T2, G, and the dummy adversary interaction
(which is fixed and independent of the environment’s choice of x and y), as in the first splittability
interaction, until T1 sends an input to FL. The output of R1 is defined as the input y∗ sent to FL, as
well as the internal state s of all component ITMs. Then R2 is defined similarly, computing the input
sent by T2 to FR when receiving an output from FL and initialized with a given internal state. Then
the output of Bob in this splittability interaction is as in the definition of complete invertibility.
But for any such R1 and R2, there is a choice of x and y such that the output induced by Bob
is distinguishable from fB(x, y), as is Bob’s output in the other splittability interaction. Thus the
environment that uses these inputs x and y, and runs the appropriate distinguisher, can distinguish
the two splittability interactions with some non-negligible bias.
SFE functionalities. We have given a combinatorial characterization for the large class of non-
reactive functionalities. For the special case of 2-party SFE functionalities (which are deterministic,
and have constant-sized input domains), our characterization collapses to a very simple combinato-
rial condition:
Theorem 3.21. Let F be a 2-party SFE functionality. Then F vnt FPVT if and only if F is isomorphic
to a function of the form F(x, y) = x. Furthermore, if F is not isomorphic to such a function, then
F 6vnt G for any self-splittable channel G.
We emphasize that this same characterization applies to both the computationally unbounded
and PPT settings.
Proof. Let F = (fA, fB). By Theorem 3.20, it suffices to show that for SFE functionalities,
unidirectional influence and complete invertibility collapse to the condition of being isomorphic
to a function of the form F(x, y) = x.
Unidirectional influence demands that, by symmetry, fA(x, y) ≈ f ′A(x) for some function f ′A.
However, when fA is deterministic, and x is from a finite domain, this condition is equivalent (in
both the unbounded and PPT settings) to fA(x, y) = f ′A(x) for some deterministic function f
′
A. By
isomorphism-preserving operations, we can have fA(x, y) = x without loss of generality.
Next, F must be completely invertible. Similar to before, in the case of SFE, the complete
invertibility condition is equivalent to the condition that for some choice of y∗, fB(x, y∗) determines
an x′ such that fB(x, ·) ≡ fB(x′, ·). In other words, if fB(x, ·) 6≡ fB(x′, ·), then fB(x, y∗) 6=
fB(x′, y∗). It is easy to see that every input for Bob other than y∗ is redundant. Thus, we can safely
remove these inputs while preserving isomorphism to the original functionality. Then, any inputs
37
x and x′ for Alice which have fB(x, y∗) = fB(x′, y∗) are also redundant, and can be collapsed,
preserving isomorphism. Finally, we may consistently re-label Bob’s outputs to obtain fB(x, y∗) = x;
thus both parties’ outputs are F(x, y) = x.
3.4.3 Results for Multi-Party Functionalities
For functionalities involving more than two parties, the splittability definition is much more
complicated, and combinatorial characterizations like Theorem 3.21 seem difficult to come by.
Nonetheless, we can use 2-party results to obtain some strong necessary conditions for the multi-
party setting.
A well-known technique for studying m-party SFE functionalities is the partitioning argument:
consider 2-party SFE functionalities induced by partitioning them parties into two sets. If the original
functionality is realizable, then clearly so is each induced 2-party functionality.
To exploit the partitioning argument, first we extend the notion of influence from the 2-party
case to multi-party SFE: If in F there is a fixed setting of inputs for parties other than i, such that
there exist two inputs for party i which induce different outputs for party j 6= i, then we say party i
influences party j, and write i F j.
Corollary 3.22. If F is an m-party SFE functionality securely realizable using completely private
channels, then in the directed graph induced by F , either all edges have a common source, or all
edges have a common destination.
Proof. Suppose the graph induced by F has two edges ij and i′j′, where i 6= i′ and j 6= j′. Then
any bipartition of [m] which separates {i, j′} and {i′, j} induces a 2-party functionality which has
bidirectional influence. Thus F cannot be realizable.
We see that there are only two simple kinds of securely realizable SFE functionalities. Let P be
the common vertex in the graph induced by F . If all edges are directed towards P , then we say that
F is aggregated via party P . If all edges are directed away from p, then we say that F is disseminated
via party P .
3-party characterization. The partitioning argument gives a necessary condition, but not gen-
erally a sufficient condition. However, we do identify one restricted setting in which the 2-party
restrictions do provide a sufficient condition for secure realizability.
Our restricted setting is the case of 3-party regular (Definition 3.1) functionalities. That is, those
functionalities whose behavior does not depend on which parties are corrupt, and which do not
interact with the adversary. For these functionalities, we prove the following result:
Theorem 3.23. Let F be a 3-party regular functionality that has an honest-majority protocol using
F∗PVT. Then F v F∗PVT if and only if all 2-party restrictions of F are UC-realizable using F∗PVT.
Proof. The forward implication is trivially true. To show the other direction, assume each 2-party
restriction is realizable (and therefore splittable according to the simplified definition Definition 3.3).
Let Ti be the machine guaranteed by splittability on the 2-party restriction induced by the partition
{i}, ({1, 2, 3} \ {i}). Let pi be the honest-majority protocol for F .
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Figure 3.6: Steps in the proof of Theorem 3.23, when one party is corrupted. Communication via F∗PVT is
denoted by a double line.
Now the protocol pi′ we construct is as follows: Party i internally simulates an instance of F ,
Ti, and of pi (initialized for party i). The communication tapes of F and Ti are linked as in the
splittability interaction, and the remaining communication tape of F (for honest party i) is treated
as the protocol’s environment-side communication tape. The environment-side communication tape
of pi and the remaining tape of Ti are linked, and the functionality-side tape of pi is treated as the
protocol’s functionality-side communication tape.
To show that this protocol pi′ is secure, we must demonstrate a simulator for each dummy
adversary. The cases when the adversary corrupts all or no parties are trivial. We focus on the
case when the adversary corrupts 1 or 2 parties.
Suppose the adversary A corrupts 2 parties (by symmetry, parties 2 and 3). This adversary
interacts on the private channel on behalf of parties 2 and 3, while the honest party 1 is running
pi′. However, in this instance of pi′, the honest party is faithfully running an instance of F . Thus,
the simulator can reflect a repackaging of the real-world interaction, simulating the instances of T1,
pi1, and F∗PVT, as they are interacting in the real-world interaction. Being a simple repackaging, this
simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from the real-world interaction.
Now suppose the adversary A corrupts only one party, by symmetry, party 3 (see Figure 3.6).
In the real-world interaction, parties 1 and 2 are simulating independent instances of F , as well
as their respective Ti and pii instances (box 1 in Figure 3.6). If we repackage this interaction so
that everything but the pii instances and FPVT are inside the environment, we have an interaction in
which two honest parties are running pi on the channel F∗PVT with an adversary (box 2 in Figure 3.6).
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This is an honest majority, and the security of pi holds. Thus there is a simulator S for the adversary
so that this interaction is indistinguishable from an ideal-world interaction with F itself (box 3 in
Figure 3.6).
Next, we again repackage so that party 1’s instance of F and T1 are outside of the environment,
and S is inside the environment (box 4 in Figure 3.6). Since the behavior of F does not depend on
which parties are corrupt, this interaction is an interaction with two instances of F being coordinated
by an instance of T1. This is exactly a splittability interaction for the 2-party restriction of F induced
by {1}, {2, 3}. Thus, this interaction is indistinguishable from the interaction with a single F alone
(box 5 in Figure 3.6).
Finally, we can again repackage so that party 2’s instance of F and T2 are outside of the
environment (box 6 in Figure 3.6). Again, what remains is exactly a splittability interaction for
another 2-party restriction of F . Then the interaction is indistinguishable from one involving a
single instance of F (box 7 in Figure 3.6). Then, repackaging to remove S from the environment,
we have an ideal-world interaction with F and simulator S (box 8 in Figure 3.6). By construction,
this interaction is indistinguishable from the real-world interaction, so S is a suitable simulator for
our protocol pi′.
Note that our protocol requires each player to indirectly simulate executions of another protocol
with a weaker/different security guarantee (in this case, the 2-party restrictions and the honest-
majority protocol). This approach is somewhat comparable to the “MPC in the head” approach
recently introduced and explored in several works [55, 49]. There, significant efficiency gains are
achieved in the standard corruption model by leveraging MPC protocols with security in the honest-
majority settings. Our constructions indicate the possibility of extending this approach by having
the parties carry out not a direct protocol execution, but a related simulation.
The same approach does not seem to apply for functionalities which interact with the adversary,
whose behavior depends on which parties are corrupt, or which involve more than three parties (so
that two parties do not form a strict majority).
3.5 Conclusion & Open Problems
We have given the first complete characterization of realizability in the UC framework for arbitrary
functionalities and arbitrary “natural” communication channels. However, the characterization is
still somewhat unwieldy in its full generality for multi-party functionalities.
Interpretations of splittability. We leave open the problem of applying splittability to provide
more “simple” characterizations of realizability, as in our characterizations for 2-party non-reactive
and SFE functionalities. In particular, we derived necessary conditions for multi-party SFE function-
alities, but do not know whether they are sufficient. Our approach of using a partitioning argument
to reduce a multi-party functionality to several 2-party functionalities has been studied in the passive
security setting by Chor and Ishai [27]. In that setting, there exist m-party SFE functionalities which
are not securely realizable, but all of whose k-party partitions (for k < m) are realizable. We leave
open the question of whether such counterexamples exist in the context of UC security.
Another natural class of functionalities are reactive, deterministic finite-memory functionalities
(DFF). We do not consider any broad characterizations for reactive functionalities in this chapter.
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However, later in Chapter 5, we develop some techniques for reasoning about DFFs. As a
consequence of our results in that chapter, we implicitly derive a combinatorial characterization
of secure realizability for DFFs (Section 5.3.3).
Non-natural communication channels. Splittability is a useful tool for understanding secure
protocols on natural communication channels (those which are self-splittable). However, these
channels are functionalities of relatively low cryptographic sophistication. Thus, in our landscape
of cryptographic complexity, splittability can be used only to prove separations of the form F 6v G
when G itself has low complexity. In particular, splittability is of no use in discriminating between
the complexities of more sophisticated functionalities.
Later in Chapter 4, we develop some new techniques for deriving complexity separations between
more sophisticated functionalities. However, these techniques appear to be tied to the particular
subclass of functionalities that we consider, and are still not applicable to functionalities of arbitrary
high complexity.
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CHAPTER 4
Unbounded Cryptographic Complexity
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, we study 2-party symmetric-output SFE (SSFE) functionalities, in the computation-
ally unbounded setting. Two-party SSFE is perhaps the most natural and widely studied subclass of
MPC functionalities, dating back to the first MPC paper by Yao [96]. Beaver [4] and Kushilevitz [67]
independently gave a combinatorial characterization of the SSFE functionalities that have perfect
passive-secure protocols against unbounded adversaries. In other security settings (honest-majority
and passive/standalone security against PPT adversaries), there exist secure protocols for all func-
tionalities, and SSFE functionalities were among the first to be considered [97, 41, 9, 25]. Finally,
Kilian [62] gave a combinatorial characterization of completeness for this class of functionalities
against unbounded adversaries.
Yet, despite these fundamental results, our understanding of the complexity of securely realizing
such functionalities remains far from complete, especially in the computationally unbounded setting.
In this chapter, we present several new results to shed more light on the cryptographic complexity
of SSFE functionalities in the unbounded setting. We provide the first complete characterizations of
passive security1 and of standalone security. We also show new impossibility results for concurrent
self-composition, and identify a complex landscape of structures for SSFE functionalities under the
vu reduction. A visual overview of all of the cryptographic complexity we uncover is given in
Figure 4.1.
4.1.1 Our Results
Leveraging passive security. The complete characterization of passive security by Beaver and
Kushilevitz is purely combinatorial. They prove that a 2-party SSFE functionality F has a perfect,
passive-secure protocol if and only if F satisfies a recursive combinatorial condition called decompos-
ability. Decomposable functionalities have very simple deterministic secure protocols, whose round
structure has a direct, natural correspondence with the recursive structure required by the definition
of decomposition. We call these simple deterministic protocols canonical protocols.
Underpinning all of our results in this chapter is the intuition that these canonical protocols
reflect the structure of all protocols for SSFE functionalities, in a wide variety of security settings that
are much more demanding than passive security. Intuitively, canonical protocols so fundamentally
express the structure of an SSFE functionality, that any protocol for that functionality in any setting
will have to disclose information in essentially the same sequence. More formally, we prove the
following technical theorem which unifies all of our further cryptographic complexity results:
Lemma. Let F be a uniquely decomposable 2-party SSFE. Then F has a non-trivial protocol that is UC-
secure (resp. standalone secure) if and only if the canonical protocol for F is UC-secure (resp. standalone
1Although Beaver [4] and Kushilevitz [67] already have a characterization for perfectly secure protocols, ours is the first
in the more natural model in which protocols are allowed to have negligible error.
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Figure 4.1: Cryptographic complexity landscape of 2-party SSFE, with several example functionalities.
secure).
Thus, to show that F is not securely realizable, it suffices to show a single attack against the
(very simple) canonical protocol for F . Consequently, we are able to derive impossibility results
which are simple and intuitively clear. The restriction that F be uniquely decomposable is necessary,
since multiple decompositions can yield very different canonical protocols.
To prove Corollary 4.15, we show that if pi is some purported protocol for F , then for every
adversary attacking the canonical protocol for F , there is a corresponding adversary attacking pi that
achieves the same effect in all environments. The proof requires us to establish a correspondence
between steps in an arbitrary protocol pi and steps in the canonical protocol for F (equivalently, steps
in the decomposition of F), in terms of how much information about the parties’ inputs has been
revealed so far. As a direct consequence of the proof, we also show that canonical protocols have
optimal round complexity among passive-secure protocols — even among randomized protocols
with negligible error probability.
Alternative characterizations of realizability. We first use some of the techniques developed for
Corollary 4.15 to extend the characterization of Beaver and Kushilevitz to the more natural model
in which protocols can have negligible error probability. Thus we have the following:
Theorem. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. F has a (statistically secure) passive-secure protocol
if and only if F is decomposable.
We also show a surprising characterization of passive security as a natural statement in the
language of UC security:
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Theorem. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. Then F is passively realizable if and only if
F vunt FCOM.
Intuitively, the commitment functionality FCOM captures the essence of passive security. However,
FCOM cannot be said to be complete, since it is not an SSFE functionality itself. To prove this
characterization, we develop a general purpose compiler which converts any passive-secure SSFE
protocol into a UC-secure protocol in the FCOM-hybrid setting.
Next, we give the first complete characterization of standalone security for SSFE functionalities.
We define an additional property of decomposable functionalities called saturation. This property
completely characterizes standalone security:
Theorem. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. Then F is standalone-realizable if and only if F is
saturated.
Intuitively, a functionality is saturated if every traversal of the decomposition structure (equiva-
lently, set of messages in the canonical protocol) corresponds to a legitimate input to the functional-
ity. We define saturation explicitly as a special case of unique decomposability. As such, our technical
results regarding canonical protocols apply, and we crucially use the connection to canonical proto-
cols to prove the characterization.
Concurrent self-composition. Lindell [70] considered the concurrent self-composition setting, in
which a protocol is analyzed in the context of many concurrent instances of the same protocol. He
showed that, in the PPT setting, security under general (that is, with no limit on the number of
protocol instances) concurrent self-composition is equivalent to full-fledged UC security, for almost
all functionalities. This impossibility result stands in contrast with the SSFE protocols of Lindell [69]
and Pass and Rosen [80], which are secure for a fixed number of concurrent protocol instances in
the PPT setting.
In the unbounded setting, however, Backes, Mu¨ller-Quade, and Unruh [3] demonstrated a
protocol for an SSFE functionality which was standalone-secure, and even had a perfect, efficient
(rewinding) simulator, but was not secure against two concurrent instances. In fact, their protocol
is the canonical protocol for that functionality. Using our new techniques, we are able to extend and
greatly generalize their attack, to obtain the following:
Theorem. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality with unique decomposition. If F is not UC-realizable,
then F has no protocol secure against even two concurrent instances.
Thus concurrent attacks are an inherent property of the SSFE functionalities themselves, and are
not particular to the specific protocol considered by Backes, Mu¨ller-Quade, and Unruh [3]. As is the
case with all of the impossibility results in this chapter, to prove this theorem, we need only show
an attack against two concurrent instances of the canonical protocol for F .
Impossibility results in the UC framework. Finally, we apply our technical tools in the UC
framework to derive cryptographic complexity separations with respect to thevunt relation. We prove
the following fundamental result identifying decomposition depth (i.e., the number of recursive
steps in the decomposition of an SSFE functionality) as one indicator of cryptographic complexity:
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Theorem. If F is a 2-party SSFE functionality with unique decomposition depth m and G is a 2-party
SSFE functionality with a (not necessarily unique) decomposition of depth n < m, then F 6vunt G.
Since decomposition depth is equivalent to round complexity for passive security, another
interpretation of this result is that round complexity against passive adversaries is an indicator of
cryptographic complexity as measured in the UC setting.
Applying Corollary 4.26, we can easily identify the following interesting complexity structures
uncovered by the vunt reduction:
Theorem. There exists a strict, infinite hierarchy of vunt-complexity; that is, functionalities G1,G2, . . .
such that Gi vunt Gj if and only if i ≤ j.
There also exist functionalities F and G whose complexities are incomparable; that is, F 6vunt G and
G 6vunt F .
We note that these are the first results differentiating the relative complexities of intermediate
MPC functionalities (that is, functionalities which are neither trivial nor complete under the
reduction in question).
Acknowledgement. Our characterizations of passive security (Theorem 4.17) and standalone
security (Theorem 4.23) were independently discovered by Ku¨nzler, Mu¨ller-Quade, and Raub [66].
They also extend these results to a multi-party setting, and beyond the symmetric-output case.
4.2 SSFE Preliminaries
We review some relevant previous results classifying SSFE functionalities, mainly regarding passive
security and completeness.
Definition 4.1 (Decomposable [4, 67]). A 2-party SSFE functionality F : X × Y → D is row
decomposable if there exists a partition X = X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xt, with t ≥ 2, such that the following
hold for all i ≤ t:
• Xi 6= ∅;
• for all y ∈ Y , x ∈ Xi, x′ ∈ (X \Xi), we have F(x, y) 6= F(x′, y); and
• F∣∣
Xi×Y is either a constant function or column decomposable, where F
∣∣
Xi×Y denotes the
restriction of F to the domain Xi × Y .
We define being column decomposable symmetrically with respect to X and Y . We say that F is simply
decomposable if it is either constant, row decomposable, or column decomposable.
For instance, the functionality 0 01 2 is row-decomposable but not column-decomposable.
0 1
1 0 is
both row- and column-decomposable. Neither 0 00 1 nor
0 0 1
3 4 1
3 2 2
are decomposable. Decomposability
completely characterizes perfect passive security in the unbounded setting:
Theorem 4.2 ([4, 67]). Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. Then F is decomposable if and only if
it has a perfectly secure protocol against passive, unbounded adversaries.
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For convenience in our proofs, we have presented a slightly different definition of decompos-
ability than that of [4, 67]. We insist that row and column decomposition steps strictly alternate,
and thus each decomposition step must select the “most refined” partition possible. We say that a
function F is uniquely decomposable if all of its decompositions are equivalent up to re-indexing the
sets X1, . . . , Xt (resp. Y1, . . . , Yt) at each step. Thus
0 0
1 2 is uniquely decomposable, but
0 1
1 0 is not,
since the first step may be either a row- or a column-decomposition step.
Canonical protocols [4, 67]. If F is decomposable, then a canonical protocol for F is a determin-
istic protocol defined inductively as follows:
• If F is a constant function, then both parties output the value, without interaction.
• If F : X×Y → Z is row decomposable as X = X1∪ · · ·∪Xt, then Alice announces the unique
i such that her input x ∈ Xi. Then both parties run a canonical protocol for F
∣∣
Xi×Y .
• If F : X × Y → Z is column decomposable as Y = Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Yt, then Bob announces the
unique i such that his input y ∈ Yi. Then both parties run a canonical protocol for F
∣∣
X×Yi .
It is an easy exercise to see that a canonical protocol is a perfectly secure protocol for F against
unbounded passive adversaries.
Deviation revealing. Prabhakaran and Rosulek [84] showed that for a class of functionalities
called “deviation revealing” functionalities, if a protocol pi is a UC-secure realization of that
functionality, then that same protocol is also secure against passive adversaries. Note that this
property is not true in general for all SFE functionalities. For example, the SFE in which Alice gets
no output but Bob gets the boolean-OR of both parties’ inputs is not passively realizable. However,
the protocol where Alice simply sends her input to Bob is UC-secure, since a malicious Bob can
always learn Alice’s input in the ideal world by choosing 0 as its input to the functionality. It turns
out that SSFE functions are deviation revealing. For completeness, we include here an adapted
version of this result:
Lemma 4.3 ([84]). Let pi be a non-trivial UC-secure (perhaps in a hybrid world) or a standalone-secure
protocol for a 2-party SSFE functionality F . Then pi is also passive-secure protocol for F as well (in the
same hybrid setting as pi).
Proof. We show that, without loss of generality, the simulator for pi maps passive real-world
adversaries to passive ideal-world adversaries. A passive adversary A for pi is one which receives an
input x from the environment, runs pi honestly, and reports its view to the environment. Note that
in the context of SSFE functionalities, the relevant kinds of environments comprise a special class
of standalone environments, so that even if pi is only standalone secure, its security still holds with
respect to the environments we consider for passive security.
Suppose S is the simulator for A. In the ideal world, both parties produce output with
overwhelming probability since pi is a non-trivial protocol (and A is passive). Thus S must also
allow the other party to generate output in the ideal world with overwhelming probability, meaning
that S must receive x from the environment, send some x′ to the ideal functionality F , receive the
output F(x′, y) and deliver the output. Without loss of generality, we may assume S does so with
probability 1.
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Suppose x′ is the input sent by S to F . This input is selected independently of the environment’s
choice of input for the honest party. If F(x, y) 6= F(x′, y) for some input y, then consider an
environment that uses y for the honest party’s input. In this environment, the honest party will
report F(x, y) in the real world, but F(x′, y) in the ideal world, so the simulation is unsound. Thus
with overwhelming probability, S sends an input x′ such that F(x, ·) ≡ F(x′, ·). We may modify S by
adding a simple wrapper which ensures that x (the input originally obtained from the environment)
is always sent to F . With overwhelming probability, the reply from F is unaffected by this change.
Conditioned on these overwhelming probability events, the output of the wrapped S is identical to
that of the original S. However, the wrapped S is a passive ideal-world adversary: it receives x from
the environment, sends x to F , and delivers the output.
Normal form for protocols. For simplicity in our proofs, we will often assume that a protocol is
given in the following normal form:
1. If m1,m2, . . . are the messages exchanged in a run of the protocol, then (m1,m2, . . .) can be
uniquely and unambiguously obtained from the string m1m2 · · · . This can be achieved without
loss of generality by encoding all protocol messages in a prefix-free code.
2. As the last steps of the protocol, both parties announce their final output. It is easy to see
that this is without loss of generality when the functionality’s output is symmetric, even for
standalone or UC security.
3. The honest protocol does not require the parties to maintain a persistent state besides their
private input (in particular, no random tape). Instead, the protocol program for each party is
simply a mapping P : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → [0, 1], indicating that if τ is the transcript
so far, and a party’s input is x, then its next message is m with probability P (x, τ,m). In other
words, randomness can be sampled as needed and immediately discarded. This requirement
is without loss of generality for computationally unbounded parties, since at each step a party
can (re)sample a random tape from the set of tapes consistent with their private input and
transcript so far.
The consequence of this normal form is that it becomes easier to reason about parties who keep
no internal state, and easier to reason about protocols in which the final output is a public function
of the transcript (i.e., the output does not depend on a party’s private state).
Completeness. We also review the known results characterizing completeness for SSFE function-
alities.
Definition 4.4. We say that {x, x′} × {y, y′} is an OR-minor in F if:
F(x, y) = F(x, y′)
= 6=
F(x′, y) 6= F(x′, y′)
Lemma 4.5 ([65]). Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. Then F is complete under the vunt reduction
if and only if F contains an OR-minor.
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In fact, Kraschewski and Mu¨ller-Quade [65] prove a more general theorem than stated above,
in which the functionality need not have symmetric output. We use this more general result later in
Chapter 5.
4.3 Simulation of Canonical Protocol in a General Protocol
In this section, we develop our main new technical tool, the protocol simulation theorem. Through-
out the section we fix a 2-party SSFE functionality F with input domain X × Y and fix a passive-
secure protocol pi for F , in normal form.
4.3.1 Structure of Protocols
We first introduce some terminology, notation, and simple technical observations relating to the
structure of protocol transcripts.
Definition 4.6. Let Pr[u|x, y] denote the probability that pi generates a transcript that has u as a valid
prefix (that is, u consists of a sequence of complete messages between parties), when executed honestly
with x and y as inputs.
Let F be a set of partial pi-transcripts that is prefix-free.2 Define Pr[F |x, y] = ∑u∈F Pr[u|x, y]. We
call F a frontier if F is maximal – that is, if Pr[F |x, y] = 1 for all x, y. We denote as Dx,yF the probability
distribution over F where u ∈ F is chosen with probability Pr[u|x, y].
Claim 4.7. For any protocol pi, there exist functions α and β such that Pr[u|x, y] = α(u, x)β(u, y).
In other words, the probability of a transcript being generated can be expressed as the product of two
probabilities, each of which depends on only one party’s input.
Proof. The next message function depends only on the active party’s input and the transcript so far.
For a message m and partial transcript u, denote by piA(um, x) is the probability that Alice’s next
message is m when running on input x and the transcript so far is u. Define piB for Bob analogously.
Suppose we run pi on inputs (x, y) ∈ X × Y , where Alice sends the first message The probability of
obtaining a particular partial transcript u = u1 · · ·un is:
Pr[u|x, y] = piA(u1, x) · piB(u1u2, y) · piA(u1u2u3, x) · · ·
=
 n∏
i=1
i odd
piA(u1 · · ·ui, x)

 n∏
i=1
i even
piB(u1 · · ·ui, y)
 = α(u, x)β(u, y).
where we define α(u, x) and β(u, y) to be the parenthesized quantities, respectively.
The following lemma is a convenient tool for proving bounds on statistical differences:
Lemma 4.8. Let F be a frontier of partial transcripts in which Alice has just spoken, and let S be the
set of partial transcripts in which Alice just spoken, which are proper prefixes of elements in F .
Then there exist constants cpi ≥ 0 and λ(v, y, y′) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ S such that:∑
u∈F
α(u, x)|β(u, y)− β(u, y′)| = cpi +
∑
v∈S
α(v, x)λ(v, y, y′).
2That is, no string in F is a proper prefix of another string in F .
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Proof. For clarity, assume that each message in the protocol is a single bit, and that the parties strictly
alternate rounds. The proof also holds for unrestricted protocols, but is more cumbersome.
Let S0 be the prefix-minimal elements of S (if Alice speaks first in the protocol, then S0 = {0, 1},
otherwise S0 = {}). We will define a sequence S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ St inductively as follows. Let L(Si)
be the set of elements of Si that have no extensions in Si; that is, L(S) = {x ∈ S | (∀y) xy 6∈ S}.
We define a pop operation on elements of L(Si) as follows. When we pop an element u ∈ L(Si), we
expand the partial transcript u by two moves in the protocol, setting Si+1 = Si∪{u00, u01, u10, u11}.
After some finite number of operations we reach St such that L(St) = F .
We define the weight of a tree Si as:
w(Si) =
∑
u∈L(Si)
α(u, x)|β(u, y)− β(u, y′)|.
Observe that w(St) = ∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx,y
′
F
)
. We define the quantity cpi = w(S0) ≥ 0. We define the
intermediate quantity δ(u, y, y′) = |β(u, y)− β(u, y′)|. Suppose the node v was popped in Si to
obtain Si+1. Then,
w(Si+1)− w(Si) = α(v00, x)δ(v00, y, y′) + α(v01, x)δ(v01, y, y′)
+ α(v10, x)δ(v10, y, y′) + α(v11, x)δ(v11, y, y′)
− α(v, x)δ(v, y, y′).
Since v0 and v1 are nodes where Bob has just spoken, we get that δ(v00, y, y′) = δ(v01, y, y′) =
δ(v0, y, y′) and δ(v10, y, y′) = δ(v11, y, y′) = δ(v1, y, y′). Similarly, α(v0, x) = α(v1, x) = α(v, x).
By definition, we have α(v00, x) + α(v01, x) = α(v0, x) and α(v10, x) + α(v11, x) = α(v1, x). Using
these observation we get:
w(Si+1)− w(Si) = (α(v00, x) + α(v01, x)) δ(v0, y, y′)
+ (α(v10, x) + α(v11, x)) δ(v1, y, y′)− α(v, x)δ(v, y, y′)
= α(v0, x)δ(v0, y, y′) + α(v1, x)δ(v1, y, y′)− α(v, x)δ(v, y, y′)
= α(v, x) [δ(v0, y, y′) + δ(v1, y, y′)− δ(v, y, y′)] .
Define λ(v, y, y′) = δ(v0, y, y′) + δ(v1, y, y′) − δ(v, y, y′) and it is easy to verify that λ(v, y, y′) ≥ 0.
The expression for w(St) telescopes, and we obtain the desired result:
w(St) = cpi +
∑
v∈S
α(x, v)λ(v, y, y′).
4.3.2 Associating Minors with Frontiers
Consider the 2 × 2 SSFE functionality 0 01 2 , which is the smallest non-trivial (decomposition depth
greater than one), uniquely decomposable SSFE. Observe that in the canonical protocol for this
SSFE, Alice completely reveals her input before Bob reveals anything about his input. We now
present a technical result that generalizes this observation about when information can be revealed,
to arbitrary protocols.
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Definition 4.9. We say that {x, x′} × {y, y′} is a -minor (resp. -minor) in F if:
F(x, y) = F(x, y′)
6= 6=
F(x′, y) 6= F(x′, y′)
resp. if F(x, y) 6= F(x, y
′)
= 6=
F(x′, y) 6= F(x′, y′)

We now show that in any secure protocol for any F , the order in which parties disclose
information about their inputs must respect all - and -minors within F . That is, if {x, x′} ×
{y, y′} is a -minor in F , then there must be a point in the protocol at which Alice has (almost)
entirely made the distinction between x and x′, but Bob has not made any (noticeable) distinction
between y and y′.
More formally,
Lemma 4.10 ( Frontiers). For all x 6= x′ ∈ X and any parameter µ(k) < 1, there is a frontier F
such that, for all y, y′ ∈ Y :
• if F(x, y) 6= F(x′, y), then ∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx
′,y
F
)
≥ µ(k)
(
1− (k)1−µ(k)
)
, and
• ∆
(
Dx′,yF ,Dx
′,y′
F
)
≤
(
1+µ(k)
1−µ(k)
)
∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx,y
′
F
)
.
where (k) is the simulation error of pi (i.e., the statistical difference between the real and ideal
interactions).
Note that when {x, x′} × {y, y′} is a -minor, we have ∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx,y
′
F
)
≤ (k) for all frontiers
F by the security of the scheme. By setting µ = 1 − √ and ν = 4√, we immediately obtain the
following corollary:
Corollary 4.11 ( Frontiers). If {x, x′} × {y, y′} is a -minor in F , then there exists a frontier F
and a negligible function ν (which depend only on x and x′) such that: ∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx
′,y
F
)
≥ 1 − ν(k),
and ∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx,y
′
F
)
,∆
(
Dx′,yF ,Dx
′,y′
F
)
≤ ν(k).
In other words, at F , Alice has overwhelmingly made the distinction between inputs x and x′, while
Bob has not made any noticeable distinction between inputs y and y′ (when Alice and Bob are executing
the protocol on inputs in the -minor).
Proof of Lemma 4.10. Suppose we have a protocol pi in normal form, and let  denote the simulation
error of pi. Let α and β be defined as in Claim 4.7.
Given parameters x, x′ ∈ X and µ < 1, we define the frontier F as the prefix-minimal elements
of: {
u
∣∣∣ u is a complete transcript, or |α(u, x)− α(u, x′)| ≥ µ(α(u, x) + α(u, x′))}.
By “complete transcript”, we mean one on which the parties terminate and give output. Intuitively,
F is the first place at which x and x′ induce significantly different probabilities on partial transcripts,
where µ measures the significance. We extend F so that it becomes a complete frontier, by adding
complete transcripts where necessary.
We partition F into Fgood ∪ Fbad, where Fgood are the elements u ∈ F which sat-
isfy |α(u, x)− α(u, x′)| ≥ µ(α(u, x) + α(u, x′)). Each element u ∈ Fbad therefore satisfies
α(u, x)/α(u, x′) < (1 + µ)/(1− µ).
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Consider any y ∈ Y such that F(x, y) 6= F(x′, y). Let A ⊆ Fbad be the transcripts in Fbad which do
not induce output F(x, y) (all elements of Fbad are complete transcripts, and the output is a function
of the transcript alone). Similarly let B ⊆ Fbad be the transcripts in Fbad which do not induce output
F(x′, y). Thus Pr[A|x, y] and Pr[B|x′, y] must each be at most . Observe that Fbad ⊆ A ∪ B. Thus
we have:
Pr[Fgood|x, y] = 1− Pr[Fbad|x, y]
≥ 1−
∑
u∈A
α(u, x)β(u, y)−
∑
u∈B
α(u, x)β(u, y)
≥ 1−
∑
u∈A
α(u, x)β(u, y)−
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)∑
u∈B
α(u, x′)β(u, y)
= 1− Pr[A|x, y]−
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
Pr[B|x′, y]
≥ 1− −
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
 = 1− 2
1− µ.
The same bound holds for Pr[Fgood|x′, y]. Now,
∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx
′,y
F
)
=
1
2
∑
u∈F
|α(u, x)− α(u, x′)|β(u, y)
≥ 1
2
∑
u∈Fgood
µ (α(u, x) + α(u, x′))β(u, y)
=
µ
2
(
Pr[Fgood|x, y] + Pr[Fgood|x′, y]
)
≥ µ
(
1− 2
1− µ
)
.
To show the other part of the lemma, consider any y, y′ ∈ Y . Let S be the set of all proper prefixes
of elements F that correspond to points where Alice has just spoken. By Lemma 4.8, we can express
the statistical difference at F in terms of a positive linear combination of α(v, x) values for v ∈ S.
Since by definition every v ∈ S satisfies α(v, x′)/α(v, x) ≤ (1 + µ)/(1− µ), we have:
∆
(
Dx′,yF ,Dx
′,y′
F
)
=
1
2
∑
u∈F
α(u, x′)|β(u, y)− β(u, y′)|
=
1
2
(
cpi +
∑
v∈S
α(v, x′)λ(v, y, y′)
)
≤ 1
2
(
cpi +
1 + µ
1− µ
∑
v∈S
α(v, x)λ(v, y, y′)
)
≤ 1
2
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)(
cpi +
∑
v∈S
α(v, x)λ(v, y, y′)
)
=
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx,y
′
F
)
.
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4.3.3 Protocol Simulation Theorem
Our main protocol simulation theorem extends Lemma 4.10 to show that the information disclosed
during any protocol must come in the same order as in the canonical protocol, provided that the
canonical protocol is unique. This restriction on the canonical protocol is necessary, since different
non-isomorphic canonical protocols for the same F can admit completely different kinds of attacks
(e.g., for the XOR function, depending on which party speaks first).
Theorem 4.12 (Protocol Simulation). If F is uniquely decomposable, and pi is a passive-secure protocol
for F (in the unbounded setting), then the canonical protocol pic for F is “as secure as” pi, in the
following sense: For all adversaries A, there exists a simulator S such that for all environments Z, we
have EXEC[Z,A, pic,FPVT] ≈ EXEC[Z,S, pi,FPVT].
In other words, every effective attack on the canonical protocol in the UC setting can be translated
into an attack against pi. Thus, if the canonical protocol for F is not secure against a given class of
environments, then F is not securely realizable (by any protocol) against that class of environments
(see Corollary 4.15).
To prove the theorem, we first establish two intermediate lemmas:
Lemma 4.13. For frontiers F and G, let “G F |x, y” denote the event that when running the protocol
on inputs x, y, the transcript reaches G strictly before reaching F . Then
∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx
′,y′
F
)
≤ ∆
(
Dx,yG ,Dx
′,y′
G
)
+
1
2
(
Pr[G F |x, y] + Pr[G F |x′, y′]).
Proof. Partition F into F1 and F2, where F1 are the partial transcripts in F which are prefixes of
elements in G. Thus the distribution of transcripts at frontier F1 can be expressed as a function of
the distribution of transcripts at frontier G. Then,
∆
(
Dx,yF ,Dx
′,y′
F
)
=
1
2
∑
u∈F1∪F2
∣∣∣Pr[u|x, y]− Pr[u|x′, y′]∣∣∣
≤ ∆
(
Dx,yG ,Dx
′,y′
G
)
+
1
2
∑
u∈F2
(
Pr[u|x, y] + Pr[u|x′, y′])
= ∆
(
Dx,yG ,Dx
′,y′
G
)
+
1
2
(
Pr[F2|x, y] + Pr[F2|x′, y′]
)
= ∆
(
Dx,yG ,Dx
′,y′
G
)
+
1
2
(
Pr[G F |x, y] + Pr[G F |x′, y′]).
This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.14. Let F be a uniquely decomposable SSFE functionality. Then for each step X × Y in the
decomposition of F (by symmetry, suppose X × Y is row-decomposable as X = X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xn), there
exists a frontier F (X,Y ) and a negligible quantity λ such that for all (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ X × Y ,
∆
(
Dx,yF (X,Y ),Dx
′,y′
F (X,Y )
)
≤ λ, if x, x′ belong to the same part Xi
∆
(
Dx,yF (X,Y ),Dx
′,y′
F (X,Y )
)
≥ 1− λ, otherwise.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the decomposition depth d of F∣∣
X×Y . When d = 1, the
claim follows trivially by the security of the protocol and triangle inequality of statistical difference,
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setting λd = 2.
Now, suppose d ≥ 2, and suppose by symmetry that F∣∣
X×Y is row-decomposable as X =
X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xn. For each i ≤ n, we have an associated frontier F (Xi, Y ) and negligible quantity
λd−1 by the inductive hypothesis. We will use this fact to construct a frontier F (X,Y ) with the
desired properties.
Step 1: F ′(i, j). For every distinct i, j ≤ n, we will construct a frontier F ′(i, j) with the following
property: For all (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ (Xi ∪Xj)× Y ,
• if x, x′ ∈ Xi or x, x′ ∈ Xj (i.e., x and x′ are in the same part of the row-decomposition), then
∆
(
Dx,yF ′(i,j),Dx
′,y′
F ′(i,j)
)
≤ γ;
• otherwise (x and x′ are in different parts of the row-decomposition), ∆
(
Dx,yF ′(i,j),Dx
′,y′
F ′(i,j)
)
≥
1− γ,
where γ is negligible in the security parameter.
If F∣∣
Xi×Y and F
∣∣
Xj×Y are both constant functions, then F
′(i, j) is simply the set of complete
transcripts. By the security of the protocol, the above claim is satisfied with γ = 2.
Otherwise, our construction is symmetric with respect to i and j, so assume that F∣∣
Xi×Y is
column-decomposable as Y = Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ym. Then F
∣∣
Xj×Y is either column-decomposable as
Y = Y ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y ′m′ ; or it is constant, in which case we define m′ = 1 and Y ′1 = Y for simplicity.
Furthermore, we assume without loss of generality that the sets are indexed so that Y1 ∩ Y ′1 6= ∅.
We will construct F ′(i, j) and prove the above properties by induction. More specifically, we will
show by induction on `+ `′ that:
• For all (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ Xi × (Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y`), we have ∆
(
Dx,yF ′(i,j),Dx
′,y′
F ′(i,j)
)
≤ γ`+`′ .
• For all (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ Xj × (Y ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y ′`′), we have ∆
(
Dx,yF ′(i,j),Dx
′,y′
F ′(i,j)
)
≤ γ`+`′ .
The remaining condition to be shown will then follow easily.
To prove the base case, we first observe that since F is uniquely decomposable, Y = (Y1 ∩ Y ′1) ∪
(Y \ (Y1 ∩ Y ′1)) is not a valid decomposition of both F
∣∣
Xi×Y and F
∣∣
Xj×Y . By symmetry, assume that
it is not a valid decomposition of F∣∣
Xi×Y ; thus there exists x ∈ Xi, y ∈ Y1 ∩ Y ′1 , and y′ 6∈ Y1 ∩ Y ′1 ,
such that F(x, y) = F(x, y′). By the properties of decompositions, this equality implies that y′ ∈ Y1;
therefore y′ 6∈ Y ′1 . Without loss of generality, assume that the sets are indexed so that y′ ∈ Y ′2 .
Choose x′ ∈ Xj arbitrarily; then {x, x′} × {y, y′} is a -minor. We will define F ′(i, j) as the
frontier given by Lemma 4.10 for inputs x, x′ and parameter µ to be fixed later. By the properties of
this frontier, we then have
∆
(
Dx′,yF ′(i,j),Dx
′,y′
F ′(i,j)
)
≤
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
.
Our choice of µ will ensure that this statistical difference is negligible. However, by the inductive
hypothesis, these two input pairs (one in Xj × Y ′1 and one in Xj × Y ′2) induce overwhelmingly
different distributions at F (Xj , Y ); the distributions have statistical difference at least 1−λd−1. Thus
(intuitively) F ′(i, j) must be encountered before F (Xj , Y ), with high probability. More formally, by
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Lemma 4.13, we have:
Pr[F ′(i, j) F (Xj , Y )|x′, y] ≥ 1− 2
(
λd−1 +
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)

)
;
Pr[F ′(i, j) F (Xj , Y )|x′, y′] ≥ 1− 2
(
λd−1 +
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)

)
.
The event “F ′(i, j) F (Xj , Y )” can be expressed naturally as a statistical test on the distribution of
transcripts at frontier F (Xj , Y ). For any (x∗, y∗) ∈ Xj ×Y ′1 , we have that ∆
(
Dx′,yF (Xj ,Y ),D
x∗,y∗
F (Xj ,Y )
)
≤
λd−1 by the inductive hypothesis. Thus the probability of the event “F ′(i, j) F (Xj , Y )” can differ
by no more than λd−1 when executing the protocol on inputs (x′, y) versus inputs (x∗, y∗). Thus, we
have:
Pr[F ′(i, j) F (Xj , Y )|x∗, y∗] ≥ 1− 3λd−1 − 2
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
,
for all (x∗, y∗) ∈ Xj × Y ′1 .
Then, intuitively, since F ′(i, j) is almost always encountered before F (Xj , Y ), for all inputs in
Xj × Y ′1 , and all of these inputs induce negligibly close distributions at F (Xj , Y ), then all of these
inputs must also induce negligibly close distributions at F ′(i, j) as well. More formally, we have the
following bound for all (x0, y0), (x1, y1) ∈ Xj × Y ′1 :
∆
(
Dx0,y0F ′(i,j),Dx1,y1F ′(i,j)
)
=
1
2
∑
u∈F ′(i,j)
F ′(i,j)F (Xj ,Y )
∣∣∣Pr[u|x0, y0]− Pr[u|x1, y1]∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
u∈F ′(i,j)
F ′(i,j)6F (Xj ,Y )
∣∣∣Pr[u|x0, y0]− Pr[u|x1, y1]∣∣∣
≤ ∆
(
Dx0,y0F (Xj ,Y ),D
x1,y1
F (Xj ,Y )
)
+
1
2
∑
u∈F ′(i,j)
F ′(i,j)6F (Xj ,Y )
(
Pr[u|x0, y0] + Pr[u|x1, y1]
)
= ∆
(
Dx0,y0F (Xj ,Y ),D
x1,y1
F (Xj ,Y )
)
+
1
2
Pr[F ′(i, j) 6 F (Xj , Y )|x0, y0]
+
1
2
Pr[F ′(i, j) 6 F (Xj , Y )|x1, y1]
≤ 4λd−1 + 2
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
.
We can apply the same reasoning for Xi × Y1 and Xj × Y ′2 ; for each of these domains of F , its input
pairs all induce pairwise negligibly close distributions at the frontier F ′(i, j).
However, we have also shown above that, due to the -minor {x, x′} × {y, y′}, some particular
input pair in Xj × Y ′1 induces a negligibly close (within
(
1+µ
1−µ
)
) distribution to an input pair in
Xj × Y ′2 , at the frontier F ′(i, j). Thus by the triangle inequality, we have that
∆
(
Dx0,y0F ′(i,j),Dx1,y1F ′(i,j)
)
≤ 8λd−1 + 5
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
,
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for all (x0, y0), (x1, y1) ∈ Xj × (Y ′1 ∪ Y ′2).
This establishes the inductive claim for ` = 1, `′ = 2, with γ3 = 8λd−1 + 5
(
1+µ
1−µ
)
.
To complete the inductive step, we use a very similar argument as in the base case. Set
Y ∗ = (Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y`) ∩ (Y ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y ′`′), and observe that (unless Y ∗ = Y , in which case we are
done) Y = Y ∗ ∪ (Y \ Y ∗) is not a valid column-decomposition of both F∣∣
Xi×Y and F
∣∣
Xj×Y . By
symmetry, suppose it is not a column-decomposition of F∣∣
Xi×Y . As above, there exists x0 ∈ Xi,
y ∈ Y ∗, y′ ∈ Y \ Y ∗ such that F(x0, y) = F(x0, y′). Then y′ ∈ Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y`, and y′ 6∈ Y ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y ′`′ .
Assume that the sets are indexed so that y′ ∈ Y ′`′+1.
Let x ∈ Xi and x′ ∈ Xj be the values used in the definition of F ′(i, j). By the inductive hypothe-
sis, ∆
(
Dx,yF ′(i,j),Dx,y
′
F ′(i,j)
)
≤ γ`+`′ , so by the construction of F ′(i, j), we have ∆
(
Dx′,yF ′(i,j),Dx
′,y′
F ′(i,j)
)
≤(
1+µ
1−µ
)
γ`+`′ .
Then applying the same argument as before, (since (x′, y′) ∈ Xj × Y ′`′+1) we can show:
∆
(
Dx0,y0F ′(i,j),Dx1,y1F ′(i,j)
)
≤ 8λd−1 + 5
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
γ`+`′ ,
for all (x0, y0), (x1, y1) ∈ Xj × (Y ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y ′`′+1).
This completes the inductive claim for (`, `′ + 1), setting γ`+`′+1 = 8λd−1 + 5
(
1+µ
1−µ
)
γ`+`′ .
Finally, if we have established the inductive claim, then it is easy to establish the second desired
condition of F ′(i, j). The definition of F ′(i, j) implies that for any y ∈ Y , x ∈ Xi, and x′ ∈ Xj , we
have ∆
(
Dx,yF ′(i,j),Dx
′,y
F ′(i,j)
)
≥ µ
(
1− 21−µ
)
. So by the triangle inequality, we have:
∆
(
Dx0,y0F ′(i,j),Dx1,y1F ′(i,j)
)
≥ µ
(
1− 2
1− µ
)
− γm+m′ ,
for any x0 ∈ Xi, x1 ∈ Xj , and y0, y1 ∈ Y .
It finally suffices to set µ appropriately. First observe that solving the recurrence γn yields
that γn = O
((
5
(
1+µ
1−µ
))n−1
(λd−1 + )
)
. Then setting µ = 1 − (λd−1 + )1/(m+m′), we have
that γm+m′ = O(10m+m
′
(λd−1 + )1/(m+m
′)), which is negligible when λd−1 and  are negligible,
and m,m′ are constant. Then all the desired bounds are negligible, with negligible quantity
γ = O(γm+m′). 4
Step 2: R(i). Next, for each i ≤ n, we define a set R(i) of transcript prefixes, as follows. First,
for each Xi, we arbitrarily choose a representative xi ∈ Xi. Define the following two sets:
L(i) = {u | (∀j 6= i) some prefix of u appears in F ′(i, j)};
R(i) =
{
u ∈ L(i)
∣∣∣∣ α(u, xi) > maxj 6=i α(u, xj)
}
.
Thus L(i) is a frontier, consisting of the partial transcripts which have reached every F ′(i, j) frontier.
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Suppose (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ Xi × Y . Then we have:
∆
(
Dx,yL(i),Dx
′,y′
L(i)
)
≤ 1
2
∑
j 6=i
∑
u∈L(i)∩F ′(i,j)
∣∣∣Pr[u|x, y]− Pr[u|x′, y′]∣∣∣
≤
∑
j 6=i
∆
(
Dx,yF ′(i,j),Dx
′,y′
F ′(i,j)
)
≤ nγ.
Note that the distribution of partial transcripts at any F ′(i, j) can be naturally expressed as a
function of the distribution of transcripts at L(i). Thus for any input pairs (xi, y) with xi ∈ Xi, and
(xj , y) with xj ∈ Xj , we have:
∆
(
Dxi,yL(i),D
xj ,y
L(i)
)
≥ ∆
(
Dxi,yF ′(i,j),D
xj ,y
F ′(i,j)
)
≥ 1− γ.
Note that the optimal statistical test for distinguishing Dxi,yL(i) and D
xj ,y
L(i) is to output (xi, y) on
input u if α(u, xi) < α(u, xj) and output (xj , y) otherwise. Since this statistical test is optimal and
the statistical difference is at least 1 − γ, the probability of reaching a transcript u ∈ L(i) such that
α(u, xi) ≤ α(u, xj) when running the protocol on input xi is at most γ. This observation motivates
the definition of R(i), and for all y ∈ Y , we have:
Pr[¬R(i)|xi, y] ≤
∑
j 6=i
∑
u∈L(i)
α(u,xi)≤α(u,xj)
Pr[u|xi, y] ≤
∑
j 6=i
γ = (n− 1)γ.
Then it follows that Pr[¬R(i)|x, y] ≤ 2nγ for all (x, y) ∈ Xi × Y , since ∆
(
Dx,yL(i),Dxi,yL(i)
)
≤ nγ. 4
Step 3: The final construction. Note that for distinct i and j, the set R(i) ∪ R(j) is prefix-free by
definition. We finally define F (X,Y ) as the partial transcripts of
⋃
iR(i), along with any complete
transcripts needed to extend F (X,Y ) to a frontier.
Let (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ Xi × Y . Then we have:
∆
(
Dx,yF (X,Y ),Dx
′,y′
F (X,Y )
)
=
1
2
∑
u∈F (X,Y )∩R(i)
∣∣∣Pr[u|x, y]− Pr[u|x′, y′]∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
u∈F (X,Y )\R(i)
∣∣∣Pr[u|x, y]− Pr[u|x′, y′]∣∣∣
≤ ∆
(
Dx,yL(i),Dx
′,y′
L(i)
)
+
1
2
∑
u∈F (X,Y )\R(i)
(
Pr[u|x, y] + Pr[u|x′, y′]
)
≤ ∆
(
Dx,yL(i),Dx
′,y′
L(i)
)
+
1
2
(
Pr[¬R(i)|x, y] + Pr[¬R(i)|x′, y′]
)
≤ 3nγ.
This establishes half of the desired claim.
Now let (x, y) ∈ Xi × Y and (x′, y′) ∈ Xj × Y , where i 6= j. Consider the statistical test
on partial transcripts in F (X,Y ) in which we output (x, y) on input u if α(u, xi) > α(u, xj), and
output (x′, y′) otherwise. The probability that this statistical test gives an incorrect answer is at
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most Pr[¬R(i)|x, y] + Pr[¬R(j)|x′, y′] = 4nγ. Thus ∆
(
Dx,yF (X,Y ),Dx
′,y′
F (X,Y )
)
≥ 1− 4nγ. Finally, setting
λ = 4nγ completes the proof.
Completing the proof. Finally, the proof of Theorem 4.12 follows naturally from the previous
lemma:
Proof of Theorem 4.12. Given such frontiers corresponding to each decomposition step, the required
simulation is natural. Suppose by symmetry that the adversary A corrupts Alice alone. The
simulator’s job is to simulate the canonical protocol to A, while interacting with the honest Bob
in the protocol pi. The simulator S does the following:
1. Maintain variables X,Y , and x ∈ X. X and Y are initialized to the domain of function F , and
x is initialized to an arbitrary element of X.
2. For each step in the canonical protocol for F , do:
(a) If this is a step in which Alice speaks, then receive a message in the canonical protocol
fromA. The message determines a subset X ′ ⊆ X upon which to recurse in the canonical
protocol. Update X ← X ′, and if x 6∈ X ′, choose an arbitrary x′ ∈ X ′ and update x← x′.
(b) If this is a step in which Bob speaks, then run the pi protocol honestly on input x,
with the external honest Bob. Run until the partial transcript reaches the frontier in
pi corresponding to Bob’s next decomposition step. If the frontier for a different Bob
decomposition step is encountered first, then abort.
Otherwise, determine the subdomain Y ′ ⊆ Y for this decomposition step such that Bob’s
input lies in Y ′; by the construction of the frontiers, there is an accurate statistical test to
determine this subdomain with overwhelming probability. Update Y ← Y ′, and simulate
to A the corresponding message (Y ′) in the canonical protocol.
3. After the last step of the canonical protocol, continue honestly running the protocol pi on the
current value of input x, with honest Bob.
We note that the simulator S may change its input x several times during its (otherwise honest)
execution of the pi protocol. Here it is important that pi be in normal form, so that the next-message
function depends only on the input and the transcript generated so far (in particular, not on a long-
term private random tape).
Without loss of generality since the canonical protocol is deterministic, suppose that A is
deterministic. For y ∈ Y , define A(y) ∈ X to be an input x ∈ X such that if A interacts with
an honest Bob who runs the (deterministic) canonical protocol on input y, then A will produce
messages in the canonical protocol consistent with having input x ∈ X. To show the soundness of
the simulation, it suffices to show that whenever S is interacting with an honest Bob with input y
in protocol pi, the pi transcript and the simulated canonical protocol transcript are indistinguishable
from respective transcripts honestly generated on inputs A(y) and y. In particular, this implies that
the output of Bob will be indistinguishable in the two settings, by the correctness of pi and the
canonical protocol.
We prove the correctness of the simulation via a sequence of hybrid interactions. Suppose the
maximum number of Alice-rounds in the canonical protocol is n, and let y be the input upon which
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the honest Bob is executing the protocol pi. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let xi be the value of variable x after
i times through step (2a). Thus in the ith time through step (2b), the simulator will honestly run
protocol pi on input xi, and xn = A(y).
We define Hybrid i, for i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, to be identical to the simulation, except that in the first i
times through step (2b), we set the variable x ← xi; thereafter the simulator updates variable x as
normal. Thus Hybrid 0 is exactly the simulation. In Hybrid n, the simulator runs pi honestly on input
A(y) the entire time, and generates a simulated canonical protocol transcript indistinguishable from
one generated with Bob’s true input y, as desired. The latter condition is because by the correctness
of the frontiers, it is only with negligible probability that in step (2b), the simulator will abort or
incorrectly determine Y ′ such that Bob’s input y ∈ Y ′.
Finally, we must show the indistinguishability of consecutive hybrids. The difference between
Hybrids i and i + 1 is that in the first i times through step (2b), the simulator honestly runs the pi
protocol with input xi instead of xi+1. By construction, both xi and xi+1 induce the same messages
in the first i rounds of the canonical protocol, when Bob has input y. Thus by the correctness of
the frontiers, these two inputs induce statistically indistinguishable partial transcripts in the first i
times through step (2b). The remainder of the interaction depends only on the partial transcript; in
particular, not on the past values of the x variable. Thus the entire interaction is indistinguishable
between the two hybrids, as desired.
Implications for other security settings. Theorem 4.12 proves an equivalence between attacks
against the canonical protocol and against any other protocol, in the UC sense. Consequently, the
theorem also has implications for other security settings as well:
Corollary 4.15. Let F be a uniquely decomposable 2-party SSFE. Then F has a non-trivial protocol
that is UC-secure against a class of environments C if and only if the canonical protocol for F is such a
protocol.
Proof. One direction (⇐) of the claim is immediate. For the other direction, suppose pi is such
a secure protocol for F , but the canonical protocol is not. By the properties of F , we have that
pi is also a passive-secure protocol for F . As such, Theorem 4.12 holds. There is an adversary
attacking the canonical protocol in some environment in the class C which violates the security of F .
Theorem 4.12 implies that there is a corresponding adversary attacking pi, in the same environment,
which also violates the security of F . This contradicts the supposed security of pi.
In particular, standalone security and concurrent-self-composable security are both defined as UC
security for a restricted class of environments; and Corollary 4.15 applies to those security settings
(as well as to full UC security, of course).
4.3.4 Round Complexity
Let R(pi, x, y) denote the random variable indicating the number of rounds taken by pi on inputs x, y,
and let R(F , x, y) denote the same quantity with respect to the canonical protocol for F (which is
deterministic).
Corollary 4.16. LetF be a 2-party SSFE functionality. IfF is uniquely decomposable, then its canonical
protocol achieves the optimal round complexity. That is, for every secure protocol pi for F , we have
E[R(pi, x, y)] ≥ R(F , x, y)− ν, where ν is a negligible function in the security parameter of pi.
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Proof. The proof of Theorem 4.12 constructs for pi a frontier for each step in the decomposition of F
(corresponding to each step in the canonical protocol). By the required properties of the frontiers,
the transcript for pi must visit all the relevant frontiers in order, one strictly after the next, with
overwhelming probability.
4.4 Characterizing Passive Security
In this section, we apply Lemma 4.10 to extend the characterization of Beaver [4] and Kushile-
vitz [67] to the case of statistical security. We also show a new characterization of passive security
in terms of the ideal commitment functionality.
Theorem 4.17. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. Then F has a (statistically secure) passive-secure
protocol if and only if F is decomposable.
Proof. (⇐) Trivial by the (perfect) security of canonical protocols.
(⇒) Suppose F has a passive-secure protocol pi. Then it cannot have an OR-minor, since such
functions are complete for passive security [63]. One can easily verify that if F does not have both
a - and -minor, then it is decomposable (in fact, F is isomorphic to the function F(x, y) = x),
and the claim is proven. Otherwise, suppose for contradiction that F is not decomposable. If one
decomposition step can be made in F , say, a partition of X into X1 ∪ X2 such that for all y ∈ Y ,
x ∈ X1, and x′ ∈ X2, F(x, y) 6= F(x′, y), then at least one of F
∣∣
X1×Y and F
∣∣
X2×Y are also not
decomposable. The corresponding condition also holds for column decomposition steps as well.
The protocol in which parties run pi, but restricted their inputs to a subdomain of X ′ × Y ′ ⊆ X × Y ,
is also a passive-secure protocol for F∣∣
X′×Y ′ . Thus without loss of generality, we assume that F is
such that no single decomposition step can be made in F .
Intuitively, by Lemma 4.10, each -minor {x, x′} × {y, y′} corresponds to a combination of
inputs where Alice must differentiate her input before Bob. Similarly, for a -minor, Bob must
differentiate first. We will leverage these constraints to obtain a contradiction to the assumption
that pi is a passively secure protocol.
For every -minor {x, x′}×{y, y′}, we compute the associated frontier Fx,x′ . Similarly, for every
-minor {x, x′} × {y, y′}, we compute the associated frontier Fy,y′ . Let FX be the prefix-minimal
elements of
⋃
x,x′ Fx,x′ , and let FY be the prefix-minimal elements of
⋃
y,y′ Fy,y′ . Intuitively, FX
is the first place where Alice finalizes any distinctions among her inputs, and FY is the first place
where Bob finalizes any distinctions among his inputs.
For an arbitrary x ∈ X, y∗ ∈ Y , we will we will inductively construct a sequence Y1 ⊂ · · · ⊂
Yn = Y such that ∆
(
Dx,y∗FX ,D
x,y
FX
)
≤ i · ν for all y ∈ Yi, where ν is the negligible quantity guaranteed
by Lemma 4.10. That is, at FX , transcripts are nearly independent of Bob’s input. The base case is
Y1 = {y∗}.
For the inductive step, we know that Y = Yi ∪ Yi is not a valid column decomposition step
in F . Thus we must have F(x′, y) = F(x′, y′) for some x′ ∈ X, y ∈ Yi, y′ ∈ Y1. We now
consider the 2 × 2 minor {x, x′} × {y, y′}. If F(x, y) = F(x, y′), then clearly by the security of
the protocol, ∆
(
Dx,yFX ,D
x,y′
FX
)
≤  ≤ ν. If F(x, y) 6= F(x, y′), then we cannot have F(x, y) = F(x′, y)
or F(x, y′) = F(x′, y′), since this would make the 2 × 2 minor in question an OR-minor. The only
other case is that this 2 × 2 minor is a -minor. As such, it has an associated frontier Fx,x′ . Since
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FX contains only prefixes of Fx,x′ , we must have ∆
(
Dx,yFX ,D
x,y′
FX
)
≤ ∆
(
Dx,yFx,x′ ,D
x,y′
Fx,x′
)
≤ ν. Thus in
either of the above cases, we have:
∆
(
Dx,y∗FX ,D
x,y′
FX
)
≤ ∆
(
Dx,y∗FX ,D
x,y
FX
)
+ ∆
(
Dx,yFX ,D
x,y′
FX
)
≤ (i− 1)ν + ν = i · ν
Setting Yi+1 = Yi ∪ {y′} completes the inductive step.
Summarizing, for any x ∈ X, the transcript distribution at FX is nearly independent of Bob’s
input. Symmetrically, for any y ∈ Y , the transcript distribution at FY is nearly independent of
Alice’s input. We will now obtain a contradiction by showing that the probability of reaching FX
strictly before FY is overwhelming, as is the probability of reaching FY strictly before FX — a clear
contradiction since these two events are mutually exclusive.
Let {x, x′}×{y, y′} be a -minor, and let Fx,x′ be its corresponding frontier. As in Lemma 4.13,
we let “F  G | x, y” denote the event that the frontier F is encountered strictly before frontier
G when honestly executing the protocol on inputs x, y. We know that ∆
(
Dx,yFx,x′ ,D
x′,y
Fx,x′
)
≥ 1 − ν,
and also that ∆
(
Dx,yFY ,D
x′,y
FY
)
≤ O(ν). From Lemma 4.13, this implies that Pr[FY  Fx,x′ | x, y] ≥
1−O(ν).
Now, checking whether a transcript reaches FY or Fx,x′ first is a statistical test that can be carried
out on both of the distributions Dx,yFY and D
x,y
Fx,x′
. Since ∆
(
Dx,yFx,x′ ,D
x,y′′
Fx,x′
)
≤ O(ν) for all y′′ ∈ Y , the
outcome of this statistical test must differ by at most O(ν) between input pairs (x, y) and (x, y′′); that
is, Pr[FY  Fx,x′ | x, y′′] ≥ 1 − O(ν). Similarly, since ∆
(
Dx,y′′FY ,D
x′′,y′′
FY
)
≤ O(ν) for all x′′ ∈ X, we
must also have Pr[FY  Fx,x′ | x′′, y′′] ≥ 1−O(ν). Thus, for an arbitrary minor with associated
frontier Fx,x′ , we have
Pr[FY  Fx,x′ | x′′, y′′] ≥ 1−O(ν)
for all x′′ ∈ X, y′′ ∈ Y . Intuitively, when running the protocol on any input, the transcript will
reach FY strictly before Fx,x′ with overwhelming probability. Since FX is defined as the prefix-
minimal elements of at most
(|X|
2
)
frontiers of the form Fx,x′ , we have by a union bound that
Pr[FY  FX | x′′, y′′] ≥ 1 − O(ν) for all x′′ ∈ X, y′′ ∈ Y . In other words, the protocol (when
running on any inputs) will encounter the FY frontier before the FX frontier with overwhelming
probability.
However, a symmetric argument using -minors shows that the protocol will encounter the FX
frontier before the FY frontier with overwhelming probability. This is the desired contradiction.
On SSFE functionalities with security parameters. The above result crucially relies on the fact
that the domain of F does not grow too much as a function of the security parameter. (We use the
fact that |X|ν and |Y |ν are both negligible in the security parameter if ν is negligible.) When
statistical error is allowed, this restriction is necessary, as illustrated by the following example
F : Zn × Zn → (Zn ∪ {⊥})2:
F(x, y) =

(⊥, y) if x ∈ {y, y + 1}
(x,⊥) if y ∈ {x+ 1, x+ 2}
(x, y) otherwise
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All additions are modulo n. F is not row decomposable, since any partition of X would separate
some adjacent pair of inputs {x, x + 1}, and yet F(x, x + 1) = F(x + 1, x + 1). Similarly, F is not
column decomposable.
However, one may also verify that F∣∣
X′×Y ′ is decomposable for any X
′ × Y ′ ( X × Y . This
suggests the following protocol in which Alice randomly picks a value x′ ∈ X, then announces x′
and also announces whether her input is equal to x′. Her announcement induces a restriction of the
function to either {x′} × Y or (X \ {x′})× Y , and the parties continue with the canonical protocol
for the appropriate restriction of F . The protocol is perfectly secure except when x′ ∈ {x, x + 1},
which happens with probability 2/n. Thus when n is allowed to be superpolynomial in the security
parameter, this protocol is statistically secure.
4.4.1 Characterization in Terms of UC Security
We also show that the natural class of passively realizable SSFE functionalities also has a simple
characterization in terms of the vunt reduction:
Theorem 4.18. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. Then F is passively realizable if and only if
F vunt FCOM.
To show a reduction to FCOM, we give a general-purpose “compiler” that compiles any passive-
secure protocol into a UC-secure protocol in the FCOM-hybrid setting. In particular, this step of
the proof applies to any passive-secure protocol for a non-reactive functionality, not just canonical
protocols or protocols for SSFE functionalities. In particular, the output of the functionality may be
non-symmetric or randomized. This compiler, like the well-known GMW compiler [41], may be of
independent interest.
We break the proof into several steps, the first of which is the simple direction:
Proof of (⇐). Suppose pi is a secure protocol for F in the FCOM-hybrid setting. Recall that any
non-trivial UC-secure protocol for a SSFE functionality F (in any hybrid setting) is also passive-
secure (Lemma 4.3). There is a trivial passive-secure protocol for FCOM (the committing party sends
“COMMITTED” in the commit phase and honestly sends the correct value in the reveal phase). We
can compose pi with the passive-secure commitment protocol to obtain a passive-secure protocol for
F in the plain FPVT-hybrid setting.
For the other direction, we modularize the protocol construction into two steps, carried out in
the following lemmas.
• On input (COMMIT, x,X) from Alice, where X is a set: Abort if x 6∈ X. Otherwise, send
(COMMITTED, X) to Bob.
• On input (PROVE, S) from Alice: Abort if S 6⊆ X or if x 6∈ S. Otherwise, send (PROVE, S)
to Bob.
Figure 4.2: Commit-and-prove functionality FC&P
Lemma 4.19. FC&P vunt FCOM, where FC&P is the commit-and-prove functionality defined in Figure 4.2.
Proof. Our protocol for FC&P is as follows, with security parameter k:
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1. On input (COMMIT, x,X), where x ∈ X, Alice lets χ ∈ {0, 1}|X| denote the characteristic vector
of x in X; that is, χi = 1 if i = x and 0 otherwise. Alice also chooses k random permutations
of X: σ1, . . . , σk.
2. Alice sends X to Bob. Then she instantiates 2k|X| instances of FCOM, which we denote as
{Fσi,j ,Fχi,j | i ∈ [k], j ∈ X}. In each Fσi,j , she commits to the value σi(j) ∈ X. In each Fχi,j , she
commits to the value χσ−1i (j) ∈ {0, 1}.
3. Bob receives X and expects to receive 2k|X| commitments from the appropriate size domains.
He then chooses a random string c← {0, 1}k and sends it to Alice.
4. For each i ∈ [k], Alice does the following: If ci = 0, then she opens the commitments Fσi,j for
all j. Otherwise, if ci = 1, then she opens the commitments Fχi,j for all j.
5. Bob checks that Alice opened the appropriate commitments. For each i, Bob does the
following: If ci = 0, then he checks that the decommitments of {Fσi,j | j ∈ X} constitute
a valid permutation of X. If ci = 0, then he checks that the decommitments of {Fχi,j | j ∈ X}
contain exactly one 1 and the others 0. If not, then he aborts the protocol; otherwise, he
outputs (COMMITTED, X).
6. On input (PROVE, S), where x ∈ S ⊆ X, then Alice sends S to Bob and does the following: For
each i ∈ [k] and j ∈ X \ S, she opens the commitments of Fσi,j and of Fχi,σi(j), if they have not
already been opened at an earlier time.
7. Bob receives S and verifies that S ⊆ X. He ensures that Alice has opened (either in this round
or at some earlier time) Fσi,j for each i ∈ [k] and j ∈ X \ S. Suppose Fσi,j has been opened to
σˆi,j (either in this round or at some earlier time). For each i ∈ [k], he ensures that the known
values {σˆi,j} contain no duplicates, and are all elements of X. Then he ensures that Alice has
opened (either in this round or at some earlier time) Fχi,σˆi,j to the value 0, for each i ∈ [k] and
j ∈ X \ S. If all of these checks succeed, then he outputs (PROVE, S).
Correctness of the protocol when both parties are honest is easily verified by inspection. Further,
FC&P never receives input from Bob, so simulation is trivial when the adversary corrupts Bob alone.
We now construct a simulator for the case when the adversary corrupts Alice alone.
The simulator faithfully simulates an honest Bob (who has no input) and FCOM instances in all
steps. If the simulated Bob aborts in step (5), then the simulation also aborts. The simulation is
clearly perfect in this case. We now analyze the simulation in the case where Bob does not abort in
step (5).
The simulator sees the values that Alice has sent to the FCOM instances. Let χˆi,j and σˆi,j be
the values that Alice sent to Fχi,j and Fσi,j , respectively. Call an index i ∈ [k] valid if the values
{χˆi,j | j ∈ X} contain exactly one 1 and the rest 0s, and if the values {σˆi,j | j ∈ X} are a
permutation of X. If all indices i ∈ [k] are invalid, then the simulated Bob would have aborted in
step (5) with overwhelming probability 1− 2−k. Thus we condition on the event that some index i
is valid.
Let i be any valid index, and let xˆ ∈ X be the unique value such that χˆi,σˆi,xˆ = 1. The simulator
sends (COMMIT, xˆ) to FC&P. Now throughout the simulation, if the simulated Bob outputs (PROVE, S),
then the simulator sends (PROVE, S) to FC&P. It suffices to show that the simulated Bob never outputs
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(PROVE, S) such that xˆ 6∈ S. However, to convince Bob that the committed value lies in S, Alice must
first open Fσi,xˆ for all i ∈ [k]. In particular, she must do this for the valid i considered above. Then for
that i, she must open Fχi,σˆi,xˆ . By our assumption, this commitment can only be opened to the value
1, so the simulated Bob does not output (PROVE, S) in this case. Thus, apart from the negligible
error probability 2−k, the overall simulation is perfect.
Lemma 4.20. Let F be any non-reactive functionality. If F is securely realizable against passive,
unbounded adversaries, then F vunt FC&P.
Proof. We describe a general-purpose procedure for compiling an arbitrary passive-secure protocol
to a UC-secure protocol in the FC&P-hybrid setting. Suppose pi is a passive-secure protocol for F , in
random-tape normal form (that is, all random coin tosses are made ahead of time, and the protocol’s
next message function is a deterministic function of the random tape, input, and transcript so far).
Since F is non-reactive, pi takes from each party a random tape from some domain Rk and a single
input, both chosen at the beginning of the interaction. The compiled protocol is as follows, with
security parameter k:
1. On input x ∈ X, Alice chooses a random rA ← Rk and sends (COMMIT, (x, rA), X ×Rk) to an
instance of FC&P.
2. Bob expects (COMMITTED, X ×Rk) from the first instance of FC&P. Otherwise he aborts.
3. On input y ∈ Y , Bob chooses a random rB ← Rk and sends (COMMIT, (y, rB), Y × Rk) to a
new instance of FC&P.
4. Alice expects (COMMITTED, Y ×Rk) from the second instance of FC&P. Otherwise she aborts.
5. Bob chooses a random r′A ← Rk and sends it to Alice.
6. Alice chooses a random r′B ← Rk and sends it to Bob.
7. Both parties maintain a partial transcript τ for the protocol pi, initialized to the empty
transcript. For each step of the protocol pi:
(a) If it is Alice’s turn, then she determines the next message m in the pi protocol on input
x, random tape rA ⊕ r′A, and transcript τ seen before. She sends m to Bob. Both parties
can compute S, the subset of X ×Rk of input/random tape pairs that are consistent with
the message m after seeing transcript τ so far. Alice sends (PROVE, S) to his instance of
FC&P, and Bob expects to receive (PROVE, S); otherwise he aborts. Both parties update
τ ← τ‖m.
(b) If it is Bob’s turn, then the parties do as above, with their roles reversed.
When pi terminates, the parties output its result.
The correctness of the protocol is clear, when both parties are honest. We show a simulator for the
case where the adversary corrupts Alice alone; the other case is symmetric. It suffices to reduce
the security of the compiled protocol to the passive security of pi. For this, we show a simulator
interacting as a passively corrupt Alice in the pi protocol achieves the same effect as the corrupt Alice
in the compiled protocol interaction.
63
The simulation is as follows: It first honestly samples a random tape r ← Rk for its external
pi interaction. Then it starts internally running the corrupt Alice. In step (1), when Alice sends
(COMMIT, (x, rA), X × Rk) to FC&P, the simulator internally records x. In step (3), it sends
(COMMITTED, Y ×Rk) to Alice, and in step (5) sends r′A = r⊕ rA. Then the simulator starts running
pi honestly on input x and random tape r. If the messages sent by the corrupt Alice in step (7a) ever
disagree with the simulator’s execution of pi, or if the corrupt Alice’s inputs to FC&P would cause an
honest Bob to abort, then the simulator aborts. Whenever the simulator receives a message m in
the pi protocol from the external honest Bob, it simulates that Bob sent m and that Alice received
(PROVE, S) for the appropriate S.
It is clear that the simulator is a passive adversary in the pi protocol – it honestly samples a
random tape and executes pi honestly on some fixed input throughout its interaction. It aborts
whenever Bob would abort in the compiled protocol, except possibly also in the case where the
corrupt Alice sends a message that disagrees with the simulator’s honest execution of pi. However,
it is easy to see that an honest Bob would have immediately aborted in these cases as well. By
construction, the simulator has computed message m as the next message in the pi protocol. If the
corrupt Alice sends message m′ 6= m, then she would have to use FC&P to prove that her committed
value (x, rA) is consistent with m′ and r′A from step (5). But by construction, these values are
consistent only with m, as computed by the simulator.
We note that for deterministic protocols (which are all that are strictly necessary to prove
the characterization for SSFE), the overhead of the compiler is linear in the input size, while for
randomized protocols, it is exponential in the randomness complexity.
4.5 Characterizing Standalone Security
Our main tool, Theorem 4.12, can apply to the standalone security setting, but only to protocols for
uniquely decomposable SSFE functionalities. In this section we first use a specialized argument
for standalone security to prove that all standalone-realizable SSFE functionalities are uniquely
decomposable. Then, we can continue our approach of applying Theorem 4.12 to identify the
additional properties that exactly characterize standalone realizability.
Lemma 4.21. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. If F is standalone-realizable, then F is uniquely
decomposable.
Proof. Suppose F has a standalone-secure protocol pi. By Lemma 4.3, we have that pi is also passive-
secure, and thus F is decomposable. Without loss of generality, assume that pi and F are in normal
form, with the following additional properties:
• If inputs (x, y) and (x′, y′) induce different transcripts in some canonical protocol for F (i.e.,
they are in different parts of some decomposition for F), then F(x, y) 6= F(x′, y′). This is
without loss of generality for decomposable functionalities, since F is isomorphic to such a
functionality.
• If either party aborts the protocol, it first announces in the protocol that it is aborting. Also
recall that in our normal form, honest parties announce in the protocol their final outputs as
their last message.
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In an interaction between a corrupt party and an honest party running the pi protocol, call an
outcome of the interaction either the output of the honest party, or the symbol ⊥A or ⊥B , indicating
an abort by honest Alice or by honest Bob, respectively. By the properties of our normal form, the
outcome of the interaction is a publicly computable function of the transcript.
Suppose we partition the set of possible outcomes into two sets, red and blue. Let the
predicate R(m1m2 · · ·mn) denote the event that the outcome of transcript m1 · · ·mn is red, and let
B(m1m2 · · ·mn) denote the event that the outcome is blue. Then for any protocol whose outcome
is a public function of the transcript, the protocol is one of the following two kinds (suppose Alice
sends the first message in the protocol):
• ∃m1∀m2 · · · : R(m1 · · ·mn). This corresponds to a strategy for a corrupt Alice to induce a red
outcome with probability 1.
• ∀m1∃m2 · · · : B(m1 · · ·mn). This corresponds to a strategy for a corrupt Bob to induce a blue
outcome with probability 1.
Now for the sake of contradiction, assume that F has two distinct decompositions. We will show that
there is then a way to partition the outcomes into red and blue so that neither of the two strategies
above can be effected in the ideal world. This will contradict the supposed security of pi.
We first claim that there exists a decomposition of F that contains a step X ′×Y ′ ⊆ X×Y where
F∣∣
X′×Y ′ is simultaneously row- and column-decomposable. Take any two distinct decompositions
of F , and consider the earliest step at which they differ. Without loss of generality, assume that
they differ at the first step. If one decomposition starts with a row-decomposition step and the other
starts with a column-decomposition step, then we are done. Otherwise, F is (by symmetry) row-
decomposable in two distinct ways, say, X × Y = (X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xm)× Y = (X ′1 ∪ · · · ∪X ′n)× Y , with
{X1, . . . , Xm} 6= {X ′1, . . . , X ′n}. Then by symmetry, there must be some Xi and X ′j such that Xi∩X ′j
and Xi ∩ (X \X ′j) are both non-empty. One can easily verify that F
∣∣
Xi×Y can be row-decomposed
starting with the step Xi = (Xi ∩X ′j) ∪ (Xi \X ′j). In particular, this implies that F is not constant
over Xi×Y . Also, Xi×Y appears in one of the two row-decompositions of F , so F
∣∣
Xi×Y must also
be column-decomposable (row- and column-decomposition steps must alternate).
We will let the outcome ⊥A (an abort by honest Alice) be red, and the outcome ⊥B (an abort
by honest Bob) be blue. Now we inductively color the output-outcomes as follows. In the base
case, F is both row- and column-decomposable, say, as X × Y = (X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xm) × Y and
X × Y = X × (Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Yn). The output ranges of F
∣∣
Xi×Yj and F
∣∣
Xk×Yl are disjoint when
(Xi, Yj) 6= (Xk, Yl), due to the normal form of F . We will color the outputs as a checkerboard; that
is, the outputs of F∣∣
Xi×Yj are red if i + j is even and blue if i + j is odd. Note that there is no
monochromatic red row or monochromatic blue column in the function table for F .
For the inductive step, if F is row-decomposable as X × Y = (X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xm) × Y , then for
some i, F∣∣
Xi×Y contains a step which is both row- and column-decomposable. We color these
outputs inductively (they are disjoint from the outputs in other parts Xj × Y , for j 6= i), and color
the remaining outputs of F red. Note that this cannot have induced a monochromatic red row or
monochromatic blue column in the function table for F . Similarly, if F is column-decomposable, we
inductively color one of the subproblems and color the remaining outputs blue.
The resulting coloring leaves no monochromatic red row or monochromatic blue column. That
is, there is no input for Alice which guarantees a red output-outcome; and by not delivering Bob’s
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output in the ideal interaction, Alice can only induce the blue outcome ⊥B . Similarly, there is
no strategy for Bob which guarantees a blue outcome in the ideal interaction. This suggests the
following environment to distinguish the real and ideal interactions: Expect the adversary to corrupt
one party, and choose a random input for the honest party. If the honest party is Alice and the
outcome is blue, or if the honest party is Bob and the outcome is red, then output 1. We have
shown that an adversary attacking pi can always cause such an environment to output 1 with
probability 1. However, in the ideal world, the environment outputs 1 with probability at most
1−min{1/|X|, 1/|Y |}, which is bounded away from 1 by a constant. This environment distinguishes
between pi and the ideal interaction with constant probability, so pi is not secure. Thus we conclude
that F must be uniquely decomposable.
We now develop our characterization of standalone realizability.
Decomposition strategies. Let F be a uniquely decomposable 2-party SSFE functionality. We
define an Alice-strategy as a function that maps every row decomposition step X × Y = (X1 ∪ · · · ∪
Xt) × Y to one of the Xi’s. Similarly we define a Bob-strategy for the set of column decomposition
steps. If A and B are Alice and Bob-strategies for F , respectively, then we define F∗(A,B) to be the
subset X ′ × Y ′ ⊆ X × Y obtained by “traversing” the decomposition of F according to the choices
of A and B.
The definition of F∗ is easy to motivate: it denotes the outcome in the canonical protocol for F ,
as a function of the strategies of (possibly corrupt) Alice and Bob.
Definition 4.22 (Saturation). Let F be a uniquely decomposable 2-party SSFE functionality. We say
that F is saturated if F is isomorphic to F∗.
To understand this condition further, we provide an alternate description for it. For every x ∈ X
we define an Alice-strategy Ax such that at any row decomposition stepX ′×Y ′ = (X1∪· · ·∪Xt)×Y ′
such that x ∈ X ′, the strategy chooses the unique Xi such that x ∈ Xi. For X ′ such that x 6∈ X ′,
the choice is arbitrary, say, X1. Similarly for all y ∈ Y we define a corresponding Bob-strategy By.
Note that in the canonical protocol, on inputs x and y, Alice and Bob traverse the decomposition
of F according to the strategy (Ax, By), to compute the set F∗(Ax, By). If F is saturated, then all
Alice strategies should correspond to some x that Alice can use as an input to F . That is, for all
Alice-strategies A, there exists an x ∈ X such that for all y ∈ Y , we have F∗(A,By) = F∗(Ax, By);
similarly each Bob strategy B is equivalent to some By.
As an example, 0 12 3 is not uniquely decomposable.
0 1 1
2 3 2 is uniquely decomposable, but not
saturated. Finally, 0 1 1 02 3 2 3 is saturated.
Note that there is exactly one saturated function (up to isomorphism) for each decomposition
structure.
Theorem 4.23. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality. Then F is standalone-realizable if and only if
F is saturated.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose F is saturated, then we will show that its canonical protocol is standalone
secure. Clearly the canonical protocol is correct, so it suffices to construct a (possibly rewinding)
simulator for a corrupt party. The simulator for an adversary A does the following: By symmetry,
suppose A corrupts Alice. First fix a random tape ω for A, then for every Bob-strategy B, run the
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canonical protocol against A (using random tape ω), effecting the strategy B. The (deterministic)
choices of A at each decomposition step (equivalently, step of the canonical protocol) uniquely
determine an Alice-strategy A. By the saturation of F , A is equivalent to some Ax strategy, and the
simulator sends x to the functionality F in the ideal world. After receiving the output F(x, y), the
simulator gives to the adversary the (unique) canonical-protocol transcript consistent with F(x, y).
(⇒) Suppose F is standalone-realizable. Then by Lemma 4.21, we know that F is uniquely
decomposable. By Corollary 4.15, then the canonical protocol for F is standalone-secure. However,
suppose for contradiction that F is not saturated. Then there is (by symmetry) an Alice-strategy A
that corresponds to no input-strategy Ax. We will show that the canonical protocol is in fact not
standalone-secure in this case, a contradiction. The attack on the canonical protocol is for a corrupt
Alice to effect the strategy A on the canonical protocol. The environment chooses a random input
y for Bob and outputs 1 if Bob reports an output consistent with Bob-strategy By and the Alice-
strategy A. Clearly the environment outputs 1 with probability 1 in the real protocol interaction.
However, in the ideal world, the simulator must send some input x to F (chosen independently of
the environment’s choice of y) and Bob’s output is F(x, y). But with probability at least 1/|Y |, a
constant, we have that y is one of the inputs for which F∗(A,By) and F∗(Ax, By) disagree, so the
environment outputs 0.
This environment distinguishes the real protocol interaction from the ideal interaction. Thus we
conclude that F is saturated.
4.6 Impossibility Results for Concurrent Self-Composition
Recall that in the concurrent self-composition setting, the parties can initiate several concurrent
instances of a single protocol, but with the same roles for each instance. Furthermore, the
environment does not interact with the adversary throughout the execution of these protocol
instances.
Lindell [70] showed that security under general (that is, with no limit on the number of
protocol instances) concurrent self-composition is equivalent to full-fledged UC security, for almost
all functionalities. His result was framed in the PPT setting, though the proof also holds in the
unbounded setting that we consider in this chapter.
Lindell’s proof heavily relies on the assumption that there is no a priori limit to the number of
concurrent protocol instances. Indeed, in the case where there is such a fixed bound, chosen before
the protocol is constructed (a setting called bounded concurrent self-composition), Lindell [69] and
Pass and Rosen [80] constructed secure protocols for all SFE functionalities.
It remained open whether there is such a difference between bounded and unbounded concur-
rency, in the computationally unbounded setting as well. Backes et al. [3] gave an example protocol
that was standalone-secure, and even had a perfect, efficient (rewinding) simulator, but was not
secure against 2 concurrent instances. They left open the question of whether it is their choice of
protocol which prevented security under concurrent self-composition (that is, the protocol requires
a rewinding simulation), or an inherent property of the functionality. Using our new techniques,
we are able to extend their concurrency attack and settle the question for the case of uniquely
decomposable SSFE functionalities.
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Theorem 4.24. Let F be a 2-party SSFE functionality with unique decomposition. If F is not UC-
realizable, then F has no protocol secure against even two concurrent instances.
Proof. An SSFE functionality F as in the theorem statement must be uniquely decomposable with
decomposition depth at least 2 (since SSFE functionalities with decomposition depth 1 are UC-
realizable; Theorem 3.21). We show a concurrent attack against two instances of the canonical
protocol for F , which by Corollary 4.15 implies that F is not realizable under concurrent self-
composition of two instances. Our attack is a simple generalization of the attack from [3].
By symmetry, suppose Alice speaks first in the canonical protocol, and let x, x′ be two inputs
which induce different messages in the first round of the protocol. Let y, y′ be two inputs which
induce different messages in the second round of the protocol when Alice has input x (thus
F(x, y) 6= F(x, y′)). We will construct an adversary that corrupts Bob. Consider an environment
which runs two instances of F , supplies inputs for Alice for the instances, and outputs 1 if Alice
reports particular expected outputs for the two instances. The environment chooses randomly from
one of the following three cases:
1. Supply inputs x and x′, respectively. Expect outputs F(x, y′) and F(x′, y), respectively.
2. Supply inputs x′ and x, respectively. Expect outputs F(x′, y) and F(x, y′), respectively.
3. Supply inputs x and x, respectively. Expect outputs F(x, y) and F(x, y), respectively.
A malicious Bob can cause the environment to output 1 with probability 1 in the real world. He
waits to receive Alice’s first message in both canonical protocol instances to determine whether she
has x or x′ in each instance. Then he can continue the protocols with inputs y or y′, as appropriate.
In the ideal world, Bob must send an input to one of the instances of F before the other (i.e.,
before learning anything about how Alice’s inputs have been chosen); suppose he first sends yˆ to
the first instance of F . If F(x, yˆ) 6= F(x, y), then with probability 1/3, he induces the wrong output
in case (3). But if F(x, yˆ) = F(x, y) 6= F(x, y′), then with probability 1/3, he induces the wrong
output in case (1). Similarly, if he first sends an input to the second instance of F , he violates either
case (2) or (3) with probability 1/3.
4.7 Cryptographic Complexity Reductions
In this section we develop a new technique for deriving separations among SSFE functionalities with
respect to the vunt relation. We apply the technique to specific functionalities to uncover interesting
structures within the landscape of cryptographic complexity.
Theorem 4.25. If G is a 2-party non-reactive functionality (not necessarily deterministic or uniquely
decomposable SSFE) with a passive-secure, m-round protocol, and F is a 2-party SSFE functionality
with unique decomposition of depth n > m, then F 6vunt G.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that pi is a protocol for F in the G-hybrid setting. Without loss
of generality since G is non-reactive, assume that every instance of G invoked by pi is invoked the
following way: In the same step, both parties send an input to G and then wait for their outputs to
be delivered before continuing.
By Lemma 4.3, pi is also passive-secure in the same setting. Define pi to be the result of replacing
each call to G in pi with the m-round passive-secure protocol for G. For simplicity, we assume that the
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first message in G’s secure protocol is always prefixed with SUBPROT-START, the last message is always
prefixed with SUBPROT-END, and all other messages are prefixed with SUBPROT. By our assumption
about how instances of G are invoked (in particular, that both parties wait for G to give output
before continuing), we have that each instance of G’s protocol appears as a continuous subsequence
of the pi protocol — that is, messages from different G-protocol instances are not interleaved. By the
composability of passive-secure protocols, we have that pi is a passive-secure protocol for F in the
plain (FPVT) setting.
We will eventually apply Theorem 4.12 to derive an adversary attacking pi. The proof of
Theorem 4.12 constructs an adversary of the following form: it maintains a local variable for its
input. At each step of the protocol, it possibly changes the contents of that variable, then runs the
protocol honestly using the contents of the variable as the input to the protocol. Say that such an
adversary behaves consistently for a span of protocol rounds if throughout that span, it does not
change the contents of its input variable. We call a step of the pi protocol off-limits if the last message
was prefixed with SUBPROT or SUBPROT-START (but not SUBPROT-END — the subprotocol is already
complete if the last message begins with SUBPROT-END).
Now suppose that S is an adversary that behaves consistently at every off-limit step in pi. Then
there is an adversary S ′ which achieves the same effect in the pi protocol (in the G-hybrid setting)
for all environments. S ′ simply simulates S, except at each point in pi when the next message
is expected to begin with SUBPROT-START, S ′ instead sends the input to G that pi prescribes in
this step when using the current contents of S ’s input variable. Since S is guaranteed to behave
consistently consistently until after the corresponding SUBPROT-END message has been received,
it behaves passively throughout the entire subprotocol. Thus S ′ uses the passive security of the
protocol for G to simulate the SUBPROT-messages of the pi protocol, given its input and output from
G.
Thus, it suffices to construct an adversary S that violates the security of F , and that behaves
consistently in every off-limits steps of pi. This will contradict the assumption that pi is a secure
realization of F in the G-hybrid setting. For this, we first construct an attack on the canonical
protocol for F and use a modification of Theorem 4.12 to derive an adversary S attacking pi with
the desired properties.
Let x0 ∈ X, y0 ∈ Y be inputs that cause the canonical protocol for F to take n ≥ 2 rounds, the
maximum number of rounds. Let r and r′ denote the indices of the first and last round, respectively,
in which Alice speaks in the canonical protocol for F on inputs (x0, y0). Similarly, let s and s′ denote
the first and last rounds in which Bob speaks. Then {r, s} = {1, 2}, and {r′, s′} = {n− 1, n}.
When running pi honestly on inputs (x0, y0), we encounter each of the n transcript frontiers (cor-
responding to each round of the canonical protocol) in strict order, with overwhelming probability;
that is, we do not encounter multiple frontiers in the same step of the protocol. As such, there are
at least n steps of pi between encountering the first and the nth frontier, inclusively. Note that at
most m− 1 ≤ n− 2 consecutive steps of pi are off-limits, by our definition of off-limits. Then by the
pigeonhole principle, at least one of the following probabilities must be at least 1/2:
• The probability of encountering a non-off-limits step between the s-th and the (r′ − 1)-th
frontiers of pi (inclusively), when executing pi honestly on inputs (x0, y0).
• The probability of encountering a non-off-limits step between the r-th and the (s′ − 1)-th
frontiers of pi (inclusively), when executing pi honestly on inputs (x0, y0).
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By symmetry, suppose the second probability is at least 1/2. Let y1 be such that the unique
canonical-protocol transcripts for inputs (x0, y0) and (x0, y1) agree until Bob’s last message; thus
F(x0, y0) 6= F(x0, y1). Let x1 be an input for Alice such that x0 and x1 induce different message in
Alice’s first turn of the canonical protocol, when Bob uses input y0. Now consider an environment
which expects the adversary to corrupt Bob, and which does the following:
1. Choose random b← {0, 1}, and supply input xb to Alice.
2. Expect b′ ∈ {0, 1} from the adversary. If b′ 6= b or b = 1, then output 0.
3. If b = 0, then choose random c← {0, 1} and give c to the adversary.
4. Output 1 if Alice reports output F(xb, yc), and 0 otherwise.
The conditions enforced by this environment are similar to those of a “split adversary” considered
by [22]. We claim that, when interacting with any adversary in the ideal world, the environment
outputs 1 with probability at most 3/4. If the adversary gives an input y to F before reporting
its guess of b to the environment, then its choice of y is independent of the environment’s choice
of c. With probability 1/4, the environment chooses b = 0 and chooses the c such that F(xb, yc)
disagrees with F(xb, y), so the environment outputs 0. If the adversary reports its guess of b to the
environment before interacting with F , then its guess is independent of the environment’s choice of
b, so the environment outputs 0 with probability 1/2.
Thus it suffices to design a suitable attack on the pi protocol that succeeds with probability
noticeably greater than 3/4.
A straight-forward adversaryA attacking the canonical protocol for F can make the environment
output 1 with probability 1: It runs the canonical protocol on input y0. After the first message from
Alice (round r), it correctly determines whether Alice’s input is x0 or x1, and reports accordingly.
After receiving c from the environment, it thereafter runs the canonical protocol on input yc. Note
that the difference between y0 and y1 does not make a difference in the protocol until round s′.
Applying Theorem 4.12 to A results in a S that attacks the pi protocol. S only needs to change
its input variable at most once: possibly from y0 to y1. By the choice of x0 and x1, S has determined
whether it needs to swap as soon as it encounters the r-th frontier. Similarly, the resulting simulation
is sound if S swaps its input any time except after leaving the (s′ − 1)-th frontier (at the (s′ − 1)th
frontier, inputs y0 and y1 still induce statistically indistinguishable transcript distributions). We
modify S so that whenever it wants to swap its input from y0 to y1, it waits for a non-off-limits step
in this range to do so. If it does not encounter such a step, then S does not change its input and
continues with input y0. Thus S behaves consistently.
The probability that when interacting with S, the environment outputs 0 is at most a negligible
amount plus the probability that b = 0 and c = 1 and S is unable to swap its input. By our
assumption, this event happens with probability at most 1/8, so the environment outputs 1 with
probability negligibly close to 7/8. Thus, S violates the security of F in this environment. Since S
behaves consistently, we can construct a S ′ that attacks pi in the G-hybrid setting and achieves the
same effect. Finally, this attack S ′ violates the supposed security of pi.
From the relationship between a functionality’s decomposition depth and the round complexity
of the associated canonical protocol, we have the following combinatorial criterion:
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Corollary 4.26. If F is a 2-party SSFE functionality with unique decomposition depth m and G is a 2-
party SSFE functionality with a (not necessarily unique) decomposition of depth n < m, then F 6vunt G.
Put another way, decomposition depth (equivalently, round complexity of a passive-secure
protocol; see Corollary 4.16) for uniquely decomposable SSFE functionalities is a monotonic quantity
in the unbounded UC security setting, which cannot be increased via any protocol. For a certain class
of 2-party SSFE functionalities G, we are able to slightly strengthen Theorem 4.25, to also derive
separations between pairs of SSFE functionalities that have the same decomposition depth:
Theorem 4.27. If F is a 2-party SSFE that has unique decomposition depth at least 2, and G is
(isomorphic to) a functionality of the form G(x, y) = (x, y),3 then F 6vunt G.
Proof sketch. The proof follows closely that of Theorem 4.25. We sketch the important differences.
First, observe that G has two distinct 2-round canonical protocols (and thus has decomposition
depth 2): one in which Alice first announces x, then Bob announces y, and vice-versa. Now, let A be
an adversary that attacks F ’s canonical protocol and violates the security of F in some environment
(such an A must exist, since F has decomposition depth at least two and is therefore not UC-
realizable; see Theorem 3.21). Suppose by symmetry that A corrupts Alice. We will translate A to
an attack against any protocol for F in the G-hybrid setting, using the approach of Theorem 4.25,
except that we will replace instances of G with the canonical protocol for G in which Alice speaks
first. (Similarly, ifA corrupts Bob, we will use the canonical protocol for G in which Bob speaks first.)
In this way, every off-limits step in the protocol is a turn in which Bob speaks. Thus every adversary
corrupting Alice obtained by applying Theorem 4.12 to the pi protocol is an adversary which behaves
consistently, and can be translated to an adversary attacking the pi protocol that achieves the same
effect.
4.7.1 Infinite Hierarchy & Incomparable Complexities
Let Gn : {0, 2, . . . , 2n} × {1, 3, . . . , 2n + 1} → {0, 1, . . . , 2n} be defined as Gn(x, y) = min{x, y}. For
example, G1 = 0 01 2 and G2 =
0 0 0
1 2 2
1 3 4
. It can be seen by inspection that Gn has a unique decomposition
of depth 2n. The corresponding canonical protocol has at most 2n rounds, and is the one in which
Alice first announces whether x = 0, then (if necessary) Bob announces whether y = 1, and so on.
These are the “Dutch flower auction” protocols from [3].
Corollary 4.28. The functionalities G1,G2, . . . form a strict, infinite hierarchy of increasing complexity
under the vunt relation. That is, Gi vunt Gj if and only if i ≤ j.
Proof. By Theorem 4.25, Gi 6vunt Gj when i > j. It suffices to show that Gn vunt Gn+1, since the vunt
relation is transitive. We claim that the following is a UC-secure protocol for Gn in the Gn+1-hybrid
world: both parties send their Gn inputs directly to Gn+1, and abort if the response is out of bounds
for the output of Gn (i.e., either 2n+ 1 or 2n+ 2).
The protocol is clearly correct when both parties are honest, thus it suffices to show a simulator
for an adversary who corrupts a party. Suppose a real-world adversary attempts to send s to Gn+1
in the protocol. If s ≤ 2n + 1, then s is a valid input for Gn, and the other party will accept, so the
3 Functionalities of this kind are called symmetric exchange functionalities, and are an important class in the results of
Chapter 5. See Definition 5.22.
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simulator simply sends s as the input in the ideal world, and delivers the output; this simulation is
perfect. If the corrupt party is Bob, and s = 2n+ 3, then since Alice is honest, her input will always
be the minimum and she will never abort. The simulator can send 2n + 1 to Gn in the ideal world
(the maximum possible value) and deliver the output. If the corrupt party is Alice and s = 2n + 2,
then if Bob’s input to the protocol was 2n + 1, he would abort in the real world interaction. So
the simulator sends 2n to Gn and delivers the output unless the output is 2n, which indicates that
Bob’s input must have been 2n+ 1. Note that we crucially use the fact that the simulator can block
outputs.
A consequence of Corollary 4.28 is that there is a UC-secure protocol for Gn in the Gm-hybrid
setting if and only if there is such a protocol that is deterministic, has perfect security, and invokes
only a single instance of Gm.
Corollary 4.29. There is no functionality F which is complete (with respect to the vunt relation) for the
class of passively realizable 2-party SSFE functionalities, or for the class standalone-realizable 2-party
SSFE functionalities.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 4.25 and by observing that there exist functionalities of arbitrarily
high decomposition depth in both classes in question.
Corollary 4.30. There exist functionalities F and G whose complexities are incomparable; that is,
F 6vunt G and G 6vunt F .
Proof. If F is passively realizable but not standalone realizable, and G is standalone realizable, then
F 6vunt G, since the class of standalone-realizable SFE functionalities is closed under composition.
This is because without loss of generality (as in the normal form considered in the proof of
Theorem 4.25), each call to a non-reactive functionality can be made synchronous in a single step
of the calling protocol. Thus no instances of the functionality are concurrently active.
On the other hand, if F and G are 2-party decomposable SSFE functionalities, and G has
unique decomposition depth larger than the decomposition depth of F , then G 6vunt F , by
Corollary 4.26.
As a concrete example, the functionalities F and G are incomparable if we let F be the XOR
function (or any function of the form F(x, y) = (x, y)) and G be any of the Gi functionalities defined
in Corollary 4.28.
4.8 Conclusion & Open Problems
We have developed a powerful new tool for analyzing the complexity of 2-party SSFE functionalities,
which unifies all of our impossibility results in a wide variety of security settings. The natural
extensions of our work involve extending these tools to apply to a larger class of functionalities.
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Non-uniquely decomposable functionalities. Our main technical tool crucially relies on unique
decomposability of the target functionality. This restriction prevents us from proving impossibility
results for securely realizing functionalities like a symmetric exchange F(x, y) = (x, y), which may
have many decompositions (this class of functionalities is important in Chapter 5). However, it seems
likely that even for non-uniquely decomposable functionalities, the decomposition structure can be
used to construct conceptually simple attacks on its protocols, in a manner similar to Theorem 4.12.
For example, in any execution of any protocol for F , the parties must (at least intuitively) reveal
information about their inputs in the same order as some decomposition of F .
We conjecture that among all decomposable SSFE functionalities F and G, there is a simple
combinatorial characterization (involving the decomposition structure) for when F vunt G. For
instance, let Fn : {1, . . . , n}2 → {1, . . . , n}2 be the simultaneous exchange function defined by
Fn(x, y) = (x, y). We conjecture that these functionalities form an infinite hierarchy of complexity,
so that Fi vunt Fj if and only if i ≤ j. However, unlike the complexity hierarchy that is known in the
uniquely decomposable case (Corollary 4.28), all of these functions have decompositions of depth 2.
Our current techniques are only able to prove complexity separations based on decomposition depth
(Corollary 4.26), so any complete combinatorial characterization of vunt will likely have to take into
account more details of the decomposition structure.
Nothing is known about the class of functionalities which are neither complete nor passively-
realizable, other than the simple observation that this class is non-empty. One such 2-party SSFE is
the “spiral” function
0 0 1
3 4 1
3 2 2
. Clearly, completely new techniques are needed to show any results of
the form F 6vunt G among functionalities F and G in this class. However, since this class contains
functionalities possibly more complex than any of the classes studied so far, any better understanding
of the class will shed valuable insight on the nature of cryptographic complexity.
Non-SSFE functionalities. Our characterizations of passive- and standalone-realizability are
known to generalize to the case of multi-party (non-symmetric) SFE functionalities [66], so it may be
possible to extend our main technical tools in a similar way. However, our current proof techniques
strongly rely on the fact that the SFE being computed has symmetric output; we use a normal form
in which the outcome of the protocol is a public function of the transcript. Also, the communication
channel (i.e., broadcast or point-to-point) makes a significant difference for secure realizability of
multi-party functionalities.
There is no known characterization of passive- or standalone-realizability for randomized func-
tionalities. Once randomized functionalities are better understood in the passive security setting, it
is likely that our techniques can be updated, since we currently leverage decomposability results of
the passive setting in all of our impossibility proofs.
In Chapter 5, we develop some tools for studying reactive functionalities, though it is not clear
whether these automata-theoretic tools can be easily incorporated into our current approach.
Commitment compiler. We have constructed a general purpose “compiler” which converts a
passive-secure protocol into a UC-secure protocol in the FCOM-hybrid setting. We used this compiler
to show that among 2-party SSFE functionalities, F vunt FCOM if and only if F has a passive-secure
protocol. We leave open the question of whether this characterization generalizes to larger classes
of functionalities. In particular, our current approach seems severely limited to the case when F is
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non-reactive.
Furthermore, the compiler’s overhead is exponential in the randomness complexity of a protocol.
A more practical compiler would have polynomial overhead for all protocols, deterministic and
randomized.
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CHAPTER 5
Polynomial-Time Cryptographic Complexity
5.1 Overview
We have seen that the vunt reduction can distinguish infinitely many levels of cryptographic
complexity among MPC functionalities. Naturally, one might wonder whether this is also the case for
the vpnt reduction, which is slightly weaker, yet still strong, being also based on UC security. In this
section, we show that, perhaps surprisingly, there are only two levels of cryptographic complexity
under the vpnt reduction.
Zero-one laws. Under any cryptographic reduction v, there are always at least two distinct
complexity levels:
• Trivial functionalities: Those which can be securely realized without access to any ideal
functionality. Generally, the security model provides some kind of communication channel
that protocols can use “for free”, so the trivial functionalities are those which reduce to the
communication channel. In our case, trivial functionalities are those which can be securely
realized using FPVT.
• Complete functionalities: Those to which every functionality can be reduced. Technically,
however, some functionalities can not have a secure protocol in any reasonable setting. For
instance, consider the functionality which announces the list of corrupted parties — this is
valid behavior, since the functionality is provided with this information. However, no protocol
in any setting can securely realize this functionality, since if an adversary is passive (i.e., follows
the protocol), the protocol must erroneously output that no one is corrupt.
In this work, we will follow the convention of Canetti et al. [23], who call a functionality
F complete if G v F for all well-formed functionalities G. A functionality is well-formed if
its behavior does not depend on its knowledge of which parties are corrupt. We directly use
the completeness of FCOM proven by Canetti et el., and thus consider completeness only with
respect to well-formed functionalities.
Within each of these two classes, all functionalities are equivalent under v reductions. In the
language of computational complexity, these classes each constitute a degree of the reduction. We
say that a class of functionalities has a zero-one law under a reduction v if every functionality in that
class is either trivial or complete with respect to v reductions.
Zero-one laws are known to exist in several security settings for MPC. However, we note that
none of them are applicable to the UC setting, and all of them are restricted to SFE functionalities:
• For 2-party SFE with one-sided output (one party’s output is a constant function) against
active, computationally unbounded adversaries [63].
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• For 2-party randomized SFE with one-sided output against passive, computationally un-
bounded adversaries [63].
• For 2-party SFE with one-sided output against passive adversaries; both computationally
bounded and unbounded cases, shown by Beimel, Malkin, and Micali [5]. They also consider
a notion of active security for computationally bounded setting, and extends their dichotomy
using a stronger notion of realizability and a weaker, non-black-box notion of completeness;
this result draws the line between realizability and completeness differently from the above
result of Kilian [63], and uses techniques not applicable in the UC setting.
• For 2-party SFE with one-sided output in the computationally bounded setting, where the size
of the function can depend on the security parameter, shown by Harnik et al. [50]. They show
characterizations for completeness and realizability which are only nearly complementary,
reflecting the gap between functions which are efficiently invertible and one-way. Their
approach uses techniques not applicable in the UC setting.
• For 2-party SFE with symmetric, boolean output against passive, computationally unbounded
adversaries [64].
5.1.1 Our Results
In this chapter we prove a zero-one law for the vpnt reduction. We note that if P = NP, then all of
our results for the vunt reduction from Chapter 4 also apply to the vpnt reduction. Thus any result
that shows such a significant difference between these two reductions must necessarily rely on some
computational assumption. We consider the following assumption:
Assumption 5.1. The oblivious transfer functionality FOT has a passive-secure protocol (using FPVT) in
the PPT setting.
This assumption is well-studied, and known to be implied by many concrete cryptographic
assumptions, such as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption [76] and the existence of enhanced
trapdoor permutations [40]. Our main theorem is that Assumption 5.1 is necessary and sufficient
for a zero-one law under the vpnt reduction:
Theorem 5.2 (Main Theorem). There is zero-one law for 2-party deterministic finite functionalities
(Definition 2.7) with respect to the vpnt reduction if and only if Assumption 5.1 is true.
We emphasize that implicit in this result is the first characterization of secure realizability
for a class of arbitrary reactive functionalities in the UC setting, and the first characterization of
completeness for arbitrary reactive functionalities in any security model.
Our hardness assumption. It is relatively straight-forward to show that Assumption 5.1 is a
necessary condition for the zero-one law. Thus to complete the proof of our main theorem, we
must construct protocols which demonstrate the completeness of every non-trivial DFF, using the
minimal hardness assumption Assumption 5.1.
Some of our protocol constructions rely on statistically binding commitment schemes, pseudoran-
dom generators, and zero-knowledge and witness-indistinguishable proofs (of knowledge) for NP
languages. All of these primitives exist assuming the existence of one-way functions [75, 51, 40].
One-way functions, in turn, are implied by Assumption 5.1 [48].
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Targeting (extractable) commitment. We first observe that the commitment functionality FCOM is
complete under the vpnt reduction (for well-formed functionalities), assuming Assumption 5.1, from
the work of Canetti et al. [23] Thus, to show that F is complete, it suffices to show that FCOM vpnt F .
The simulator for a UC-secure commitment protocol has two main tasks, which highlight the
technical challenges involved: First, the simulator for a corrupt sender must extract the adversary’s
input during the commit phase, so that it can commit to the appropriate bit in the ideal interaction.
Second, the simulator for a corrupt receiver must give an equivocable commitment in the reveal
phase, which it must be able to later open to any value in the reveal phase.
The main challenge in our work is achieving extractability using very simple (but still non-
trivial) functionalities, and without relying on trapdoor permutations or any other assumptions
not known to be implied by Assumption 5.1. Previous UC-secure protocols for commitment have
used stronger computational assumptions (trapdoor permutations and dense cryptosystems in [23]
and dual-mode cryptosystems in [82]) to achieve extractability; we use new protocol techniques to
achieve extractability from a non-trapdoor-based assumption.
To focus on the extractability requirement, we define an intermediate ideal “extractable com-
mitment” functionality FEXT-COM. This functionality formalizes the requirement that a protocol has
a standalone-secure hiding guarantee, but admits a straight-line extraction in the UC framework.
Then we show that FCOM vpnt FEXT-COM (Lemma 5.26); thus to show that a functionality is complete,
it suffices to use that functionality to construct an “extractable commitment” protocol (i.e., to show
FEXT-COM vpnt F). In ourFCOM protocol in theFEXT-COM-hybrid setting, we use witness-indistinguishable
proofs and apply an idea similar in spirit to
(
2
1
)
-commitments [78].
Classifying reactive functionalities. Since ours is the first work to consider completeness for
arbitrary reactive functionalities, one of our important contributions is developing new technical
tools for reasoning about them. We model reactive functionalities as finite-state automata, and we
develop an automata-theoretic characterization of important cryptographic properties.
Our characterization allows us to identify exactly what behaviors make a functionality non-trivial.
First, a reactive functionality can be non-trivial if in some state its input/output behavior defines non-
trivial SFE behavior. Second, a reactive functionality can be non-trivial if it uses its memory to store
hidden information about the parties’ inputs, which later influences the functionality’s behavior.
These intuitive properties, which are challenging to define formally and combinatorially, completely
characterize non-triviality, as demonstrated in the following result:
Theorem. Let F be a DFF. Then F is non-trivial if and only if FCOM vnt F or G vnt F for some
non-trivial SFE functionality G.
In other words, a functionality is non-trivial if and only if it uses its memory in a non-trivial
way (which is the essence of the commitment functionality FCOM) or it gives input/output in a
non-trivial way. We note that our combinatorial definitions of these properties also provide a
completely automata-theoretic characterization of realizability for arbitrary DFFs. Indeed, the
protocols constructed in this proof are unconditionally secure, so the characterization of realizability
also holds in the unbounded setting.
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Classifying SFE functionalities. Theorem 5.14 effectively reduces the question of a zero-one law
for DFFs to the simpler question of a zero-one law for SFE functionalities.
We already have a combinatorial characterization of triviality for SFE functionalities from
Chapter 3, as well as a combinatorial characterization for completeness in the unbounded setting
from [65] (relying on the completeness of oblivious transfer [61, 56]). We give the following purely
combinatorial classification of non-trivial SFE functionalities:
Lemma. Let F be a non-trivial 2-party SFE functionality. Then either FOT vnt F , or FCC vnt F , or
FCOIN vnt F .
The protocol for FOT is due to Kraschewski and Mu¨ller-Quade [65]. FCOIN is the coin-tossing
functionality, and FCC is the symmetric-output SFE functionality whose function table is 0 01 2 . We
interpret FCC as a kind of cut-and-choose functionality — Alice can choose to learn Bob’s input by
choosing the bottom row input, or choose not to learn it by choosing the top row input; Bob learns
whether or not Alice has learned his input.
Obtaining extractable commitment. To complete the picture, we must finally show extractable
commitment protocols in the FCC-hybrid and FCOIN-hybrid settings.1
Our extractable commitment protocol in the FCC-hybrid setting (Lemma 5.27) achieves ex-
tractability by performing a cut-and-choose on an error-correcting encoding of a random string
chosen by the sender, so that the receiver can (adaptively) choose to see a small fraction of the bits
of the codeword. The commitment will use a deterministically extracted bit that the receiver has no
information about, as a random mask. But the simulator obtains the entire (possibly noisy, if Alice
is corrupt) codeword, which it can use to extract the committed bit.
Our extractable commitment protocol in the FCOIN-hybrid setting directly uses a passive-
secure OT protocol and “compiles” it using (standalone-secure) zero-knowledge and witness-
indistinguishable proofs in a variant of the GMW paradigm [41]. The sender gives a standalone
commitment to some random bits, half of which the receiver picks up using the compiled OT pro-
tocol. Then the parties use FCOIN to publicly agree on a random half of the bits to actually use as
the random mask in the commitment (Lemma 5.28). The simulator can arrange for these choices to
coincide, so that it learns the entire random mask and can extract.
Implications of a zero-one law. Composable security is a very desirable cryptographic property.
However, the existing models for composable security have proven to be prohibitively strong. Very
few functionalities admit composably secure protocols in these models, and thus much work has
focused on tweaking the models to maintain a protocol composition theorem while allowing more
functionalities to be securely realizable. The most common augmentation of the model is to assume
the existence of a “setup” functionality like a common random string. A zero-one law implies that
all such augmentations of the model are either trivial (they do not add any expressivity) or else
all-powerful (they admit secure protocols for every task).
Indeed, many previously considered setup functionalities were known to be consistent with a
zero-one characterization. For example, starting with Canetti et al. [23], many setup functionalities
1Canetti et al. [23] gave a secure commitment protocol in the FCOIN-hybrid model, which is secure even against adaptive
corruption, but relied on enhanced trapdoor permutations and dense cryptosystems; we develop a secure commitment
protocol in the FCOIN-hybrid setting (against static corruption) using the minimal hardness assumption.
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are known to be complete, while Kidron and Lindell [60] showed that the known impossibility
results in the plain UC framework also apply in the presences of several setup functionalities.
We view a zero-one law as strong evidence that the notion of composable security against PPT
adversaries is robust. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, all existing modifications to the
UC framework (not just those involving simply adding a setup functionality) follow a zero-one
characterization, giving more evidence for the robustness of composable security. For example,
relaxing the composability requirement to self-composability yields an equivalent model to general
composability [70]. Bounding network latency [58] or allowing superpolynomial-time simulation
[87] allows secure protocols for all functionalities.
5.2 Necessity of the Cryptographic Assumption
We first show that Assumption 5.1 is necessary for our desired zero-one to hold.
Lemma 5.3. Let F be any 2-party SFE functionality that is passively realizable but not UC-realizable
(note that such functionalities exist and that these characterizations are unconditional; see Chapter 4).
If F is complete for the vpnt reduction, then Assumption 5.1 is true.
Proof. If F is complete, then FOT vpnt F via some protocol pi. We claim that pi is also a passive-secure
protocol. Supposing this is true, we can compose pi (a protocol in the F -hybrid setting) with the
passive-secure protocol for F (in the FPVT-hybrid setting) to obtain a passive-secure protocol for FOT
to establish Assumption 5.1.
Thus it suffices to show that pi is passive-secure. We will use an argument similar to Lemma 4.3
to show that the simulator for pi without loss of generality maps passive real-world adversaries to
passive ideal-world adversaries. Consider an environment that chooses random inputs for all parties
(x0, x1 for the sender and b for the receiver) and outputs 1 if the receiver reports output xb. This
environment outputs 1 with probability negligibly close to 1 in the real world by the correctness of
the protocol.
SupposeA is a passive adversary that corrupts the sender. Whenever the corresponding simulator
S does not send (x0, x1) to FOT in the ideal world, the environment outputs 0 with probability 1/2.
Thus with overwhelming probability by the protocol’s security guarantee, S acts passively by sending
the correct inputs. Without loss of generality, S can be made passive with probability 1.
In the other case, suppose A is a passive adversary that corrupts the receiver. Whenever the
corresponding simulator S does not send b to FOT in the ideal world, its view is independent of
the correct output xb, so the environment outputs 0 with probability 1/2. Thus with overwhelming
probability, S acts passively by sending the correct inputs and reporting the output from FOT. Again,
S can be made passive with probability 1 without loss of generality.
5.3 Classifying Reactive Functionalities
Our first step is to develop an “automata-theoretic” language to reason about arbitrary reactive
functionalities.
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5.3.1 Dominating Inputs
In arguing security, it is often convenient for Alice to assume that Bob will supply an input that is
the “worst possible” for Alice, among all inputs that achieve the same effect. Towards that end, we
develop the notion of dominating inputs to formally define when one input x “achieves the same
effect” as another input x′, in the context of a reactive functionality. Intuitively, this happens when
every behavior that can be induced by sending x at a certain point can also be induced by sending
x′ instead, and thereafter appropriately translating subsequent inputs and outputs. More formally:
Definition 5.4. Let F be a finite functionality, and let x, x′ ∈ X be inputs for Alice. We say that x
dominates x′ in the first round of F , and write x ≥A x′, if there is a secure protocol for F in the
F -hybrid setting, where the protocol for Bob is to run the dummy protocol (as Bob), and the protocol
for Alice has the property that whenever the environment provides input x′ for Alice in the first round,
the protocol instead sends x to the functionality in the first round.
We define domination for Bob inputs analogously, with the roles of Alice and Bob reversed.
Without loss of generality, the secure protocol from the definition above may be just the dummy
protocol, except possibly when the environment provides x′ as Alice’s first input. In this case, the
definition requires that any behavior of F that is possible when Alice uses x′ as her first input can
also be induced in an online fashion by using x as her first input (and subsequently translating
inputs/outputs according to some strategy).
Note that domination is trivially reflexive, and due to the universal composition theorem, it is
also transitive. Also note that if x dominates x′, then both x and x′ must induce the same output for
Bob in the first round, regardless of Bob’s input.
Combinatorial characterization. We now show that there is also an alternative characterization of
dominating inputs that is purely combinatorial. The previous definition in terms of secure protocols
is more intuitive, but the combinatorial criteria will be useful in proving Lemma 5.8, which is
crucially used in Theorem 5.14.
Definition 5.5. Let F be a DFF, S ⊆ Q2, let x, x′ ∈ X, and let z be a possible output of fA. We define:
next(S, x, x′, z) =
{(
δ(q, x, y), δ(q′, x′, y)
) ∣∣∣ ∃(q, q′) ∈ S, y ∈ Y : fA(q, x, y) = z}.
The intuition behind this definition is as follows. Suppose that in some protocol that uses F , Alice
has received inputs x′1, x
′
2, . . . from the environment but has instead sent x1, x2, . . . to F . Suppose
Alice is keeping track of S, the set of pairs (q, q′), such that:
• There is a sequence of inputs for Bob, y1, y2, . . ., such that Alice’s view of F is consistent with
F ’s behavior on input sequence (x′1, y1), (x′2, y2), . . .
• The input sequence (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . would put F in state q.
• The input sequence (x′1, y1), (x′2, y2), . . . would put F in state q′.
Then next(S, x, x′, r) defines the subsequent value of S if the environment then provides input x′
but the protocol instead sends x to F and receives output z.
Definition 5.6. Let F be a DFF, S ⊆ Q2, and x, x′ ∈ X. We say that (x, x′) is good for S if the
following are true:
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1. For all (q, q′) ∈ S, we have fB(q, x, ·) ≡ fB(q′, x′, ·),
2. For all outputs z, we have
∣∣{fA(q′, x′, y) | ∃(q, q′) ∈ S, y ∈ Y such that fA(q, x, y) = z}∣∣ = 1,
3. For all outputs z and all x′ ∈ X, there exists x ∈ X such that (x, x′) is good for next(S, x, x′, z).
Intuitively, suppose Alice has been sending different inputs to F than requested by the environ-
ment, but is trying to make the behavior of F reflect the environment’s requests. If S represents
Alice’s knowledge about F ’s state so far (as defined above), and S is not good for x, x′, then Alice
has a chance of being caught in the future if in the next round the environment asks her to send x
but she sends x′ instead.
In case (1), there is a chance (depending on Bob’s sequence of inputs) that Alice may induce the
wrong output for Bob in this round. In case (2), Alice might send x to F and get response z as the
response, but this new view might be consistent with at least 2 states which would require Alice to
send conflicting outputs to the environment. In case (3), Alice may be able to induce correct outputs
in this round, but she has a chance of being caught in the next round if the environment happens to
provide input x′.
Lemma 5.7. x ≥A x′ if and only if (x, x′) is good for {(q0, q0)}.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose (x, x′) is good for {(q0, q0)}. We must describe a strategy for Alice to send x in
the first round, but make it appear as if she had sent x′ and is running the dummy protocol. Without
loss of generality, suppose the environment internally simulates an instance of F , with the inputs of
its choice, and compares the parties’ outputs with the expected outputs from this simulated instance
of F .
Then the protocol for Alice is to maintain a state of knowledge S according to her view, as above,
starting with S = {(q0, q0)}. She maintains the following invariants:
• For all x′ ∈ X that the environment might supply in the next round, there is some x ∈ X such
that (x, x′) is good for S.
• If the external instance of F is in state q and the environment’s internally simulated instance
of F is in state q′, then (q, q′) ∈ S.
The claim is true for the base case of S = {(q0, q0)}, since the environment will send x′ in the first
round, and (x, x′) is good for S.
The protocol proceeds as follows: If the environment provides input x′ for Alice, then Alice sends
input x to F such that (x, x′) is good for S. Such an x must exist by the inductive hypothesis. Then
we have:
• Bob reports the correct output in this round, since his output is fB(q, x, y), and the environ-
ment is expecting fB(q′, x′, y), and fB(q, x, ·) ≡ fB(q′, x′, ·) from case (1) of Definition 5.6.
• Alice receives input z = fA(q, x, y), and the environment is expecting z′ = fA(q′, x′, y). By case
(2) of Definition 5.6, given S, x, x′, and z, Alice can compute a singleton set which contains
z′, so she reports this output to the environment.
• Alice updates S ← next(S, x, x′, z). By case (3) of Definition 5.6 and the definition of next(·),
the inductive invariants are maintained for the next round.
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(⇒) Assume that (x, x′) is not good for {(q0, q0)}, and consider any Alice protocol that replaces
x′ by x in the first round. It suffices to construct an environment that successfully distinguishes this
interaction from an interaction in which Alice uses the dummy protocol.
Let n be the minimum number of times that case (3) of Definition 5.6 needs to be applied to show
that (x, x′) is not good for {(q0, q0)}. We note that n is always at most m = 2|Q|2 |X|2, a constant.
We will construct Z0, which sends x′ to Alice in the first round, and otherwise sends randomly
chosen inputs, for a total of m rounds. As usual, it also internally simulates an instance of F , to
which it sends the inputs that it has chosen for Alice and Bob. Z0 outputs 1 if Alice and Bob’s
outputs always match that of its simulated instance of F , and 0 otherwise.
Clearly Z0 outputs 1 with probability 1 when both parties run the dummy protocol. It suffices to
show that when Alice runs a protocol which in the first round sends x instead of x′, the environment
Z0 outputs 0 with at least some constant probability. We will prove via induction that Z0 outputs 0
with probability at least 2(|Y ||X|)−n, where n is defined as above. Let qk be the state of the external
instance of F after k rounds, and q′k be the state of the internally simulated instance of F after k
rounds. As before, we let Sk ⊆ Q2 denote the set of pairs (q, q′) that are consistent with Alice’s view
after k rounds.
We first claim that Pr[(qk, q′k) = (q, q
′) | (q, q′) ∈ Sk] ≥ |Y |−k. In other words, after k rounds of
interacting with F , every (q, q′) ∈ Sk has some constant probability of being the “correct” pair, from
Alice’s point of view. The claim is trivially true for k = 0. For the inductive step, observe that by the
definition of next(·), every (p, p′) ∈ Sk+1 is in the set owing to at least one particular predecessor
(q, q′) ∈ Sk and Bob input y ∈ Y . Thus the probability that (p, p′) is correct is at least the probability
that the predecessor (q, q′) is correct, and the appropriate y ∈ Y is chosen, which is |Y |−k−1 as
desired.
We will prove the claim about Z0’s distinguishing probability inductively in n. We will maintain
the invariant that (xk+1, x′k+1) is not good for Sk, which is true in the base case.
Suppose (xk+1, x′k+1) is not good for Sk due to case (1) of Definition 5.6. Then with probability
at least |Y |−k, the two instances of F are in the “bad” states (q, q′) from the negation of case (1).
Conditioned on this event, then with probability 1/|Y |, the environment chooses input yk such that
Bob’s output and expected output disagree. The environment outputs 0 with probability at least
|Y |−k−1.
Suppose (xk+1, x′k+1) is not good for Sk due to case (2) of Definition 5.6. Then there are two
triples (q, q′, y) such that if the two instances of F are in states q and q′ respectively, and Bob’s input
is chosen as y, then Alice’s output is the same, but her expected output is different. The correct
value of (qk, q′k, yk) is indeed one of these triples (q, q
′, y) with probability at least 2/|Y |k+1, and
conditioned on this being the case, Alice’s reported output is incorrect with probability 1/2. Overall,
the environment outputs 0 with probability at least |Y |−k−1.
Suppose (xk+1, x′k+1) is not good for Sk due to case (3) of Definition 5.6. Then with probability
at least 1/|X||Y |, the environment chooses x′k+2 and yk+2 to be among the “bad” ones so that Alice
receives output z and for all xk+2, (xk+2, x′k+2) is not good for next(Sk, xk+1, x
′
k+1, z). We may
condition on this event and apply the inductive hypothesis.
We see that the total probability that Z0 outputs 0 is at least |X|−n|Y |−2n.
The first half of the above proof also immediately implies the following useful lemma:
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Lemma 5.8. Let F be a DFF. Then there is an environment Z0 with the following properties:
• Z0 sends a constant number of inputs to F ,
• Z0 always outputs 1 when interacting with two parties running the dummy protocol on an
instance of F ,
• For every x, x′ ∈ X, if x 6≥A x′, then Z0 has a constant probability of outputting 0 when
interacting with an Alice protocol that sends x instead of x′ in the first round.
The Z0 in question is the environment that simply chooses random inputs, and compares the
responses to the known, deterministic behavior of F . From the proof of Lemma 5.7, we see that Z0
needs to execute for only m rounds, where m is a constant that depends only on the size of F . The
distinguishing probability of Z0 is at least |X|−m|Y |−2m, a constant.
5.3.2 Simple States & Safe Transitions
Definition 5.9. Let F be a DFF, and let q be one of its states. We define F [q] as the functionality
obtained by modifying F so that its start state is q.
Definition 5.10. Let F be a DFF, and let q be one of its states. We say that q is a simple state if:
• The input/output behavior of F at state q — (fA(q, ·, ·), fB(q, ·, ·)) — is a trivial SFE; and
• For all Alice inputs x, x′ ∈ X such that fB(q, x, ·) ≡ fB(q, x′, ·), there exists an Alice input x∗ ∈ X
such that x∗ ≥A x and x∗ ≥A x′ in F [q]; and
• For all Bob inputs y, y′ ∈ Y such that fA(q, ·, y) ≡ fA(q, ·, y′), there exists a Bob input y∗ ∈ Y
such that y∗ ≥B y and y∗ ≥B y′ in F [q].
Suppose q is a simple state. We write x
q∼ x′ if fB(q, x, ·) ≡ fB(q, x′, ·). The relation q∼ induces
equivalence classes over X. When q is a simple state, then within each such equivalence class, there
exists at least one input x∗ which dominates all other members of its class. For each equivalence
class, we arbitrarily pick a single such input x∗ and call it a master input for state q. Similarly we
define master inputs for Bob by exchanging the roles of Alice and Bob.
Definition 5.11. Let F be a DFF, We say that a transition is safe if it leaves a simple state q on inputs
(x, y), where x and y are both master inputs for state q.
We define r(F) to be the functionality which runs F , except that in the first round only, it allows
only safe transitions to be taken. r(F) can be written as a copy of F plus a new start state. The new
start state of r(F) duplicates all the safe transitions of F ’s start state.
Observation 5.12. If a safe transition was just taken in F , then Alice (resp. Bob) can uniquely
determine Bob’s (resp. Alice’s) input in the previous round and the current state of F , given only the
previous state of F and Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) input and output in the previous round.
Proof. We will show that Alice has no uncertainty about which master input Bob used, thus no
uncertainty about the resulting state of F . If a safe transition was just taken from q, then q was a
simple state and its associated SFE (fA(q, ·, ·), fB(q, ·, ·)) is trivial. Thus either fA(q, ·, ·) is insensitive
to Bob’s input, or fB(q, ·, ·) is insensitive to Alice’s input.
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If fA(q, ·, ·) is insensitive to Bob’s input, then Bob has a single master input y for q (all of his
inputs are in a single equivalence class under
q∼). There is no uncertainty for Alice regarding which
master input Bob used.
If fB(q, ·, ·) is insensitive to Alice’s input, then let x∗ be Alice’s unique master input. If y, y′ are
distinct master inputs for Bob, then fA(q, ·, y) 6≡ fA(q, ·, y′). In other words, fA(q, x, y) 6= fA(q, x, y′)
for some s. Since x∗ ≥A x, we must have fA(q, x∗, y) 6= fA(q, x∗, y′), so Alice (who must have used
input x∗) has no uncertainty about which master input Bob used.
Lemma 5.13. If the start state of F is simple, then r(F) vnt F vnt r(F). Furthermore, if q is
reachable from the start state of F via a safe transition, then F [q] vnt F .
Proof. The protocol for r(F) vnt F is the dummy protocol, since r(F) implements simply a subset
of the behavior of F . Simulation is trivial unless in the first round, the corrupt party (say, Alice)
sends an input x to F which is not a master input for q0. The simulator must send the corresponding
master input x∗ (from the
q0∼ equivalence class of x) in the ideal world, and then it uses the translation
protocol guaranteed by the definition of x∗ ≥A x to provide a consistent view to Alice and induce
correct outputs for Bob.
Similarly, the protocol for F vnt r(F) is simply the dual of the above protocol. On input x in
the first round, Alice sends x∗ to r(F), where x∗ is the master input from the q0∼-equivalence class
of x. Thereafter, Alice runs the protocol guaranteed by the fact that x∗ ≥A x. Bob’s protocol is
analogous. Simulation is a trivial dummy simulation, since any valid sequence of inputs to r(F) in
the real world also produces the same outcome in the F -ideal world (r(F) implements a subset of
the behavior of F).
Note that in r(F), the added start state has no incoming transitions; thus (r(F))[q] = F [q] if q
is a state in F . So to show F [q] vnt F , it suffices to show that (r(F))[q] vnt r(F). Suppose q is
reachable in F from the start state via safe transition on master inputs x∗, y∗. The protocol for F [q] is
for Alice and Bob to send x∗ and y∗ to r(F), respectively, as a “preamble”. Each party can determine
with certainty, given their input and output in this preamble, whether r(F) is in state q (since only
safe transitions can be taken from the start state of r(F)). If the functionality is not in q, then the
parties abort. Otherwise, the functionality is r(F) in state q as desired, so the parties thereafter run
the dummy protocol. Simulation is trivial – the simulator aborts if the corrupt party does not send
its specified input (x∗ or y∗) in the preamble; otherwise it runs a dummy simulation.
5.3.3 Complete Characterization of DFFs
We now prove our main classification regarding reactive functionalities, which is a useful alternative
characterization of secure realizability for DFFs. Interestingly, though this chapter focuses exclu-
sively on the PPT setting, our characterization of DFFs in this section also applies in the unbounded
setting. Our characterization is as follows:
Theorem 5.14. Let F be a DFF. Then the following are equivalent:
1. F vnt FPVT
2. FCOM 6vnt F and G 6vnt F for all non-trivial SFE functionalities G
3. No non-simple state in F is reachable via a sequence of safe transitions from F ’s start state.
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First, this lemma implies that if FCOM is vpnt-complete, and if there is a zero-one law for SFE
functionalities, then there is a zero-one law for all DFFs. Thus we have reduced the proof of
the zero-one law to the much simpler case of SFE. To prove Theorem 5.14, we construct two
protocols in the following lemmas, both of which are unconditionally secure. Also, the definition
of triviality for SFE functionalities is the same in both the PPT and unbounded settings. Thus, the
lemma provides a complete characterization of secure realizability for DFFs in both settings. Finally,
note that condition (3) of Theorem 5.14 can be expressed completely combinatorially (automata-
theoretically) using Lemma 5.7, giving the first such alternate characterization of realizability for
any large class of arbitrary reactive functionalities.
We have that (1)⇒ (2) of Theorem 5.14, by the fact that FCOM is non-trivial (in the unbounded
and PPT settings). We prove (2)⇒ (3) and (3)⇒ (1) in the following two lemmas:
Lemma 5.15. If a non-simple state in F is reachable via a sequence of safe transitions from F ’s start
state, then either FCOM vnt F or G vnt F for some non-trivial SFE functionality G.
Proof. Without loss of generality (by Lemma 5.13) we assume that the start state of F is non-simple.
First, suppose the start state q0 of F is non-simple because its input/output behavior in the first
round is non-trivial. Then in the F -hybrid setting we can easily securely realize the SFE functionality
G = (fA(q0, ·, ·), fB(q0, ·, ·)), by the simple dummy protocol. Even though F may keep in its memory
arbitrary information about the first-round inputs, the information can never be accessed since
honest parties never send inputs to F after its first round, and F waits for inputs from both parties
before giving any output. Thus G vnt F .
Otherwise, assume that the input/output behavior in the first round is a trivial SFE, and that q0
is non-simple for one of the other reasons in Definition 5.10. The two cases are symmetric, and we
present the case where Alice can commit to Bob. Suppose there are Alice inputs x∗0, x
∗
1 ∈ X such
that fB(q0, x∗0, ·) ≡ fB(q0, x∗1, ·), but for all x ∈ X, either x 6≥A x∗0 or x 6≥A x∗1. Intuitively, this means
that F binds Alice to her choice between inputs x∗0 and x∗1 — there are behaviors of F possible when
her first input is x∗b , which are not possible when her first input is x
∗
1−b. We formalize this intuition
by using the first input round of F to let Alice commit a bit to Bob.
Recall the “complete” environmentZ0 from Lemma 5.8, and suppose it runs form rounds and has
a distinguishing probability p > 0. Our protocol for FCOM is to instantiateN = 2dlog1−p 0.5eκ = Θ(κ)
independent instances of F , where κ is the security parameter. We will write Fi to refer to the ith
instance of F . The protocol is as follows:
1. (Commit phase, on Alice input (COMMIT, b), where b ∈ {0, 1}) Alice sends x∗b to each Fi. For
each i, Bob sends a random yi1 ∈ Y to Fi and waits for output fB(q0, yi1, x∗0) = fB(q0, yi1, x∗1).
If he receives a different input, he aborts. Otherwise, he outputs COMMITTED.
2. (Reveal phase, on Alice input REVEAL) Alice sends b to Bob. For each i, Alice sends her
input/output view of Fi to Bob (x∗b and the first-round response from Fi). If any of
these reported views involve Alice sending something other than x∗b to Fi, then Bob aborts.
Otherwise, Bob sets xi1 = x∗b for all i.
3. For j = 2 to m:
(a) Bob sends Alice a randomly chosen xij ∈ X. Alice sends xij to Fi.
(b) Bob sends a randomly chosen input yij ∈ Y to Fi.
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(c) For each i, Alice reports to Bob her output from Fi in this round.
4. If for any i, Alice’s reported view or Bob’s outputs from Fi does not match the (deterministic)
behavior of F on input sequence (xi1, yi1), (xi2, yi2), . . ., then Bob aborts. Otherwise, he
outputs (REVEAL, b).
When Bob is corrupt, the simulation is to do the following for each i: When Bob sends yi1 to F in
the commit phase, simulate Fi’s response as fB(q0, x∗0, yi1) = fB(q0, x∗1, yi1). In the reveal phase,
to open to a bit b, simulate that Alice sent Bob x∗b and the view that is consistent with that input:
fA(q0, x∗b , yi1). Maintain the corresponding state qi of Fi after seeing inputs (x∗b , yi1). Then when
Bob sends xij to Alice and yij to Fi, simulate that Fi gave the correct output to Bob and that Alice
reported back the correct output from Fi that is consistent with F receiving inputs xij , yij in state
qi. Each time, also update the state qi according to those inputs. It is clear that the simulation is
perfect.
When Alice is corrupt, the simulation is as follows: The simulator faithfully simulates each
instance of F and the behavior of an honest Bob. If at any point, the simulated Bob aborts, then the
simulation aborts. Suppose Alice sends x˜i1 to each Fi in the commit phase, and that the simulation
has not aborted at the end of the commit phase. If the majority of x˜i1 values satisfy x˜i1 ≥A x∗0, then
the simulator sends (COMMIT, 0) to FCOM; otherwise it sends (COMMIT, 1). Note that by the properties
of F , each x˜i1 cannot dominate both x∗0 and x∗1. Let b be the bit that the simulator sent to FCOM.
If the simulated Bob ever outputs (REVEAL, b), then the simulator sends REVEAL to FCOM. The
simulation is perfect except for the case where the simulated Bob outputs (REVEAL, 1 − b) (in this
case, the real world interaction ends with Bob outputting (REVEAL, 1 − b), while the ideal world
interaction aborts). We show that this event happens with negligible probability, and thus our
overall simulation is statistically sound.
Suppose Alice sends b′ = 1 − b at the beginning of the reveal phase. Say that an instance Fi is
bad if x˜i1 6≥A x∗1−b. Note that at least half of the instances of Fi are bad. When an instance Fi is
bad, Z0 can distinguish with probability at least p between the cases of F receiving first input x˜i1
and x∗1−b from Alice. However, in each instance of Fi, Bob is sending random inputs to Alice (who
sent x˜i1 as the first input to Fi), sending random inputs himself to Fi, obtaining his own output
and Alice’s reported output from Fi in an on-line fashion, and comparing the result to the known
behavior of F (when x∗1−b is the first input of Alice). This is exactly what Z0 does in the definition of
x˜i1 ≥A x∗1−b, so Bob will detect an error with probability p in each bad instance. In the real world,
Bob would accept in this reveal phase with probability at most (1−p)−N/2 ≤ 2−κ, which is negligible
as desired.
Lemma 5.16. If no non-simple state in F is reachable via a sequence of safe transitions from F ’s start
state, then F is trivial (F vnt FPVT).
Proof. We first define an intermediate functionality R(F), which is F with all its non-safe transitions
removed. We first observe that R(F) is trivial (in fact, R(F) is trivial for all F). Only safe transitions
may be taken in R(F), thus both parties’ views uniquely determine the state of R(F). If the current
state q was non-simple in F , then q is a dead state in R(F) and the protocol is trivial. Otherwise,
note that restricting a simple state’s transition function to its safe transitions preserves the triviality
of the SFE round function. Thus the protocol’s behavior when in state q is to simply evaluate a trivial
SFE.
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Next, to prove the main claim it suffices to show that F vnt R(F), since R(F) is trivial. We
prove a stronger claim; namely that if q is safely reachable (i.e., reachable from the start state by
a sequence of safe transitions) in F , then F [q] vnt (R(F))[q]. To prove this stronger claim, we
construct a family of protocols pˆiq, for every such q.
First, let piq denote the protocol guaranteed by F [q] vnt r(F [q]) (Lemma 5.13). Then the protocol
pˆiq is as follows:
1. Run piq to interact with the functionality.
2. After the first round, we will have sent an input to the functionality and received an output.
Assuming that the functionality was (R(F))[q], use the first round’s input/output to determine
the next state q′ (Observation 5.12)
3. Continue running piq, but hereafter, instead of letting it interact directly with the functionality,
we recursively instantiate pˆiq′ . We let our piq instance interface with pˆiq′ , which we let interact
directly with the functionality.
The protocol is recursive, and after k rounds, must maintain a stack depth of size k. We prove by
induction on k that pˆiq is a secure protocol for F [q] using (R(F))[q], against environments that run
the protocol for k ≥ 0 steps. The claim is trivially true for k = 0.
Note that simulation is trivial if either party is corrupt. Such an adversary is running the protocol
interacting with (R(F))[q], which is a subset of the functionality F [q]. Thus the simulator is a dummy
simulator. It suffices to show that the output of the protocol is correct (indistinguishable from the
ideal interaction) when both parties are honest.
In the first round, both parties are running piq, interacting with (R(F))[q]. Although piq is
designed to interact with r(F [q]), the behavior of both these functionalities is identical in the first
round (including the next-state function). Thus the first round of outputs is correct, by the security
of piq. For the same reason, step 2 of pˆiq correctly identifies the next state q′ of (R(F))[q]. Clearly
(R(F))[q][q′] = (R(F))[q′], so after step 1 of the protocol, the functionality is identical to a fresh
instantiation of (R(F))[q′]. At the same time, we also instantiate a fresh instance of pˆiq′ to interact
with this functionality. By the inductive hypothesis, hereafter piq is interacting with an interface
that is indistinguishable from an ideal interaction with F [q′]. However, an external functionality
which behaves like R(F)[q] in the first round, then after transitioning to state q′ behaves like F [q′],
is simply the functionality r(F [q]). In other words, the entire protocol pˆiq is indistinguishable from
running piq on r(F [q]). By definition of piq, this is indistinguishable from an ideal interaction with
F [q] itself.
5.4 Classifying SFE Functionalities
2 × 2 minors. Our classification of SFE functionalities is combinatorial, and relies on identifying
crucial 2× 2 minors in the function table of the SFE.
Definition 5.17. Let F = (fA, fB) be a 2-party SFE. We say that F has a generalized CC-minor at
{x, x′} × {y, y′} if F has the following form:
fA y y
′
x a a
x′ b c
fB y y
′
x h j
x′ i k
where b 6= c and h 6= i and j 6= k
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or the symmetric condition with the roles of Alice and Bob exchanged.
In a generalized CC-minor, Alice chooses input x if she wants no information about Bob’s input
(y or y′), and chooses input x′ if she wants to receive Bob’s input. Bob learns which option Alice
chose.
We call the following (symmetric-output) function the symmetric cut-and-choose function FCC:
fA = fB 0 1
0 0 0
1 1 2
It is the canonical function that contains a generalized CC-minor, and it plays an important role in
our results.
Definition 5.18 ([65]). Let F = (fA, fB) be a 2-party SFE. We say that F has a generalized OR-minor
at {x, x′} × {y, y′} if F has the following form:
fA y y
′
x a a
x′ b c
fB y y
′
x h j
x′ h k
where b 6= c or j 6= k
Lemma 5.19 ([65]). If F is a 2-party SFE functionality that contains a generalized OR-minor after
removing all redundant inputs, then F is complete under vnt reductions.
In fact, the lemma proven by Kraschewski and Mu¨ller-Quade [65] is stronger, giving a complete
characterization of completeness against computationally unbounded adversaries. That is, they
prove that F is vnt-complete if and only if it contains a generalized OR-minor. We note that the
protocol and simulator in their reduction are both efficient when F has constant size, but the security
holds against computationally unbounded adversaries. Thus the completeness of these functions
holds with respect to the vunt and vpnt reductions. Of course, we will show that many other SFE
functions are also complete under the vpnt reduction.
Definition 5.20. F = (fA, fB) is a symmetric exchange function if F is isomorphic to the symmetric
function F(x, y) = (x, y) for some input domain X × Y .
In a symmetric exchange function, each party learns the other party’s input (the function’s output
also includes that party’s own input, which it already knows). The cryptographic non-triviality of
symmetric exchange functions is due to the fact that each party’s input is chosen independently of
the other party’s input.
Combinatorially classifying non-reactive functionalities. We now prove the first characteriza-
tion of SFE functionalities, using two technical lemmas:
Lemma 5.21. Let F = (fA, fB) be an SSFE functionality. If F has a generalized CC-minor and no
generalized OR-minor, then FCC vnt F .
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Proof. Suppose F has a generalized CC-minor at {x, x′} × {y, y′}. We will show that the protocol in
which parties simply restrict their inputs to this 2 × 2 minor is a UC-secure protocol for computing
that minor.2 If the output from F is not consistent with the party’s input and one of the two
allowed inputs for the other party, then we abort. Since every generalized CC-minor is isomorphic
to symmetric CC, the claim will be established.
Suppose the function table of F is as follows for the CC-minor:
fA y y
′
x a a
x′ b c
fB y y
′
x h j
x′ i k
where b 6= c, h 6= i, and j 6= k
We first consider the case where Alice is corrupt. If Alice provides input x or x′, then the simulator
also gives the same input in the ideal world, and returns the output to Alice. Otherwise, suppose
Alice sends some other input x′′:
fA y y
′
x a a
x′ b c
x′′ p q
fB y y
′
x h j
x′ i k
x′′ r s
where b 6= c, h 6= i, and j 6= k
We consider several cases, depending on the values of p, q, r, s:
• If r 6∈ {h, i} and s 6∈ {j, k}, then honest Bob will always abort in the real world. The simulator
sends input x′ in the ideal world. The simulator can determine from its output whether Bob’s
input was y or y′, and simulate either output p or q to Alice accordingly, and finally abort.
• If [r = h and s = j and p 6= q] or [r = h and s 6= j] or [r 6= h and s = j]. then {x, x′′}×{y, y′}
is a generalized OR-minor in F . This is not possible in F .
• If r = h and s = j and p = q, then the simulator sends input x in the ideal world. Bob receives
the same output as in the real world, and the simulator gives Alice output p = q.
• If r = i and s = k, then the simulator sends input x′ in the ideal world. Bob receives the same
output as in the real world, the simulator can determine from its output whether Bob’s input
was y or y′, and simulate either output p or q to Bob, accordingly.
• If r = i and s 6∈ {j, k}, then Bob will abort in the real world if his input was y′. The simulator
sends input x′ in the ideal world. If Bob’s input is y, then Bob receives the same output as in
the real world. The simulator can determine from its output whether Bob’s input was y or y′,
and simulate either output p or q to Bob, accordingly. The simulator aborts if Bob’s input is y′.
The definition of generalized CC-minor is symmetric with respect to y and y′, so all other cases are
obtained by symmetry.
The other case to consider is when Bob is corrupt. Similarly, the simulation is trivial when Bob
2Note that for an arbitrary F , it does not necessarily follow that restricting inputs is a secure protocol for evaluating that
minor, since adversaries may carefully choose other inputs to send to F .
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uses either y or y′. Otherwise, suppose Bob uses some other input y′′:
fA y y
′ y′′
x a a p
x′ b c q
fB y y
′ y′′
x h j r
x′ i k s
where b 6= c, h 6= i, and j 6= k
We again consider several cases:
• If p 6= a and q 6∈ {b, c}, then similar to above, Alice will always abort in the real world. The
simulator sends input y in the ideal world. It can determine from its output whether Alice’s
input was x or x′, and simulate either output r or s to Bob accordingly, and finally abort.
• If p = a and q = b, then the simulator sends input y in the ideal world. Alice receives the same
output as in the real world. The simulator can determine from its output whether Alice’s input
was x or x′, and simulate either output r or s to Bob, accordingly.
• If p = a and q = c, the simulation is identical to the previous case, except the simulator sends
input y′ in the ideal world.
• If p = a and q 6∈ {b, c}, then Alice aborts in the real world if her input was x′. The simulator
sends input y in the ideal world. Alice receives the same output as in the real world if her
input was x. The simulator can determine from its output whether Alice’s input was x or x′,
and simulate either output r or s to Bob, accordingly. The simulator aborts if Alice’s input was
x′.
• If p 6= a and q = b, then Alice aborts in the real world if her input was x. Similar to above,
the simulator sends input y in the ideal world, simulates the appropriate output for Bob, and
aborts if Alice’s input was x.
• If p 6= a and q = c, then the simulation is identical to the previous case, except the simulator
sends input y′ in the ideal world.
Lemma 5.22. If F = (fA, fB) has no generalized CC-minor and no generalized OR-minor, then F is a
symmetric exchange function.
Proof. If F is not a symmetric exchange function, then different inputs to F for (without loss of
generality) Alice let her learn different distinctions among Bob’s inputs. That is, for some x, x′, y, y′,
we have: fA(x, y) = fA(x, y′) and fA(x′, y) 6= fA(x′, y′). Now no matter how fB behaves on inputs
{x, x′} × {y, y′}, that 2× 2 minor is either a generalized CC-minor or generalized OR-minor.
Finally, we prove our main classification of SFE functionalities:
Lemma 5.23. Let F be a non-trivial 2-party SFE functionality. Then either FOT vnt F , or FCC vnt F ,
or FCOIN vnt F .
Proof. If F contains no generalized OR-minor, but contains a generalized CC-minor, then FCC vnt F
(Lemma 5.21). Otherwise, if F contains neither a generalized CC-minor nor a generalized OR-minor,
thenF is a symmetric exchange function (Lemma 5.22). SupposeF is (isomorphic to) the symmetric
function F(x, y) = (x, y), where F has input domain X × Y . If |X| < 2 or |Y | < 2, then F is trivial,
by Theorem 3.21.
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Otherwise, suppose |X| ≥ 2 and |Y | ≥ 2. Then let x0 6= x1 ∈ X and y0 6= y1 ∈ Y . A secure
protocol for FCOIN in the F -hybrid setting is for Alice to choose a random bit a ← {0, 1} and Bob to
choose a random bit b ← {0, 1}. They compute F(xa, yb) = (xa, yb) and use a ⊕ b as the output of
the coin toss. Alice aborts if she observes that Bob did not use y0 or y1 as his input, and likewise Bob
aborts if he observes that Alice did not use x0 or x1 as her input. It is straight-forward to see that
this protocol is UC-secure.
5.5 Extractable Commitment
In this section we show how full-fledged commitment can be realized using only a weak intermediate
variant. We start off by introducing some convenient terminology.
Definition 5.24. A protocol is a syntactic commitment protocol if:
• It is a two phase protocol between a sender and a receiver (using only plain communication
channels).
• At the end of the first phase (commitment phase), the sender and the receiver output a transcript
τ . Further the sender receives an output γ (which will be used for opening the commitment).
• In the reveal phase the sender sends a message γ to the receiver, who extracts an output value
opening(τ, γ) ∈ {0, 1}κ ∪ {⊥}.
In the above description, as is implicit in all our protocol specifications, the parties may choose
to abort at any point in the protocol.
Definition 5.25. We say that two syntactic commitment protocols (ωL, ωR) form a pair of complemen-
tary statistically binding commitment protocols if the following hold:
• ωR is a statistically binding commitment scheme (with standalone security).
• In ωL, at the end of the commitment phase the receiver outputs a string z ∈ {0, 1}κ. If
the the receiver is honest, it is only with negligible probability that there exists γ such that
opening(τ, γ) 6= ⊥ and opening(τ, γ) 6= z.
Note that ωL by itself is not an interesting cryptographic goal, as the sender can simply send the
committed string in the clear during the commitment phase; however, in defining F (ωL,ωR)EXT-COM below,
we will require a single protocol to satisfy both the security guarantees.
We define the extractable commitment functionality F (ωL,ωR)EXT-COM in Figure 5.1. The functionality is
parameterized by a pair of complementary statistically binding commitment protocols.
Our main result in this section is that extractable commitment can be used to securely realize
full-fledged commitment:
Lemma 5.26. If (ωL, ωR) form a pair of complementary statistically binding commitment protocols,
then FCOM vpnt F (ωL,ωR)EXT-COM .
Proof. Our protocol uses additional witness-indistinguishable proofs, which are guaranteed to exist if
standalone-secure commitment schemes exist. The protocol uses a “1-out-of-2 binding commitment”
scheme, similar to the notion introduced by Nguyen and Vadhan [78].
Our protocol for FCOM is as follows, with security parameter κ. It uses ideal access to 3
independent instances of F (ωL,ωR)EXT-COM , which for clarity we will name F0,F1,F2. Bob is identified
as the sender in F0, and the receiver in F1 and F2.
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We name the two parties Sender and Receiver. The functionality’s behavior depends on who is
corrupt.
If both Sender and Receiver are honest, the functionality behaves as follows:
1. (Commitment phase.) It accepts (COMMIT, x) from Sender. Then it internally simulates a
session of ωR (simulating both the sender and the receiver in ωR), with the sender’s input
being x. It gives (TRANSCRIPT, τ, γ) to Sender and (COMMITTED, τ) to Receiver.
2. (Reveal phase.) On receiving the message REVEAL from Sender, it sends (REVEAL, x) to
Receiver.
If Sender is corrupt and Receiver is honest, the functionality does the following:
1. (Commitment phase.) It runs the commitment phase of ωL with Sender, playing the part
of the receiver in ωL, to obtain (τ, z). It sends (COMMITTED, τ) to Receiver and internally
records z.
2. (Reveal phase.) It receives (REVEAL, γ) from Sender. If opening(τ, γ) = z, it sends
(REVEAL, z) to Receiver.
If Sender is honest and Receiver is corrupt, the functionality does the following:
1. (Commitment phase.) It accepts (COMMIT, x) from Sender. Then it runs the commitment
phase of ωR with Receiver, playing the sender’s role in ωR, with x as input. It obtains the
output (τ, γ) at the end of this phase, and sends (TRANSCRIPT, τ, γ) to Sender.
2. (Reveal phase.) it sends (γ, x) to Receiver.
(We do not define the behavior of the functionality when both Sender and Receiver are corrupt.)
Figure 5.1: Functionality F (ωL,ωR)EXT-COM : Extractable commitment, parameterized by two syntactic commitment
protocols ωL and ωR.
1. (Commit phase, on Alice input (COMMIT, x)) Bob chooses a random string r ← {0, 1}κ and
sends (COMMIT, r) to F0. Alice receives output (COMMITTED, τ0) and Bob receives output
(TRANSCRIPT, τ0, γ0).
2. Alice sends (COMMIT, x) to F1. Alice receives output (TRANSCRIPT, τ1, γ1) and Bob receives
output (COMMITTED, τ1).
3. Alice sends (COMMIT, 0κ) to F2. Alice receives output (TRANSCRIPT, τ2, γ2) and Bob receives
output (COMMITTED, τ2).
4. Bob sends REVEAL to F0, and Alice receives output (REVEAL, γ0, r). Bob outputs COMMITTED.
5. (Reveal phase, on Alice input REVEAL) Alice sends x to Bob, then uses a WI proof to prove the
following statement S(x, r, τ1, τ2):
There exists γ such that either opening(τ1, γ) = x or opening(τ2, γ) = r.
Bob outputs (REVEAL, x) if the proof verifies.
It is straight-forward to see that the protocol is correct; i.e., simulation is trivial when both parties
are honest. Simulation is trivial when both parties are corrupt, too. We consider the other two cases.
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Simulation when Alice is corrupt: Since Bob has no private inputs to FCOM, the simulator
faithfully simulates the honest Bob protocol and honest functionalities F0,F1,F2. If the simulated
Bob ever aborts, then the simulation also aborts. In step (2), the simulator obtains the value z1 the
value recorded by F1. When the commit phase finishes, the simulator sends (COMMIT, z1) to FCOM.
Later, in the reveal phase, if the simulated ever Bob outputs (REVEAL, z1), then the simulator sends
REVEAL to FCOM; if the simulated Bob outputs (REVEAL, x) for some x 6= z1, then the simulation
aborts. The simulation is clearly perfect except in the case where the simulated Bob outputs
(REVEAL, x) for some x 6= z1. We will show that this event happens with only negligible probability.
First, we argue that at the end of the commitment phase, the probability that there exists γ
such that opening(τ2, γ) = r is negligible. By the security property of ωL, the functionality F2
records a value z2 such that (except with negligible probability) there does not exist γ such that
opening(τ2, γ) 6= z2. Hence, it suffices to show that F2 records z2 = r with at most negligible
probability. However, consider an adversary A attacking the standalone hiding property of ωR.
Adversary A internally simulates Alice and the functionality instances F0 and F2. It simulates Alice’s
interaction with F1 by interacting in a challenge commit phase of ωR, to a random value r. After
the commit phase, A outputs the value z2 output by its internally simulated F2. By the standalone
hiding property of ωR, this output can equal r with only negligible probability.
Given this, with overwhelming probability, the second clause of the WI proof statement is false.
By the security property of ωL, the first clause is only true when Alice is attempting to reveal to
x = z1, except with negligible probability. Thus by the soundness of WI proof, if the simulated Bob
outputs (REVEAL, x), then x = z1 except for negligible probability, as desired.
Simulation when Bob is corrupt: Here, the simulator will simulate F0, F1 and F2 during the
commitment phase, as follows:
1. First, it carries out an honest simulation of step (1), where it faithfully runs F0 and the
receiver’s protocol with F0. At the end of this it obtains a value z0 as the value recorded
by F0.
2. Then it simulates step (2) by internally simulating F1 and the honest sender, but with the
sender’s input as 0κ (instead of Alice’s input x, which it does not know yet).
3. It simulates step (3) similarly, but this time using z0 as the sender’s input (instead of 0κ); note
that this yields (τ2, γ2) such that opening(τ2, γ2) = z0.
4. Then it simulates step (4), the reveal phase of F2. If the simulated F2 outputs (REVEAL, r) to
the simulated sender, then the simulator ensures that r = z0. If this is not the case, then the
simulator fails.
The reveal phase is simulated as follows:
1. First the simulator obtains (REVEAL, x) from FCOM. It simulates the protocol execution by
sending x and then gives a WI proof for the statement S(x, r, τ1, τ2), by using the witness
γ2 and the fact that opening(τ2, γ) = r.
First, we observe that the probability of the simulator failing (in step (4)) of commitment is
negligible (by the security of ωL). To show that the simulation is indistinguishable from the real
protocol execution (conditioned on the simulator not failing), we shall rely on the hiding property
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of ωR and the witness indistinguishability of the WI proof. In more detail, we employ the following
hybrid simulators:
Hybrid 1: Same as the simulation, except that in step (2) the simulator uses Alice’s true input x
rather than 0κ as the input to the (simulated) sender in its interaction with (simulated)
F1. The entire interaction can be carried out by an adversary in the standalone hiding
experiment for ωR: the adversary receives either a commitment to x or to 0κ, and it can
simulate the rest of the interaction without receiving the opening of that commitment
(the opening is not used as a witness to the WI proof later). Thus these two interactions
are indistinguishable.
Hybrid 2: Same as above, except that in the reveal phase, the simulator uses the witness γ1 in
the WI proof, since opening(τ1, γ1) = x. This interaction is indistinguishable from the
previous by a straightforward application of the witness-indistinguishability property in
the WI proof.
Real world: Same as above, except that the simulator sends 0κ to F2 instead of z0, in step (3). This
interaction is indistinguishable from the previous hybrid, by an identical argument as
was used to show that Hybrid 1 and the simulation are indistinguishable.
5.6 Obtaining Extractable Commitment from FCC
In this section, we show how FEXT-COM can be securely realized using FCC. We first show a protocol
pi in the FCC-hybrid world, and then define appropriate (piL, piR) protocols such that pi is a secure
realization of F (piL,piR)EXT-COM .
Parameters. Let Com be a statistically binding, standalone-secure commitment scheme with a non-
interactive reveal phase (for instance, Naor’s commitment scheme [75], which relies only on the
existence of one-way functions). Let C1, . . . be a family of error-correcting codes, with the following
properties:
• Ci is a linear (ni, ki) code over GF (2), with generator matrix Mi.
• ki, ni ∈ Θ(i).
• It is possible to efficiently (polynomial time in i) correct Θ(ni) errors in Ci.
These parameters can be easily achieved, for instance, by a Justesen code [72].
The protocol. We define the following interactive protocol pi in the FCC-hybrid model. The security
parameter is κ.
1. (Commit phase.) On input (COMMIT, b) (for b ∈ {0, 1}), Alice chooses random string
s ∈ {0, 1}kκ and computes the associated codeword t = (Mκ)s. She commits to t using
Com.
2. Bob chooses a string y ∈ {0, 1}nκ by setting each yi = 0 with probability kκ/2nκ = Θ(1).
3. For i ∈ {1, . . . , nκ}, do:
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(a) Alice and Bob invoke a session of FCC with Alice as sender. Alice sends ti, the ith bit of t,
as her input to FCC, and Bob sends input yi.
Recall that in FCC, Alice learns yi; Bob learns ti whenever yi = 0.
(b) If Alice sees that Bob has set yi = 0 as many as kκ times so far, then Alice aborts the
protocol.
4. The bits of t that Bob has picked up are a linear function of s (a subset of the rows of Mκ), but
are insufficient to completely determine s. Let g be a vector in {0, 1}kκ linearly independent of
all the rows of Mκ for which Alice has revealed the corresponding bits of t. g can be computed
by both parties in some canonical way. Then Alice sends c = b⊕ 〈g, s〉 to Bob.
5. Both parties locally output τ to consist of y, y ∧ t, g, c, and the transcript of the commitment
to t in step (1).
6. Alice locally outputs γ to consist of s, t and the non-interactive opening to the commitment t.
7. (Reveal phase) Alice sends γ to Bob. We define opening(τ, γ) = ⊥ if it does not contain a valid
opening of the commitment of t to a valid codeword Mκs, or if the bits of t are not consistent
with y and y ∧ t computed in step (3). Otherwise, opening(τ, γ) = c⊕ 〈g, s〉.
We define two protocols piL and piR (in the plain model, without access to FCC), as follows.
• piL is identical to pi, except that Bob honestly plays the role of FCC. Thus in step (3), Alice
sends every bit ti to Bob, and Bob responds by sending yi to Alice.
After the commit phase, Bob uses the error-decoding algorithm of Cκ to decode the sequence
of bits t = t1t2 · · · to its maximum likelihood dataword s˜, and locally outputs the extracted
value z = c⊕ 〈g, s˜〉.
• piR is identical to pi, except that Alice honestly plays the role of FCC. Thus in step (3), Bob
sends each yi to Alice and Alice responds appropriately according to ti.
Lemma 5.27.
1. If Com is a statistically binding commitment scheme with non-interactive reveal, then (piL, piR)
are a pair of complementary statistically binding commitment protocols.
2. The protocol pi securely realizes F (piL,piR)EXT-COM in the FCC-hybrid model.
Proof. Given that part (1) is true, part (2) is easily demonstrated via a trivial simulation, since
(piL, piR) are simply pi with FCC honestly “collapsed” into the responsibilities of one party. The non-
trivial step is to show that part (1) is true.
First, we claim that piR is a statistically binding standalone commitment scheme. This is straight-
forward by the security of the component Com commitment scheme. We remark that, by applying a
standard Chernoff bound, we see that an honest Bob will request to see more than kκ bits of t only
with exponentially low probability κ.
Next, we must show that piL is extractable. As in Definition 5.25, we consider an interaction
between a corrupt Alice and honest Bob. Let t˜ be the sequence of inputs sent by Alice in step
(3). After step (4), Bob decodes t˜ to obtain maximum likelihood dataword s˜, and locally outputs
z = c⊕ 〈g, s˜〉.
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We now argue that the extracted value z is correct. In step (1) of piR, Alice gives a statistically
binding commitment, so with overwhelming probability there is a well-defined unique value t∗ such
that the commitment can be successfully opened only to t∗. We condition on this overwhelming-
probability event. If t∗ is not a codeword of Cκ, then Bob will never accept in the reveal phase of
pˆi, and our extraction is trivially correct. Otherwise, assume t∗ is a codeword, t∗ = (Mκ)s∗. If s∗ is
equal to s˜ computed by Bob, then the extraction is also correct.
However, if s˜ 6= s∗, then the Hamming distance between t˜ and codeword t∗ is at least the
minimum distance of Cκ, which is d = Θ(nκ). With overwhelming probability 1 − (kκ/2nκ)d =
1− O(1)Θ(κ), one of these d positions would have appeared in τ as a result of Bob choosing yi = 0.
When this happens, then Bob will never accept in the reveal phase and our extraction is correct.
5.7 Obtaining Extractable Commitment from FCOIN
In this section, we show how FEXT-COM can be securely realized using FCOIN. We first show a protocol
ρ in the FCC-hybrid world, and then define appropriate (ρL, ρR) protocols such that ρ is a secure
realization of F (ρL,ρR)EXT-COM . Protocol ρ uses as a component the following protocol ψˆ:
Compiled OT protocol ψˆ. Suppose ψpsv is a passive-secure OT protocol (as in Assumption 5.1)
with security parameter κ, that uses R(κ) bits of randomness. Let Com denote a statistically
binding, standalone-secure commitment scheme with non-interactive reveal phase (for instance,
Naor’s commitment scheme [75], which relies only on the existence of one-way functions). Finally,
let Gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}2n be a PRG family.
We define the following OT protocol ψˆ as follows, with security parameter κ. We assume Alice is
the sender, with input bits x0, x1, and Bob the receiver with input bit b.
1. Alice and Bob use FCOIN to generate a random σ ← {0, 1}2κ.
2. Alice chooses a random string rA ← {0, 1}R(κ) and commits to x0, x1, and rA using Com.
3. Alice uses a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge scheme to prove that she knows a valid
opening for the commitment in the previous step.
4. Bob sends a random string r′A ← {0, 1}R(κ) to Alice.
5. Bob chooses a random string rB ← {0, 1}R(κ) and commits to (b, rB) using Com.
6. Bob uses a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge scheme to prove that he knows a valid opening
for the commitment in the previous step.
7. Alice sends a random string r′B ← {0, 1}R(κ) to Bob.
8. Both parties start running the ψpsv protocol, with Alice using input (x0, x1) and random tape
rA ⊕ r′A, and Bob using input b and random tape rB ⊕ r′B . At each step, the parties do the
following: Suppose the transcript so far in the ψpsv protocol is τ :
(a) If it is Alice’s turn in the ψpsv protocol, then she sends m according to the ψpsv protocol.
Then she uses a zero-knowledge proof scheme to prove that there exists (x˜0, x˜1, r˜A) such
that her commitments in step (2) can be successfully opened to x˜0, x˜1, and r˜A respectively,
and the ψpsv protocol instructs Alice to sendmwhen her input is (x˜0, x˜1), her random tape
is r˜A ⊕ r′A, and the transcript so far is τ .
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(b) If it is Bob’s turn in the ψpsv protocol, then he sends m according to the ψpsv protocol.
Then he uses a witness-indistinguishable proof scheme to prove that there exists (b˜, r˜B , s)
such that either Gκ(s) = σ, or his commitment in step (5) can be successfully opened to
(b˜, r˜B), and the ψpsv protocol instructs Bob to send m when his input is b˜, his random tape
is r˜B ⊕ r′B , and the transcript so far is τ .
9. If at any point, a zero-knowledge or witness-indistinguishable proof by the other party fails to
verify, the parties immediately abort. Otherwise, they both output the values prescribed by the
ψpsv protocol when it terminates.
Some explanation of ψˆ is in order. We have essentially applied the GMW compiler [41] to ψpsv,
with the following important differences:
• In steps (3) and (6), the parties prove knowledge of the commitments to their inputs and
random-tape shares. This is important because we eventually reduce an adversary running ψˆ
to a passive adversary running ψpsv. For technical reasons, we need to extract inputs and the
random tape share in this step, but rewinding extraction is sufficient.
• Bob does not prove the standard GMW-style statement. Instead, he gives a witness-
indistinguishable proof of a statement containing a trapdoor clause related to the public ran-
domness σ. This extra trapdoor allows a straight-line simulator for a corrupt Bob to prove
false statements (by choosing σ from the range of G and using the trapdoor witness), which is
crucial in our subsequent security reductions.
• Note that ψˆ involves Alice committing to her inputs x0, x1 separately, but never opening these
commitments. We use this fact and eventually open these commitments in our overall protocol.
Interactive commitment protocol ρ. We now define a statistically binding standalone-secure
commitment protocol ρˆ. The protocol ρˆ has security parameter κ, and is as follows:
1. (Commit phase, on Alice input (COMMIT, b), with b ∈ {0, 1}) For i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, do:
(a) Alice chooses random bits x(0)i and x
(1)
i , and Bob chooses a random bit ai.
(b) The parties run the ψˆ OT protocol, so that Bob obtains x(ai)i . This interaction also results
in commitments to x(0)i and x
(1)
i under the Com commitment scheme.
2. Alice and Bob obtain r ∈ {0, 1}κ using FCOIN.
3. Alice sends c = b⊕
(⊕
i x
(ri)
i
)
to Bob.
4. Both parties output τ consisting of all of the Com-commitments to values x(ri)i .
5. Alice locally outputs γ to consist of the non-interactive openings for the commitments to each
x
(ri)
i .
6. (Reveal phase, on Alice input REVEAL) Alice sends γ. We define opening(τ, γ) = ⊥ if the
decommitments to x(ri)i bits are not valid. Otherwise, opening(τ, γ) = c⊕
(⊕
i x
(ri)
i
)
.
We then define the two related protocols, in the plain model:
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• ρL is identical to pi, except that Bob honestly plays the role of FCOIN. However, he chooses the
coins r for step (2) at the beginning of the protocol, and in step (1c) he runs the ψˆ protocol
obtaining x(ri)i instead of x
(ai)
i . After the commit phase, Bob locally outputs the extracted value
z = c⊕
(⊕
i x
(ri)
i
)
.
• ρR is identical to ρ, except that Alice honestly plays the role of FCOIN.
Lemma 5.28.
1. If ψpsv is a passive-secure OT protocol, and Com is a statistically binding commitment scheme
with non-interactive reveal, then (ρL, ρR) are a pair of complementary statistically binding
commitment protocols.
2. The protocol ρ securely realizes F (ρL,ρR)EXT-COM in the FCOIN-hybrid model.
Proof. (1) We first show that ρR is a statistically binding standalone-secure commitment protocol.
Statistical binding follows directly from the fact that the opening value of the commitment is a fixed
function of the openings of n statistically binding Com-commitments.
To show that ρR is computationally hiding, we consider an interaction between an honest Alice
and a malicious Bob, in the commit phase of ρR. To establish the computational hiding property, we
construct a (rewinding) simulator that simulates the commit phase against Bob without knowledge
of Alice’s bit. We construct the simulator via the following sequence of hybrids:
Real world: The simulator simply runs the honest Alice protocol, on Alice’s input. This is exactly
what happens in the real interaction between Alice and Bob.
Hybrid 1: Same as above, but each time in the ψˆ subprotocol, the simulator extracts Bob’s input
(b, rB), possibly by rewinding, from the proof of knowledge in step (6). The simulator
flips fair coins R and sends r′B = R ⊕ rB in step (7) of ψˆ. Intuitively, the simulator will
force Bob to run ψpsv on the coins R of its choice. This hybrid is distributed exactly as
the previous.
Hybrid 2: Same as above, but each time in the ψˆ protocol, the simulator also computes the next-
message function of ψpsv on input b and random tape R. If the honest next message
disagrees with the message Bob gives in step (8b), then the simulator aborts. By the
soundness of the extraction of (b, rB), the statistical binding of the commitment to
(b, rB), and the soundness of the WI proof that Bob gives in step (8b),3 this hybrid
is indistinguishable from the previous. However, we are guaranteed that in this hybrid
(and subsequent hybrids), Bob is running the ψpsv sub-protocol honestly on some input
on a randomly chosen random tape (note that it is important that the simulator honestly
sampled the random tape — it not enough for the random tape to be distributed
uniformly, since Bob may be able to generate correctly distributed random tapes with
some trapdoor).
Hybrid 3: Same as above, but each time in steps (3) and (8a) of the ψˆ protocol, the simulator
gives simulated zero-knowledge proofs (perhaps by rewinding Bob). This difference is
indistinguishable by the security of the zero-knowledge proof schemes.
3Only with negligible probability is σ in the range of the PRG, so that clause of the WI proof is false.
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Hybrid 4: Same as above, but each time in the ψˆ protocol, the simulator chooses two sets of
independent random bits: x′0, x
′
1 for the commitment in step (2), and x0, x1 to use
as input to the ψpsv protocol in step (8a). This difference is indistinguishable by the
computational hiding guarantee of the Com commitments, since the openings for these
commitments are never needed (they are no longer used as witnesses in the ZK proof
protocols).
Hybrid 5: Same as above, but the simulator chooses the string r from step (2) of ρR uniformly
from the set {0, 1}κ \ {a1a2 · · · aκ}, where ai is Bob’s input to the ith instance of the
ψˆ subprotocol, extracted above (instead of randomly from {0, 1}κ). This difference is
statistically indistinguishable from the previous hybrid.
Simulation: Same as above, but the simulator chooses the message c from step (3) of ρR randomly.
This hybrid defines our final simulation, since it does not need to know Alice’s bit, as
desired. To see that these last two hybrids are indistinguishable, choose an i such that
ai 6= ri (such an i must exist by our assumption in hybrid 5). Then in hybrid 5, the
value of x(ri)i influences Bob’s view only in the ith instance of ψpsv, and in the value c.
However, since Bob is running ψpsv honestly with input ai 6= ri, the transcript of this ψpsv
execution is computationally indistinguishable from a transcript that is independent of
x
(ri)
i . Thus the value c is pseudorandom, and our final simulation is computationally
indistinguishable from the previous hybrid.
We next show that ρL has the desired extraction property. For this, we consider an interaction
between a malicious Alice and honest Bob. We show that with overwhelming probability, Bob’s
outputs from step (1) of ρL are the only values to which Alice can successfully open the commitments
of x(ri)i in the reveal phase. We omit the details, which follow very closely to the approach taken
above. Briefly, we can argue that Alice runs the ψpsv protocol honestly on some inputs, using an
honestly sampled random tape (again by extracting from the proof of knowledge). As such, the
correctness of the ψpsv protocol implies that Bob will always learn the correct value of x
(ri)
i that
underlies Alice’s relevant Com-commitments. Thus, by the statistical binding property of these
commitments, Bob has learned (with overwhelming probability) the only values to which Alice can
successfully open.
(2) Finally, we show that ρ is a secure protocol for F (ρL,ρR)EXT-COM in the FCOIN-hybrid model. The
simulation is trivial, in that the simulator honestly engages in ρL against a corrupt Alice, and engages
in ρR against a corrupt Bob. What remains is to argue that this simulation is indistinguishable from
the real-world interaction. This is straight-forward for ρR, since there the honest party faithfully
simulates the behavior of FCOIN.
In the case of ρL, the simulation is sufficiently different from the real-world interaction, since in
the simulation Bob runs ψˆ with inputs ri instead of ai. We carefully establish the soundness of the
simulation through the following sequence of hybrids:
Hybrid 1: Same as the real world, except that each time in step (1) of ψ, the simulator picks
σ from the pseudorandom distribution G. This difference is indistinguishable by the
pseudorandomness of the PRG G.
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Hybrid 2: Same as before, except that each time in step (8b) of ψˆ, the simulator uses the “trap-
door” witness corresponding to the preimage of σ. This difference is indistinguishable
by the witness-indistinguishability of the WI proof scheme.
Hybrid 3: Same as before, except that each time in step (8) of ψˆ, the simulator uses ri as its
inputs to the ψpsv protocol, instead of ai (recall that these have been chosen at the
beginning of the simulation, and that the actual inputs to ψpsv are no longer being used
in the witness for the WI proof in this hybrid). The difference is indistinguishable by
the passive security guarantee of the receiver in the ψpsv protocol. To show this formally
requires some care, but it follows the same approach as the previous reductions to
passive security properties used earlier in this proof.
Hybrid 4: Same as before, except that each time in step (5) of ψˆ, the simulator commits to ri
instead of ai. Since the contents of these commitments are never used later (either by
revealing them later, or as a witness in the WI proofs), this difference is indistinguishable
by the hiding property of Com.
Hybrid 5: Same as before, except that each time in step (8b) of ψˆ, the simulator uses the
“legitimate” witness to the WI proof, corresponding to the opening of the commitment
to ri. This difference is indistinguishable by the witness-indistinguishability of the WI
proof scheme.
Simulation: Same as before, except that each time in step (1) of ψ, the simulator faithfully chooses
random coins σ instead of pseudorandom coins. Since the previous hybrid did not use
the preimage to the pseudorandom coins σ, these two hybrids are indistinguishable by
the pseudorandomness of G. We observe that this final hybrid represents exactly what
our simulator does: runs ρL honestly. Thus the simulation is indistinguishable from the
real-world interaction.
5.8 Extensions & Open Problems
We now identify some possible extensions to our zero-one law, and some directions for future work
suggested by our results.
5.8.1 Strengthening the Reduction
We have shown a zero-one law under the vpnt reduction. Since there is no zero-one law for the
significantly stronger vunt reduction (Chapter 4), a natural question is how much the vpnt reduction
can be strengthened to still admit a zero-one law?
Fixed roles. Our definition F v G allows parties to access many instances of the functionality G,
and accessing G as either of the two parties that it expects to interact with. One may consider a
stronger reduction called a fixed-role reduction, in which the protocol for F is required to interact
with all instances of G in the same role. Some functionalities like FCOIN are symmetric with respect
to the two parties, but others like FCC are not.
Theorem 5.29. There is no fixed-role reduction from FCOM to FCC.
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Proof. Suppose there is a protocol that securely realizes FCOM in the FCC-hybrid setting where Alice,
the committer for FCOM, is always the “sender” in FCC. Then Alice can equivocate in such a protocol,
as follows: she internally runs the simulator for when Bob is corrupt, playing the role of corrupt Bob,
and relaying the messages from the simulator to Bob. When the protocol requires Alice and Bob to
access FCC, Alice obtains an input to be sent to FCC from the simulator by telling it that Bob’s input to
FCC is 1 (i.e., Bob chooses to see Alice’s input); then Alice sends this input to FCC. If it turns out that
Bob indeed chooses to see Alice’s input, the simulation continues normally. However, if Bob chooses
to not see Alice’s input, Alice rewinds the simulator, tells it that Bob’s input to FCC is 0; she obtains
an input to FCC from the simulator, but does not forward it to FCC (because she has already sent an
input). Note that it does not matter if the input to FCC by the simulator changes after rewinding,
as this input is not revealed to Bob. Thus a corrupt Alice can faithfully run the simulator, and in
particular open the commitment to any bit specified at the beginning of the opening phase, and the
protocol is not secure.
On the other hand, suppose there is a protocol for FCOM in the FCC-hybrid model, in which Alice,
the committer for FCOM is always the “receiver” in FCC. In this case, we show that Bob can learn
Alice’s input after the commit phase and before the reveal phase. For this Bob will internally run the
simulator for when Alice is corrupt, relaying the messages from Alice in the actual protocol to this
simulator. Now again, when Alice and Bob are required to access FCC, Bob (who is the sender in FCC)
will generate an input for FCC by telling the simulator that Alice’s input to FCC is 1. Subsequently, if
her input turns out to be 0, Bob will rewind the simulator, give it 0 as Alice’s input, as above. In this
case, Bob obtains Alice’s input as the bit extracted by the simulator at the end of the commitment
phase.
Since FCC is unconditionally non-trivial, this theorem demonstrates that there is no zero-one
law under this fixed-role reduction. This impossibility highlights the fact that FCC is indeed a
functionality of rather low complexity, and justifies our somewhat complicated protocol used to
realize FCOM using FCC.
Weakening the communication channel. We formulated our results in the private channel model,
where the two parties can communicate with each other privately via an ideal communication
channel. (However, the adversary is allowed learn the number of bits communicated.) This is
perhaps the natural model for capturing the cryptographic complexity of 2-party computation.
Nevertheless, our main result readily extends to a model where the parties use a public channel
completely controlled by the adversary. This follows from the fact that under Assumption 5.1,
private channels can be securely realized using public channels [38]. (If the public channels are not
authenticated channels, then digital signatures are used to achieve authentication, with identities
of the parties being their signature verification keys. Note that digital signatures also follow from
one-way functions [90], in turn implied by Assumption 5.1.)
Even if the reduction is strengthened so that no additional channel is given (i.e., the protocol is
allowed to access only instances of F), our zero-one results still hold, since FPVT vnt F for all non-
trivial F (in the terminology of [70], non-trivial functionalities F enable bit transmission). Suppose
F is some DFF, and suppose for all sequences of inputs ~x0, ~x1, ~y, the output for Bob is the same when
F is given input sequence (~x0, ~y) or (~x1, ~y), and vice-versa with the roles of Alice and Bob reversed.
Then F is trivial, since either party’s output does not depend on the other’s inputs. So if F is non-
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trivial, then the above condition (or its symmetric variant) holds. Then FPVT vnt F as follows: To
send a bit b to Bob, Alice sends input sequence ~xb to F , and to receive it Bob sends sequence ~y. It is
straight-forward to see that this protocol is secure.
Hardness assumptions. Our results rely on the existence of passive-secure protocols for FOT. From
this assumption, we obtain one-way functions and other useful primitives. However, in our protocol
constructions we use most of these primitives in a non-black-box way (in particular, we use witness-
indistinguishable and zero-knowledge proofs of statements relating to these primitives). It is not
known whether the zero-one law holds with respect to protocols that use Assumption 5.1 in a black-
box way. In particular, it is not obvious how witness-indistinguishable/zero-knowledge proofs can
be avoided in our constructions (or how our proofs can be made to avoid statements involving the
evaluation of one-way functions or commitment scheme algorithms).
While we have shown that Assumption 5.1 is necessary for the zero-one law to hold, we do
not know the state of affairs if only a weaker assumption (like the existence one-way functions)
is true. Intuitively, the weaker the cryptographic assumptions considered, the closer the vpnt
reduction acts to the vunt reduction. In Lemma 5.3, we showed that if the vpnt-completeness
class expands (in comparison to the vunt-completeness class) to intersect the class of passively
realizable functionalities, then Assumption 5.1 is true, and in fact the completeness class expands
to contain all non-trivial functionalities. However, Lemma 5.3 does not rule out the possibility that
the vpnt-completeness class is larger than the vunt-completeness class, but is disjoint from the class of
passively realizable functionalities. In this case, perhaps only a much weaker hardness assumption
is needed.
As a concrete example, consider the SSFE functionality whose function table is
0 0 1
3 4 1
3 2 2
. This func-
tionality is neither passively realizable nor vunt-complete. Is it vpnt-complete under a cryptographic
assumption weaker than Assumption 5.1; say, the existence of one-way functions? Alternatively, is
vpnt-completeness equivalent to vunt-completeness, assuming only one-way functions?
Adaptive security. We consider protocols which are secure only against static adversaries, and
we do not know whether our results extend to the case of adaptive corruption. It is likely that a
completely different approach, and also a much stronger hardness assumption will be needed to
achieve adaptive security. The current state of the art is the result of Canetti et al. [23], who showed
that FCOIN is complete for adaptive security, under the assumption of dense cryptosystems. Thus
it suffices to identify a hardness assumption under which FCC is complete for adaptive security.
Our current approach of obtaining full-fledged commitment from the intermediate extractable
commitment FEXT-COM is not adaptively secure.
Of independent interest would be to identify the minimal hardness assumption necessary for a
zero-one law for adaptive security. In particular, it is not clear how an adaptively secure protocol for,
say, FOT in the FCOIN-hybrid setting would imply a dense cryptosystem. However, this must be the
case if the currently known hardness assumption is optimal.
5.8.2 Larger Classes of Functionalities
Our zero-one result is for the class of deterministic, finite functionalities. Some of the restrictions
of this class are necessary for our result, while we conjecture that the result extends if some of the
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restrictions are relaxed.
Unbounded memory. In this work we strictly considered functionalities with finite memory. This
restriction was crucial for our techniques, and we show that some memory restriction is crucial for
the zero-one law to hold:
Theorem 5.30. Let g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be a one-way function, and define
f(x) =
g(x) if |x| is of the form 22
n
for some n
x otherwise.
Let F be the functionality that takes input x from Alice and delivers f(x) to Bob. Then F is neither
complete nor trivial under the vpnt reduction.
Proof. First, F is not trivial. This can be seen by an appeal to the splittability characterization of
Theorem 3.20. F is not completely invertible, in particular it is non-invertible on security parameters
of the form 22
n
.
On the other hand, F is not complete. Consider any purported protocol for FOT in the F -
hybrid setting. For most values of the security parameter k, access to F is equivalent to FPVT, since
messages of length 22
n
are superpolynomially long in k (and thus can never be sent to F), or are
sub-logarithmically short in k (and thus f can be efficiently inverted to a canonical pre-image). As
such, for these values of k, a real-world adversary has exactly as much power as a simulator. Thus,
a corrupt receiver can run the simulator algorithm for a corrupt sender, to extract both of the honest
sender’s inputs. This violates the security of FOT for these values of the security parameter, so the
purported protocol is not secure.
The functionality F is admittedly contrived. While this impossibility result still does indicate
the necessity of making some restriction on the class of functionalities, we leave open the problem
of identifying the largest “natural” class of unbounded-memory functionalities that does satisfy the
zero-one law.
For instance, in this paper we model functionalities as finite state automata; a natural model
which allows unbounded memory but avoids letting the functionality evaluate one-way functions
is to consider automata equipped with a counter or stack. We leave this as an interesting open
question.
Randomized functionalities. Our restriction to deterministic functionalities is crucial for several
parts of our proof. We conjecture that the zero-one law holds also for randomized (but still finite-
memory) functionalities. A particular challenge is to consider that the transition function of a
finite-memory functionality might be randomized. However, even some simpler questions about
randomized functionalities are unresolved. For instance, which randomized SFE functionalities
admit unconditional protocols for FOT?
Non-well-formed functionalities. Two other restrictions we require are that functionalities take
inputs from both parties and give outputs to each party in a series of rounds, and that functionalities
interact with the adversary only to model an asynchronous adversarially controlled communication
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network. We leave open the problem of relaxing these requirements, both for realization results
(i.e., considering a functionality complete if a larger class of functionalities can be reduced to it) and
for extending the scope of the zero-one result (i.e., developing techniques to analyze a larger class
of functionalities).
Indeed, it is often very convenient to define intermediate functionalities which crucially use
more sophisticated communication with the adversary, and which do not have a round-based
input/output structure. Our splittability characterization (Chapter 3) does indeed completely
characterize triviality for arbitrary functionalities like these, so it may be possible to develop tools
for classifying them in the context of completeness.
Of secondary interest would be to have a convincing, tighter definition of when a functionality
“abuses” its knowledge of which parties are corrupt. The current definition of well-formedness is
motivated by ruling out pathological cases, like a functionality which announces the list of corrupt
parties. Such a functionality cannot be securely realized by any protocol in any realistic setting.
However, since many realizable functionalities do indeed require knowledge of the corrupt parties,
the current definition of well-formedness (which rules out all such dependence on the identities
of corrupt parties) seems overkill. To extend the zero-one law to functionalities whose behavior
depends on the identities of the corrupt parties, it will likely be necessary to develop a more refined
notion of well-formedness.
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CHAPTER 6
Reconciling Non-Malleability &
Homomorphic Encryption
6.1 Overview
A recurring theme in cryptography is the tension between achieving powerful functionality and
making strong security guarantees. In the case of encryption, a recent trend is towards achieving
various kinds of computations on encrypted data, e.g., rerandomizability [43, 45], proxy re-
encryption [11, 20], searchability [94, 26], predicate encryption [59], and various homomorphism
properties [36, 79]. Encryption schemes with computational features are interesting and useful in
their own right, but also are convenient in designing simple, intuitive protocols for many tasks that
combine data privacy and computation (like mix-nets and voting schemes).
On the other hand, non-malleability is usually required for an encryption scheme to be directly
useful in providing guarantees against malicious adversaries, in a composable security setting. In a
very general sense, non-malleability means that an adversary cannot manipulate ciphertexts in any
“unexpected” way. Unfortunately, existing non-malleability security definitions are incompatible
with encryption schemes with computational features. CCA security (security against chosen
ciphertext attack)1 rules out the possibility of manipulating encrypted data in any way, CPA security
(security against chosen plaintext attack) permits every possible kind of manipulation, and the very
few security notions between these two extremes are not expressive enough to cover the many
desired uses of encryption with computational features.
An ideal security definition for encryption with computational features would be one that realizes
a sharp tradeoff; for example, “this encryption scheme allow operations x, y, and z, but no other
operations are possible.”
In this work we address this problem in the context of homomorphic public-key encryption
schemes — those which allow (as a feature) anyone to obtain an encryption of T (m1, . . . ,mk)
given only the encryptions of unknown messages m1, . . . ,mk, for some allowed set of functions
T . Homomorphic encryption schemes hide not only the underlying plaintext, but also the “history”
of a ciphertext — i.e., whether it was derived by encrypting a known plaintext, or by applying a
homomorphic operation applied to some other ciphertext(s). Such schemes have been extensively
studied for a long time and have a wide variety of applications (cf. [10, 91, 29, 92, 52, 57, 33, 43,
54, 31]).
Challenges and Related Work. The first challenge is formally defining (in a convincing way)
the intuitive requirement that a scheme “allow particular features but forbid all others.” Security
notions for regular encryption developed and matured over many years [42, 77, 89, 8, 35, 16],
while arguably security definitions for homomorphic encryptions have lagged behind — to date,
1We will use the term CCA to refer to adaptive chosen-ciphertext security, also known as CCA2. When referring to CCA1
(also known as static CCA or “lunchtime attack”) security, we will be explicit.
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homomorphic encryptions are almost exclusively held to the weak standard of CPA security. In some
applications (e.g., [31]) CPA security is indeed sufficient, but for others (e.g. [34]) it is not. In
practical terms, this means that protocols that use homomorphic encryption usually have to employ
the heavy machinery of zero-knowledge proofs or verifiable secret sharing to extend to security
against malicious adversaries.
Very little work has addressed the possibility of homomorphic encryption schemes having
malleability beyond the desired operations; one exception is Wikstro¨m [95], who addresses this
question in a simpler setting for El Gamal encryption. Benignly-malleable (also called gCCA) security
[93, 1] was proposed as a relaxation of CCA security, and was further relaxed in the definition of
Replayable-CCA (RCCA) security [21]. RCCA security allows a scheme to be malleable, but only in
ways which are guaranteed to preserve the underlying plaintext. However, relaxing CCA security
in the same way does not yield an acceptable level of security when applied to more expressive
homomorphic operations (see Section 6.3.1); a new approach to defining security is needed.
The second challenge is achieving the desired security with a construction based on standard
assumptions — i.e., an encryption scheme that has a particular set of expressive homomorphic
operations, but is non-malleable with respect to all other operations. Note that even if the set
of allowed operations is very simple, supporting it can be very involved. Indeed, the problem of
rerandomizable RCCA encryption considered in a recent series of works [21, 45, 83] corresponds to
the simplest special case of our definitions.
6.1.1 Our Results
We give several new security definitions to precisely capture the desired requirements in the case of
unary homomorphic operations (those which transform a single encryption of m to an encryption of
T (m), for a particular set of functions T ). We provide two new indistinguishability-based security
definitions. The first definition, called Homomorphic-CCA (HCCA) security, formalizes the intuition
of “non-malleability except for certain prescribed operations,” and the second definition, called
unlinkability, formalizes the intuition that ciphertexts not leak their “history.” To justify our non-
malleability definition, we show that it subsumes the standard CCA, gCCA, and RCCA security
definitions (Theorem 6.5). We further show that our two new security requirements imply a
natural definition of security in the Universal Composition framework (Theorem 6.9). Using the
UC framework to define security of encryption schemes was already considered in [16, 21, 81, 19].
Our main result is to describe a parameterized encryption scheme which achieves our definitions
for a wide range of allowed (unary) homomorphism operations. The construction is secure under
the standard DDH assumption, and supports homomorphic operations related to a cyclic group
operation as its homomorphic feature. We also describe a very efficient construction that supports
homomorphic operations in arbitrary groups, but which only achieves a weak level of unlinkability.
To demonstrate the practical utility of our definitions, we show a simple, intuitive protocol for an
anonymous opinion polling functionality, which uses HCCA-secure encryption as a key component.
Even though the component encryption scheme supports only unary operations, we are able to
perform non-trivial computations on a set of independently encrypted inputs, crucially using the
scheme’s homomorphic features. Furthermore, because of the strong non-malleability guarantee,
this simple protocol achieves UC security against malicious adversaries without resorting to the
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overhead of zero-knowledge proofs or general-purpose multi-party computation. Our protocol can
be instantiated with either of our two new constructions, resulting in a very efficient protocol.
Finally, we consider extending our definitions to the case of binary homomorphic operations
(those which combine pairs of ciphertexts). We show that the natural generalization of our UC
security definition to this scenario is unachievable for a large class of useful homomorphic operations
(Theorem 6.16). However, we also give a positive result when one of our requirements is slightly
relaxed. In particular, if we allow a ciphertext to leak only the number of homomorphic operations
that were applied to obtain the ciphertext, then it is possible to construct a homomorphic scheme
that supports the binary group operation (that is, it is possible to obtain Enc(α ∗ β) from Enc(α) and
Enc(β), but no other operations are possible).
6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Homomorphic Encryption Syntax
LetM be a space of plaintext messages, let ⊥ be a special error indicator symbol not inM, and let T
be a “transformation space” — i.e., a set of polynomial-time computable functions from (M∪{⊥})k
toM∪ {⊥}. We call the elements of T the allowable transformations.
An encryption scheme consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time (polynomial in the implicit
security parameter) algorithms: KeyGen, Enc and Dec.
A T -homomorphic encryption scheme comes with an additional probabilistic polynomial-time al-
gorithm CTrans, the homomorphic operation feature, which takes k ciphertexts and (the description
of) a transformation from T , and outputs another ciphertext.2 For much of this work, we focus on
the case where k = 1; i.e., when the homomorphic operation is unary.
m ζ
m′ ζ ′
Enc
Dec
T CTrans(·, T )
Dec
Figure 6.1: Illustration of the syntax and
correctness of a homomorphic encryption
scheme.
Syntax of unary homomorphic encryption. Below we give the correctness properties for unary
homomorphic encryption. These requirements can be slightly relaxed (e.g., to hold only with
overwhelming probability over the randomness of they various procedures), but for simplicity we
present the stronger formulations.
For all key pairs (PK,SK) in the support of KeyGen, we require the following:
2Allowing CTrans to take the public key as additional input would also be a meaningful relaxation, but may not be suitable
in some applications. See Section 6.8.
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1. For every plaintext msg ∈ M, we require DecSK(EncPK(msg)) = msg, with probability 1 over
the randomness of Enc.
2. For every purported ciphertext ζ and every T ∈ T , we require DecSK(CTrans(ζ, T )) =
T (DecSK(ζ)), with probability 1 over the randomness of CTrans.
6.2.2 Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption
Let G be a (multiplicative) cyclic group of prime order p. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption in G is that the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
{(g, ga, gb, gab)}g←G;a,b←Zp and {(g, ga, gb, gc)}g←G;a,b,c←Zp .
Here, x← X denotes that x is drawn uniformly at random from a set X.
Cunningham chains. Our construction requires two (multiplicative) cyclic groups with a specific
relationship: G of prime order p, and Ĝ of prime order q, where Ĝ is a subgroup of Z∗p. We require
the DDH assumption to hold in both groups (with respect to the same security parameter).
As a concrete example, the DDH assumption is believed to hold in QR∗p, the group of quadratic
residues modulo p, where p and p−12 are prime (i.e, p is a safe prime). Given a sequence of primes
(q, 2q+1, 4q+3), the two groups Ĝ = QR∗2q+1 and G = QR
∗
4q+3 satisfy the needs of our construction.
A sequence of primes of this form is called a Cunningham chain (of the first kind) of length 3
(see [2]). Such Cunningham chains are known to exist with q as large as 220,000. It is conjectured
that infinitely many such chains exist, and with sufficient density.
6.2.3 Existing Security Definitions for Encryption
Several existing security definitions for encryption — CCA security, benignly-malleable (gCCA)
security [93, 1], and Replayable-CCA (RCCA) security [21] — follow a similar paradigm: The
adversary has access to a decryption oracle, and receives an encryption of one of two messages
of his choice. His task is to determine which of the two messages has been encrypted, and we say
that security holds if no adversary can succeed with probability significantly better than chance.
Since the adversary can simply submit the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle, it is
necessary to restrict the oracle in some way. The difference among these three security definitions
is in how the decryption oracle is restricted. This restriction corresponds intuitively to identifying
when a ciphertext has been (potentially) derived from the challenge ciphertext. In Figure 6.2, we
give a unified overview of these three security notions.
6.3 New Security Definitions for Homomorphic Encryption
In this section we present our formal security definitions. The first two are traditional definitions
based on indistinguishability security games, while the third is a definition in the Universal
Composition framework.
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Setup: Pick (PK,SK)← KeyGen and give PK to A.
Phase I: A is given access to the decryption oracle DecSK(·).
Challenge: Flip a coin b ← {0, 1}. Receive from A two plaintexts msg0,msg1. Compute
ζ∗ ← EncPK(msgb), and give ζ∗ to A.
Phase II: A is given access to the following “guarded” decryption oracle:
GDecSK(ζ) =
{
“GUARDED” if G(SK, ζ, ζ∗,msg0,msg1) = 1
DecSK(ζ) otherwise
.
Output: A outputs a bit b′. The advantage of A in this experiment is Pr[b′ = b]− 12 .
By using different predicates for G, different levels of security are obtained:
Security: G(SK, ζ, ζ∗,msg0,msg1):
CCA ζ ?= ζ∗
gCCA R(ζ, ζ∗) ?= 1, for arbitrary predicate R, provided that R
satisfies R(ζ, ζ∗) = 1⇒ DecSK(ζ) = DecSK(ζ∗)
RCCA DecSK(ζ)
?∈ {msg0,msg1}
Figure 6.2: Security experiment for CCA security and its relaxations gCCA and RCCA
6.3.1 Homomorphic-CCA (HCCA) Security
Our first indistinguishability-based security definition formalizes the intuitive notions of message
privacy and “non-malleability other than certain operations.”
A natural idea for formalizing our desired notion of non-malleability is to start with the standard
CCA security experiment and sufficiently relax it. Indeed, this is the approach taken in the definitions
of benignly-malleable (gCCA) security [93, 1] and Replayable CCA (RCCA) security [21], which
allow for a scheme to be only “mostly” non-malleable. In these security experiments (see Figure 6.2),
the decryption oracle is guarded so as not to decrypt ciphertexts that may be legitimate “derivatives”
of the challenge ciphertext. In CCA security, the only derivative is the challenge ciphertext itself; in
gCCA, derivatives are those which satisfy a particular binary relation with the challenge ciphertext;
in RCCA, derivatives are those which decrypt to either of the two adversarially-chosen plaintexts.
However, the same approach of guarding the decryption oracle fails in the case of more general
homomorphic encryption. For some sets of allowed transformations, it may be legal (i.e., possible
via a feature of the scheme) to change the underlying plaintext of a ciphertext to any other possible
plaintext. Indeed, in some instantiations of our construction, every ciphertext in the support of
the Enc operation is a possible derivative of every other such ciphertext. Letting the decryption
oracle refuse to decrypt possible derivatives in such a scenario would essentially weaken the security
requirement to IND-CCA1 (i.e., “lunchtime attack”) security, which is unsatisfactory.
Our approach to identifying “derivative” ciphertexts is completely different, and as a result our
definition initially appears incomparable to these other standard definitions. However, Theorem 6.5
demonstrates that our new definition gives a generic notion of non-malleability which subsumes
these existing definitions.
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Overview and intuition. The formal definition, which we call Homomorphic-CCA (HCCA) security,
appears below. Informally, in the security experiment we identify derivative ciphertexts not for
normal encryptions, but for special “rigged” ciphertexts.
When b = 0 in the experiment, the adversary simply receives an encryption of his chosen plaintext
msg∗, and gets access to an unrestricted decryption oracle. However, when b = 1 in the experiment,
instead of an encryption of msg∗, the adversary receives a “rigged” ciphertext, generated by RigEnc
without knowledge of msg∗. Such a rigged ciphertext need not encode any actual message, so
if the adversary asks for it (or any of its derivatives) to be decrypted, we must compensate for
the decryption oracle’s response in some way, or else it would be easy to distinguish the b = 0
and b = 1 cases. For this purpose, the RigEnc procedure also produces some (secret) extra state
information, which makes it possible to identify (via the RigExtract procedure) all ciphertexts derived
from that particular rigged ciphertext, as well as how they were derived. So in the b = 1 scenario,
the decryption oracle first uses RigExtract to check whether the given ciphertext was derived via a
homomorphic operation of the scheme, and if so, compensates in its response. For example, if the
query ciphertext was derived by applying the T transformation, then the decryption oracle should
respond with T (msg∗), to mimic the b = 0 case.
It is easily seen that if it is feasible for an adversary to modify an encryption of Enc(msg) into a
related encryption Enc(T (msg)), but RigExtract never outputs T , then there is a way for an adversary
to distinguish between b = 0 and b = 1 in the experiment. Conversely, if RigExtract never outputs T ,
and yet no adversary has nonnegligible advantage in the IND-HCCA experiment, then the scheme is
intuitively non-malleable with respect to T . Thus by restricting the range of the RigExtract procedure
in the security definition, we enforce a limit on the malleability of the scheme.
Finally, because RigExtract uses the private key, as well as secret auxiliary information from
RigEnc, we provide an oracle for these procedures. We do so in a “guarded” way that keeps the
auxiliary shared information hidden from the adversary in the experiment. These oracles are useful
in security reductions where we replace several encryptions with rigged encryptions.
Definition 6.1. A unary homomorphic encryption scheme is Homomorphic-CCA (HCCA) secure with
respect to T if there are PPT algorithms RigEnc and RigExtract, where the range of RigExtract is T ∪{⊥},
and such that for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the IND-HCCA experiment (Figure 6.3)
is negligible.
Simpler formulation. Some of constructions do not need the full power of the IND-HCCA
experiment. For instance, consider the case where RigExtract may evaluate DecSK as a black-box,
but otherwise does not use SK. Then the guarded oracles GRigEnc and GRigExtract are superfluous
in the IND-HCCA experiment. An adversary can simulate the behavior and shared state of these two
oracles using the public key PK and access to its own decryption oracle Dec/GDec.
Without these extra oracles, the IND-HCCA experiment collapses to a much simpler experiment,
which we call IND-HCCA-simp (Figure 6.4). Several of our results involve RigExtract procedures
of this required special form, and our corresponding proofs are made simpler by considering the
IND-HCCA-simp experiment. However, our main construction (Section 6.5.2) does require the full
power of the original experiment.
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Setup: Pick (PK,SK)← KeyGen and give PK to A.
Phase I: A is given access to the DecSK(·) oracle and the following two “guarded” RigEnc and
RigExtract oracles, which keep shared state to keep RigEnc’s auxiliary information hidden:
GRigEncPK: Takes no input. Run (ζ, S)← RigEncPK , store (ζ, S), and return ζS .
GRigExtractSK: On input (ζ, ζ ′), if (ζ ′, S) is stored for some S, then return
RigExtractSK(ζ, S).
Challenge: Flip a coin b ← {0, 1}. Receive from A a plaintext msg∗. If b = 0, compute
ζ∗ ← EncPK(msg∗); if b = 1, compute (ζ∗, S∗)← RigEncPK . Give ζ∗ to A.
Phase II: A is given access to the same GRigEnc and GRigExtract oracles as in Phase I, as well
as a “rigged” version of the decryption oracle RigDecSK(·). When b = 0, RigDecSK(·) is
simply implemented as the normal decryption oracle DecSK(·). When b = 1, RigDecSK(·)
is implemented as follows:
RigDecSK(ζ) =
{
T (msg∗) if ⊥ 6= T ← RigExtractSK(ζ, S∗)
DecSK(ζ) otherwise
.
Output: A outputs a bit b′. The advantage of A in this experiment is Pr[b′ = b]− 12 .
Figure 6.3: IND-HCCA experiment, parameterized by set of allowed transformations T
Setup: Pick (PK,SK)← KeyGen and give PK to A.
Phase I: A is given access to the DecSK(·) oracle.
Challenge: Flip a coin b ← {0, 1}. Receive from A a plaintext msg∗. If b = 0, compute
ζ∗ ← EncPK(msg∗); if b = 1, compute (ζ∗, S∗)← RigEncPK . Give ζ∗ to A.
Phase II: A is given access to a “rigged” version of the decryption oracle RigDecSK(·), which is
implemented as follows. When b = 0, RigDecSK(·) is simply implemented as the normal
decryption oracle DecSK(·). When b = 1, RigDecSK(·) is implemented as follows:
RigDecSK(ζ) =
{
T (msg∗) if ⊥ 6= T ← RigExtractSK(ζ, S∗)
DecSK(ζ) otherwise
.
Output: A outputs a bit b′. The advantage of A in this experiment is Pr[b′ = b]− 12 .
Figure 6.4: IND-HCCA-simp experiment, parameterized by set of allowed transformations T
6.3.2 Unlinkability
There indeed is some tension between the HCCA definition given above and the intuitive notion
of unlinkability that we desire. HCCA security implies that it is possible to track transformations
applied to rigged ciphertexts, while unlinkability demands that ciphertexts not leak whether they
were generated via a transformation. To reconcile this, we require unlinkability to apply only
to ciphertexts that successfully decrypt under a private key chosen by the challenger. This excludes
linkability via the RigEnc and RigExtract procedures, since tracking ciphertexts using RigExtract in
general requires the tracking party to know the private key.
Our formal definition of unlinkability is given below. We note that the definition is more than just
a correctness property, as it involves the behavior of the scheme’s algorithms on maliciously-crafted
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ciphertexts. The security experiment also includes a decryption oracle, making it applicable even to
adversaries with chosen-ciphertext attack capabilities.
Definition 6.2. A unary homomorphic encryption scheme is unlinkably homomorphic with respect
to T (T -unlinkable) if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the IND-UH experiment
(Figure 6.5) is negligible.
Setup: Pick (PK,SK)← KeyGen and give PK to A.
Phase I: A is given access to the decryption oracle DecSK(·).
Challenge: Flip a coin b← {0, 1}. Receive from A a ciphertext ζ and a transformation T ∈ T . If
DecSK(ζ) = ⊥, do nothing; otherwise:
• If b = 0, give the adversary ζ∗ ← EncPK(T (DecSK(ζ)).
• If b = 1, give the adversary ζ∗ ← CTrans(ζ, T ).
Phase II: Same as Phase I.
Output: A outputs a bit b′. The advantage of A in this experiment is Pr[b′ = b]− 12 .
Figure 6.5: IND-UH experiment, parameterized by set of allowed transformations T
Relaxations. Unlinkability is a strong security guarantee that considers even maliciously crafted
ciphertexts. We also consider relaxations of unlinkability which are implied by simple indistinguisha-
bility properties of the scheme’s CTrans procedure, but are nonetheless useful.
Definition 6.3. A unary homomorphic encryption scheme is weakly unlinkably homomorphic with
respect to T (T -weakly-unlinkable) if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the IND-WUH
experiment (Figure 6.6) is negligible.
Setup: Pick (PK,SK)← KeyGen and give PK to A.
Phase I: A is given access to the decryption oracle DecSK(·).
Challenge: Flip a coin b← {0, 1}. Receive from A a plaintext msg and transformation T ∈ T .
• If b = 0, give the adversary ζ∗0 ← EncPK(msg) and ζ∗1 ← EncPK(T (msg)).
• If b = 1, give the adversary ζ∗0 ← EncPK(msg) and ζ∗1 ← CTrans(ζ∗0 , T ).
Phase II: Same as Phase I.
Output: A outputs a bit b′. The advantage of A in this experiment is Pr[b′ = b]− 12 .
Figure 6.6: IND-WUH experiment, parameterized by set of allowed transformations T
Unlike the stronger variant, weak unlinkability is implied by a simple indistinguishability condi-
tion: namely, that for all transformations T ∈ T , plaintexts msg, and ciphertexts ζ ← EncPK(msg),
the distributions of EncPK(T (msg)) and CTrans(ζ, T ) are computationally indistinguishable given
SK.
Definition 6.4. A unary homomorphic encryption scheme is transformation hiding with respect to T
(T -transformation-hiding) if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the IND-TH experiment
(Figure 6.7) is negligible.
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Setup: Pick (PK,SK)← KeyGen and give PK to A.
Phase I: A is given access to the decryption oracle DecSK(·).
Challenge: Flip a coin b← {0, 1}. Receive from A a plaintext msg and transformation T ∈ T .
• If b = 0, give the adversary ζ∗ ← EncPK(T (msg)).
• If b = 1, generate ζ ← EncPK(msg) and give the adversary ζ∗ ← CTrans(ζ, T ).
Phase II: Same as Phase I.
Output: A outputs a bit b′. The advantage of A in this experiment is Pr[b′ = b]− 12 .
Figure 6.7: IND-TH experiment, parameterized by set of allowed transformations T
Note that the IND-TH experiment is identical to the IND-WUH experiment, except that the
adversary does not receive ζ∗0 in the IND-TH experiment. Thus transformation hiding is a strictly
weaker requirement.
Transformation hiding is also implied by a simple indistinguishability criterion: namely,
that for all transformations T and plaintexts msg, the distributions EncPK(T (msg)) and
CTrans(EncPK(msg), T ) are computationally indistinguishable given SK, over the randomness
of both Enc and CTrans in the second expression. In particular, CTrans need not be randomized for
a scheme to be transformation hiding.
6.3.3 Defining Security Using an Ideal Functionality
We also define the “Homomorphic Message Posting” functionality FTHMP in the framework of Univer-
sally Composable security [16] as a natural security definition encompassing both unlinkability and
our desired notion of non-malleability. The complete definition appears in Figure 6.8.
Setup: On receiving a command SETUP from a party P : If a previous SETUP command has been
processed, abort. Else, send (ID-REQ, P ) to the adversary, and expect in response a string id.
Broadcast (ID-ANNOUNCE, P, id) to all other parties.
Message posting: On receiving a command (POST,msg) from a party sender: If msg 6∈ M,
ignore the request. If P is corrupt, send (HANDLE-REQ, sender,msg) to the adversary; otherwise
send (HANDLE-REQ, sender) to the adversary. In both cases expect a string handle in return.
If handle has been previously used, abort; else internally record (handle,msg) and broadcast
(HANDLE-ANNOUNCE, handle) to all parties.
Dummy handles: On receiving a command (DUMMY, handle) from a corrupt party, internally
record (handle,⊥) and broadcast (HANDLE-ANNOUNCE, handle) to all parties.
Homomorphic reposting: On receiving a command (REPOST, handle, T ) from a party sender: If
handle is not recorded internally or T 6∈ T , ignore the request. Otherwise, suppose (handle,msg)
is recorded internally. If msg 6= ⊥, then do the same as if (POST, T (msg)) were received.
Otherwise, send (HANDLE-REQ, sender, handle, T ) to the adversary and expect a string handle′ in
return. If handle′ has been previously used, abort; else record (handle′, T (msg)) internally and
send (HANDLE-ANNOUNCE, handle′) to all parties.
Message reading: On receiving a command (GET, handle) from party P (and only party P ): If
a record (handle,msg) is recorded internally, give msg to P ; otherwise ignore this request.
Figure 6.8: UC ideal functionality FTHMP.
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FTHMP allows parties to post private messages for other parties, as on a bulletin board, represented
by abstract handles which reveal no information about the message (they are generated by the
adversary without knowledge of the message). Only the designated receiver is allowed to obtain the
corresponding message for a handle. To model the homomorphic features, the functionality allows
parties to post messages derived from other handles. The functionality is parameterized by the set of
allowed transformations T . When a party provides a previously posted handle and a transformation
T ∈ T , the functionality retrieves the message m corresponding to the handle and then acts as if the
party had actually requested T (m) to be posted. The sender does not need to know, nor is it told,
the underlying message m of the existing handle.
FTHMP models the non-malleability we require, since the only way a posted message can influence
a subsequent message is via an allowed transformation.
The functionality also models unlinkability by internally behaving identically (in particular, in
its interaction with the adversary) for the two different kinds of posts. The only exception is that
corrupt parties may generate “dummy” handles which look like normal handles but do not contain
any message. When a party derives a new handle from such a dummy handle, the adversary learns
the transformation. This apparent slight weakness is natural3 and it mirrors the tradeoff between
our indistinguishability definitions. In our security proofs, this additional dummy handle feature is
crucial.
Homomorphic encryption schemes and protocols for FTHMP. The UC framework defines when a
protocol is said to securely realize the functionality FTHMP: for every PPT adversary in the real world
interaction (using the protocol), there exists a PPT simulator in the ideal world interaction with
FTHMP, such that no PPT environment can distinguish between the two interactions.
We associate homomorphic encryption schemes with candidate protocols for FTHMP in the follow-
ing natural way (for simplicity assume all communication is on an authenticated broadcast channel).
To setup an instance of FTHMP, a party generates a key pair and broadcasts the public key. To post a
message, a party encrypts it under the public key and broadcasts the resulting ciphertext. The “de-
rived post” feature is implemented via the CTrans procedure. To retrieve a message from a handle,
the receiver decrypts it using the private key.
6.4 Relationships Among Security Definitions
To justify our new security definitions, we prove some relationships among them and among the
more established definitions of CCA, gCCA [1, 93], and RCCA [21] security. We first give some
simple observations.
6.4.1 Simple Observations
In order to achieve HCCA security, T must be closed under composition, and must also contain the
identity function, since the adversary can simply submit the challenge ciphertext ζ∗ to the RigDec
oracle.
3For example, an adversary may broadcast a single encryption under a public key that he keeps hidden. The ciphertext
will be meaningless to the recipient, but if the adversary later encounters another ciphertext that decrypts under this same
key, he can deduce that the it was derived from his previous ciphertext.
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Simultaneously achieving HCCA security and unlinkability. We have defined unlinkability and
HCCA security with the goal that a scheme can be both T -unlinkably homomorphic, and T -HCCA-
secure (for the same T ). Indeed, it is easy to see that if a scheme is T -unlinkably homomorphic and
T ′-HCCA-secure, then T ⊆ T ′. For simplicity, and to highlight the compatibility and sharp tradeoff
between these two definitions, we only focus on schemes which satisfy them both with respect to
the same transformation space T .
Triviality of HCCA without (weak) unlinkability or transformation-hiding. Without a require-
ment of (weak) unlinkability or transformation-hiding, it is relatively trivial to construct a scheme
that is HCCA-secure with respect to any space of message transformations T . Consider modify-
ing any CCA-secure encryption scheme by considering an additional kind of ciphertext of the form
(ζ, T ), where ζ is a ciphertext in the original scheme and T is a description of a transformation
in T . To decrypt a ciphertext of this new form, first decrypt ζ and then if T ∈ T , apply T to
the result. The scheme has a homomorphic transformation procedure: CTrans(ζ, T ) = (ζ, T ), and
CTrans((ζ, T ), T ′) = (ζ, T ′ ◦ T ).
It is not hard to see that such a scheme achieves HCCA security with respect to T . RigEnc
should encrypt some fixed message and use the ciphertext itself as the auxiliary information S.
Then on input (ζ, T ), S, the RigExtract procedure should return T if T ∈ T and ζ = S, and return
⊥ otherwise. Since T is included explicitly in the ciphertext itself, the scheme is clearly not even
transformation-hiding.
6.4.2 HCCA Generalizes Existing Non-Malleability Definitions
Theorem 6.5. CCA, gCCA, and RCCA security can be obtained as special cases of the HCCA definition,
by appropriately restricting RigEnc and RigExtract.
Proof. The restrictions on RigExtract are progressively relaxed as we go from CCA to gCCA to RCCA,
making it explicit that the non-malleability requirements get weaker in that order.
First, consider a variant of the traditional CCA security experiment (Figure 6.2), in which the
adversary provides only one of the two challenge plaintexts msg1, while the other challenge plaintext
msg0 is fixed and publicly known. This variant realizes the same level of security as the original CCA
definition (in which the adversary chooses both plaintexts).4 We can further modify the experiment
cosmetically so that when the adversary submits the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle,
the response is msg1 (regardless of whether msg0 or msg1 was chosen), instead of “GUARDED”.
This modified CCA experiment can be directly obtained as a special case of IND-HCCA as follows:
RigEnc generates an encryption of msg0, and uses the ciphertext itself as the auxiliary information.
RigExtract simply checks if an input ciphertext is identical to the auxiliary information; if so, it
outputs the identity transformation (indicating that the given ciphertext encodes the same plaintext
as the output of RigEnc); otherwise, it outputs ⊥. This RigExtract does not use the private key at all,
thus the corresponding IND-HCCA experiment can be simplified to the IND-HCCA-simp experiment
without loss of generality. Then it is easy to see that the resulting IND-HCCA-simp experiment
4If an adversary can successfully distinguish between encryptions of msg versus msg′ in the CCA experiment, then a
related adversary can successfully distinguish between either (msg,msg0) or (msg
′,msg0).
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is exactly equivalent to the modified CCA experiment described above, with RigDec acting as the
decryption oracle.
Similarly, benignly non-malleable (or gCCA) security is obtained if RigExtract is allowed to
compute an arbitrary equivalence relation among the two ciphertexts (but still without being given
the private key). RCCA security is obtained if RigEnc encrypts a random plaintext (using that
plaintext as the auxiliary information), and RigExtract simply decrypts the given ciphertext and
checks whether the result equals the auxiliary information. In this case, RigExtract only uses the
private key to implement Dec as a black box, so again the corresponding IND-HCCA experiment
collapses to the IND-HCCA-simp experiment.
Note that in all these cases RigExtract is allowed to output only ⊥ or the identity transformation.
This highlights the fact that schemes satisfying these security definitions are not malleable in ways
which alter the message.
We note that all of these special cases of HCCA involve a RigEnc procedure which simply encrypt
a plaintext as normal. In our construction (Section 6.5.2), we exploit the flexibility of the full HCCA
definition to achieve larger classes of transformations, by letting RigEnc generate a “ciphertext” that
is not in the range of Enc(·).
Rerandomizable RCCA. The notion of rerandomizable RCCA encryption was introduced in [21]
and later considered by [45, 83]. Briefly, rerandomizable RCCA security demands that given any
ciphertext in the support of Enc(m), anyone should be able to freshly sample the distribution of
Enc(m) (rerandomizability), but the scheme is non-malleable in ways which alter the plaintext
(RCCA security).
Rerandomizable RCCA security corresponds to the special case of unlinkable HCCA security,
where the only allowed transformation is the identity transformation,5 and we will use the term
“rerandomizable RCCA” security when appropriate. However, for the general case, we prefer the
term “unlinkable”, as it emphasizes a concrete security end goal, and not the technique used to
achieve it.
6.4.3 CCA From HCCA
Given a (not necessarily unlinkable) HCCA-secure scheme satisfying a reasonable condition, we
show a black-box construction of a CCA-secure scheme. The reduction is a simple modification of
the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transformation to construct a CCA-secure scheme from any identity-
based encryption (IBE) scheme [18]. A similar black-box transformation appeared independently
in [71]. The CHK transformation relies on the fact that IBE ciphertexts are non-malleable with
respect to the identity string. Using the verification key of a strong one-time signature scheme as the
identity, the CHK transformation thwarts any potential malleability of the IBE ciphertext’s message.
Similarly, if the homomorphic transformations of an HCCA-secure scheme preserve any part of the
plaintext, then that part of the plaintext is non-malleable and can be used to store a signature
verification key, as in the CHK transformation, to thwart the possible malleability of the remainder
of the plaintext.
Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,CTrans) be a T -HCCA-secure scheme with the following properties:
5Technically, our unlinkability requirement is slightly stronger than the rerandomizability requirement as stated above.
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• The message spaceM is isomorphic to A× B. That is, there are efficiently computable maps
betweenM and A×B. Without loss of generality, we assumeM = A×B.
• For all T ∈ T , there exists a function t : B → B such that T (a, b) = (a, t(b)). That is, each
transformation preserves the A-component of the plaintext.
Intuitively, these are the minimal requirements so that E enforces non-malleability on some part of
the message. These requirements are sufficient to adapt the CHK transformation.
Let Σ = (SigGen,Sign,Ver) be a strong one-time signature scheme6 with A as its space of
verification keys. We define the new CCA-secure scheme E CHK, with message space B, as follows:
• KeyGenCHK: same as KeyGen.
• EncCHKPK(msg): Run (vk, ssk) ← SigGen. Compute ζ ← EncPK(vk,msg) and σ ← Signssk(ζ),
then output (vk, ζ, σ).
• DecCHKSK(vk, ζ, σ): If Vervk(ζ, σ) 6= 1, then output ⊥. Else, compute (vk′,msg) ← DecSK(ζ). If
the decryption fails, or if vk 6= vk′, then output ⊥. Otherwise, output msg.
Theorem 6.6. If E and Σ are as above, then E CHK is CCA-secure.
Proof. Consider the standard CCA experiment (Figure 6.2) against E CHK, in which the adversary
receives an encryption of msg∗ = msgb. Now consider a hybrid experiment in which the challenge
ciphertext is generated as follows:
• Enc∗PK(msg∗): Run (vk∗, ssk) ← SigGen. Compute (ζ∗, S∗) ← RigEncPK and σ∗ ←
Signssk(ζ∗), then output (vk∗, ζ∗, σ∗).
and the decryption oracle is replaced by:
• Dec∗SK(vk, ζ, σ): If Vervk(ζ, σ) 6= 1, then output ⊥. If ⊥ 6= T ← RigExtractSK(ζ, S∗), then
set (vk′,msg) = T (vk∗,msg∗). By the properties of E , vk′ = vk∗ in this case. Otherwise set
(vk′,msg) ← DecSK(ζ). If the decryption fails, or if vk 6= vk′, then output ⊥. Otherwise,
output msg.
By the HCCA security of E , this hybrid experiment is indistinguishable from the original experiment
(to simulate the CCA experiment and this hybrid variant in the IND-HCCA experiment requires no
access to the GRigEnc or GRigExtract oracles). Note that in the hybrid experiment, the challenge
ciphertext is generated independently of the message msg∗, but the hybrid decryption oracle still
depends on msg∗.
However, in the case that RigExtractSK(ζ, S∗) 6= ⊥, we have that vk′ will be set to vk∗. But
since the decryption oracle is only called when (vk, ζ, σ) 6= (vk∗, ζ∗, σ∗), we must have either
vk′ 6= vk, or Vervk′(ζ, σ) = 0 with overwhelming probability by the strong unforgeability of Σ.
Thus the experiment is indistinguishable from one in which the decryption oracle rejects whenever
RigExtractSK(ζ, S∗) 6= ⊥. That is:
6Strong one-time signature schemes are implied by one-way functions, and it is easy to construct a one-way function from
the KeyGen procedure of any HCCA-secure scheme.
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• Dec∗SK(vk, ζ, σ): If Vervk(ζ, σ) 6= 1, or if RigExtractSK(ζ;S∗) 6= ⊥, then output ⊥. Set
(vk′,msg) ← DecSK(ζ). If the decryption fails, or if vk 6= vk′, then output ⊥. Otherwise,
output msg.
Now in this final hybrid, the challenge ciphertext and decryption oracle responses are computed
independently of msg∗, so the adversary’s advantage is 1/2. By the indistinguishability of our
sequence of hybrids, the scheme is CCA-secure.
We also note that if Σ is not strongly unforgeable, then the above transformation results in an
RCCA-secure scheme instead of a CCA-secure scheme.
Given an HCCA-secure scheme E with message space isomorphic to A × B, and all allowed
transformations preserving the A-component, the above construction gives a CCA-secure scheme
with message space B. We also observe that one can also construct an RCCA-secure [21] scheme
with message space A using E: simply add an arbitrary B-component when encrypting and ignore
the B-component when decrypting.
Black-box separation from CPA. Given the black-box separation results of [39], our construction
above implies that there is no shielding7 black-box construction of a HCCA-secure scheme satisfying
the condition of Theorem 6.6 from a CPA-secure scheme.
6.4.4 Restricting the Transformation Space
In general, one cannot easily modify a T1-unlinkable-HCCA-secure scheme into a T2-unlinkable-
HCCA-secure scheme, even if T2 ⊆ T1. The problem of “disabling” the transformations in T1 \ T2
while at the same time maintaining those in T2 appears just as challenging as constructing a T2-
unlinkable-HCCA scheme from scratch. However, a simple black-box transformation is possible for
the special case where T2 is a singleton set containing only the identity transformation. Recall that
this special case is known as rerandomizable RCCA security [21].
Definition 6.7. Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,CTrans) be a unary homomorphic encryption scheme, and
let E ′ = (KeyGen′,Enc′,Dec′) be a (not necessarily homomorphic) encryption scheme. We define the
encapsulation of E ′ inside E , denoted E ◦ E ′, to be a unary homomorphic encryption scheme, given by
the following algorithms:
• KeyGen∗: Run (pk, sk) ← KeyGen and (pk′, sk′) ← KeyGen′. Output PK = (pk, pk′) and
SK = (sk, sk′).
• Enc∗pk,pk′(msg) = Encpk(Enc′pk′(msg)).
• Dec∗sk,sk′(ζ) = Dec′sk′(Decsk(ζ)), where we let Dec′sk′(⊥) = ⊥ for simplicity.
• CTrans∗: same as CTrans.
Theorem 6.8. If EH is a T -unlinkable-HCCA-secure scheme (for any T ) and ER is a (not necessarily
rerandomizable) RCCA-secure scheme, then EH ◦ ER is rerandomizable RCCA-secure.
7A shielding construction is one in which the HCCA scheme’s decryption algorithm does not make calls to the CPA scheme’s
encryption algorithm.
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Intuitively, the outer scheme’s unlinkability is preserved by the encapsulation, but the inner
scheme’s non-malleability renders useless all transformations but the identity transformation.
Note that RCCA security without rerandomizability is a weaker requirement than CCA secu-
rity [21]. Thus, for example, an unlinkable HCCA-secure scheme encapsulating a plain CCA-secure
encryption scheme will yield a rerandomizable RCCA-secure encryption scheme. For many instan-
tiations of HCCA-secure schemes, there is a black-box reduction to a CCA-secure scheme (Theo-
rem 6.6), and in these cases we get a direct black-box reduction from unlinkable HCCA security to
rerandomizable RCCA security.
Proof. For clarity, we superscript with “H” the algorithms of EH , and superscript with “R” the
algorithms of ER. We write the keys of EH as (hpk, hsk), and similarly the keys of ER as (rpk, rsk).
We write the algorithms of the encapsulated scheme EH ◦ ER without superscripts.
Note that CTransH accepts possibly many allowed transformations as input when viewed in the
context of EH . However, in the context of the encapsulated scheme EH ◦ ER, CTrans = CTransH
is only meaningful when called with the identity transformation. We note that to achieve HCCA
security with respect to T , T must indeed contain the identity function (see Section 6.4.1). It is
easy to see that the unlinkability of the outer scheme (with respect to the identity transformation)
is preserved by the construction.
To show RCCA security (HCCA security with the identity function as the only allowed transfor-
mation), we must demonstrate appropriate RigEnc and RigExtract procedures for the new scheme.
Let (RigEncH ,RigExtractH) and (RigEncR,RigExtractR) be the procedures guaranteed by the two
schemes, respectively. Then the new scheme satisfies HCCA security with the following procedures:
• RigEnchpk,rpk does the following: Run (ζ, SH) ← RigEncHhpk and (ζR, SR) ← RigEncRrpk. Set
S = (SH , ζR, SR) and output (ζ, S).
• RigExtracthsk,rsk(ζ, S) does the following: Parse S as (SH , ζR, SR). Run T ←
RigExtractHhsk(ζ, SH). If T = ⊥, output ⊥; otherwise output RigExtractRrsk(T (ζR), SR),
which must be either the identity function or ⊥, by the RCCA security of the inner scheme.
Consider a hybrid HCCA experiment where the challenge ciphertext is generated from msg∗ as:
• Run (ζ∗, S∗)← RigEncHhpk and ζ∗R ← EncRrpk(msg∗). Remember ζ∗R and output ζ∗.
and RigDec in Phase II of the IND-HCCA experiment is implemented as:
RigDechsk,rsk(ζ) =
Dec
R
rsk(T (ζ
∗
R)) if ⊥ 6= T ← RigExtractHhsk(ζ, S∗)
DecRrsk(Dec
H
hsk(ζ)) otherwise.
It is straight-forward to verify that this hybrid experiment is indistinguishable from both the b = 0
and b = 1 branches of the HCCA experiment instantiated with the new scheme and its RigEnc and
RigExtract procedures described above.
6.4.5 Unlinkable HCCA Implies the UC Definition
Theorem 6.9. Every T -homomorphic encryption scheme which is HCCA-secure, unlinkably homomor-
phic (with respect to T ) and satisfies the correctness properties, is a UC-secure realization of FTHMP,
against static (non-adaptive) corruptions.
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Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,CTrans) be an unlinkably homomorphic, HCCA-secure encryption
scheme (with allowable homomorphisms T ). To prove Theorem 6.9, for any real-world adversary
A, we must demonstrate an ideal-world adversary (simulator) S, so that for all PPT environments
Z, EXEC[Z,A, E ,FBCAST] ≈ EXEC[Z,S, pidummy,FTHMP]. We assume that all communication is done on
an authenticated broadcast channel FBCAST.
In the case where the recipient P is corrupt, the simulation is trivial. Each time it is asked to
generate a handle, it is given the underlying message. Each time the adversary itself outputs a
ciphertext, the simulator can register it as a dummy handle, after which it is notified each time that
handle is REPOST’ed. We now focus on the case where P is not corrupt.
We construct S in a sequence of hybrids, starting from the real-world interactions and altering
it step by step to get an ideal-world adversary, at every stage ensuring that each change remains
indistinguishable to all environments. All the simulators below exist in the ideal world, but are also
given (progressively less) information about the inputs to the honest parties. We conveniently model
this access to extra information using modified functionalities.
S0 and F0 (correctness): F0 behaves exactly like FTHMP except that in its HANDLE-REQ interactions
with the adversary, it reveals the message and whether the handle is being requested for a repost.
Thus S0 effectively learns all the honest parties’ inputs to F0. S0 internally simulates the encryption
scheme algorithms for all honest parties, and lets the adversary A interact with these simulated
parties and directly with the environment, as follows:
1. When an honest party P sends a SETUP command to F0, the functionality sends (ID-REQ, P ) to
S0 and expects an ID in return. S0 generates a key pair (PK,SK)← KeyGen and uses PK as
the ID string. It also internally simulates to A that P broadcast the public key.
2. When an honest party sender sends a command (POST,msg) to F0, the functionality sends
(HANDLE-REQ, sender,msg) to S0 and expects a handle in return. S0 computes handle ←
EncPK(msg) and uses it as the handle. It also internally simulates to A that sender broadcast
handle.
3. When an honest party sender sends a command (REPOST, handle, T ) to F0, and handle is
internally recorded, the functionality sends (HANDLE-REQ, sender, handle, T ) to S0 and expects
a handle in return. S0 computes handle′ ← CTrans(handle, T ) and uses it as the handle. It also
internally simulates to A that sender broadcast handle′.
4. When the adversary broadcasts a ciphertext ζ, S0 does the following:
• If DecSK(ζ) = msg 6= ⊥, then S0 sends (POST,msg) to the functionality on behalf of A. It
uses ζ as the corresponding handle.
• Otherwise, S0 sends (DUMMY, ζ) to F0.
Claim 6.10. For any given PPT adversary, let F0 and S0 be as described above. Then for all PPT
environments Z, EXEC[Z,A, E ,FBCAST] ≈ EXEC[Z,S0, pidummy,F0].
Proof. This follows from the correctness properties of encryption scheme E , and the fact that S0
exactly emulates the real world actions of all parties.
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S1 and F1 (unlinkable homomorphism): F1 is identical to F0 except that it does not tell the
adversary whether a HANDLE-REQ was the result of a POST or REPOST command, except for dummy
handles. The exact differences are as follows:
1. When an honest party sender sends a command (REPOST, handle, T ) to F1, and (handle,msg)
is internally recorded, and msg 6= ⊥, the functionality now does the same thing as if sender
had given the command (POST, id, T (msg)) command. If msg = ⊥, the functionality sends
(HANDLE-REQ, sender, handle, T ) to the simulator just as in F0.
2. S1 and S0 are identical, although they receive different types of HANDLE-REQ requests when
interacting with F1 instead of F0.
Claim 6.11. For any given PPT adversary A, let S0, F0, S1 and F1 be as described above. Then for all
PPT environments Z, EXEC[Z,S0, pidummy,F0] ≈ EXEC[Z,S1, pidummy,F1].
Proof. This follows from the unlinkable homomorphism property of the encryption scheme. The only
manner in which the adversary’s view differs in the two executions is in whether certain ciphertexts
are generated via a transformation (just as S0 does on receiving a (HANDLE-REQ, sender, handle, T )
request) or as a fresh encryptions of the appropriate message (just as S1 does on receiving a
(HANDLE-REQ, sender, T (msg)) request). We note that F1 only behaves differently when msg 6= ⊥.
Thus the difference between executions only involves ciphertexts which were either honestly
generated by the simulator, or adversarially generated ciphertexts that successfully decrypted under
PK. The unlinkable homomorphism property of the scheme implies that the difference in these
interactions’ outcomes is negligible.
More formally, we can only apply the unlinkable homomorphism property to one ciphertext at a
time. It is straightforward to construct a sequence of hybrid simulators where the difference between
successive hybrids is in whether a single handle was freshly re-encrypted or had a transformation
applied, and such that the rest of the interaction can be carried out within the unlinkability
experiment. Thus EXEC[Z,S0, pidummy,F0] ≈ EXEC[Z,S1, pidummy,F1].
S2 and F2 (HCCA security): F2 is identical to F1 except that it does not tell the adversary the
contents of the posted messages when the receiver is not corrupted. S2 differs from S1 accordingly,
and uses the RigEnc and RigExtract features guaranteed by HCCA security. The exact differences are
as follows:
1. When P is not corrupt and F1 would send (HANDLE-REQ, sender,msg) to the simulator (i.e,
when a party posts or reposts a non-dummy handle), F2 instead sends (HANDLE-REQ, sender).
2. When S2 receives a request of the form (HANDLE-REQ, sender) from F2, it computes
(handle, S) ← RigEncPK and uses handle as the message’s handle. It internally keeps
track of (handle, S) for later use.
3. When the adversary broadcasts a ciphertext ζ, S2 does the following: For each (handle, S)
recorded above, S2 checks if RigExtractSK(ζ, S) = T 6= ⊥. If so, S2 sends (REPOST, handle, T )
to F2 and uses ζ as the handle. If none of these RigExtract calls succeed, then S2 proceeds just
as S1 (i.e, attempts to decrypt ζ under SK and so on).
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Claim 6.12. For any given PPT adversary A, let S1, F1, S2 and F2 be as described above. Then for all
PPT environments Z, EXEC[Z,S1, pidummy,F1] ≈ EXEC[Z,S2, pidummy,F2].
Proof. This follows from the HCCA security of the scheme. Intuitively, the only way the two
executions differ is in whether the simulator provides honest ciphertexts (as S1 does) or “rigged”
ciphertexts (as S2 does).
More formally, we can only apply the HCCA guarantee to one ciphertext at a time. It is straight-
forward to construct a sequence of hybrid simulators where the difference between successive hy-
brids is in whether a single handle was encrypted with the correct message or else via RigEnc, and
such that the rest of the interaction can be carried out within the HCCA experiment. We note that in
most hybrids, there must be calls to RigEnc and RigExtract for other ciphertexts, so the GRigEnc and
GRigExtract oracles are crucial in the HCCA definition.
Concluding the proof. Combining the above claims we get that for all adversaries A, there exists
a simulator S2 such that EXEC[Z,A, E ,FBCAST] ≈ EXEC[Z,S, pidummy,F2] for all environments Z. Note
that F2 is in fact identical to FTHMP. So letting S = S2 completes the proof.
Weak unlinkability. If a scheme achieves only weak unlinkability (Definition 6.3), then a slight
relaxation of the UC functionality can realized. In the FTHMP UC functionality, call a handle
adversarially influenced if:
• it is the result of a POST or REPOST command issued by a corrupted party,
• or it is the result of a (REPOST, handle) command, where handle is adversarially influenced.
An encryption scheme which is HCCA secure and only weakly unlinkably homomorphic is a secure
realization of a variant of FTHMP, in which the adversary is notified every time an adversarially
influenced handle is reposted (in the same way it is notified when its dummy handles are reposted).
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 6.9, except that unlinkability is only applied to handles
which are not adversarially influenced (i.e., a ciphertext which was generated by the simulator
honestly using Enc).
6.5 Constructions
We now present several constructions of various strengths, and supporting different classes of
homomorphic operations.
6.5.1 Achieving Transformation Hiding
Our first construction is an encryption scheme which is HCCA secure with respect to any unary group
operation, and achieves the transformation hiding property.
The construction. Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be any RCCA-secure encryption scheme with
message space G, which is an abelian group with group operation “∗”. Without loss of generality, we
assume that G isomorphic to the direct product H1 × H2, where H1 is a parameter of our scheme,
and elements in G are represented as (m1,m2) ∈ H1 ×H2.8
8For example, one may choose H1 = G and H2 = {1}, leading to a useful instantiation of our scheme.
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For t ∈ H1, let Tt denote the “multiplication by t” transformation Tt(m1,m2) = (t ∗m1,m2). For
simplicity, we let Tt(⊥) = ⊥.
Our construction has message space M, and supports transformations T = {Tt | t ∈ H1}. The
construction is specified by the following algorithms:
• KeyGen∗: Same as KeyGen.
• Enc∗PK(m1,m2): Choose random r ← H1, and set s = m1 ∗ r ∈ H1. Output (EncPK(r,m2), s).
• Dec∗SK(ζ, s): Decrypt (r,m2) ← DecSK(ζ), and output ⊥ if the decryption fails. Otherwise,
output (s ∗ r−1,m2).
• CTrans∗((ζ, s), Tt): Output (ζ, s ∗ t).
Intuitively, our desired transformations preserve the H2-component of the plaintext, but allow the
group operation to be applied to the H1-component. Thus our encryption scheme places the H2-
component of the plaintext into the RCCA-secure encryption. We also place inside the RCCA
encryption a random one-time pad that masks the H1-component of the plaintext. The masked
H1-component is provided in the clear of the ciphertext, so that anyone can apply the appropriate
algebraic operations to it.
Theorem 6.13. The above construction is HCCA-secure with respect to T , and is transformation-hiding.
Proof. First, it is easy to see that the scheme is transformation-hiding, since the distributions of
Enc∗PK(Tt(m1,m2)) and CTrans
∗(Enc∗PK(m1,m2), Tt) are identical.
To show that the scheme is HCCA-secure, we must demonstrate appropriate RigEnc and
RigExtract procedures. Let RigEnc and RigExtract be the procedures guaranteed by the RCCA se-
curity of the component scheme E . We define the following procedures:
• RigEnc∗PK : Choose random s← T1 and compute (ζ, S)← RigEncPK . Output (ζ, s) and private
information (S, s).
• RigExtract∗SK((ζ ′, s′); (S, s)): If RigExtractSK(ζ ′;S) = ⊥, then output ⊥. Otherwise, the output
of RigExtractSK(ζ ′;S) is the identity transformation, by the RCCA security of E . In that case,
output t = s′ ∗ s−1.
Our definition of RigExtract∗ does not use the private key except to implement Dec∗ as a black
box, so we can consider the simplified HCCA experiment, IND-HCCA-simp.
We must prove that the two branches of the IND-HCCA-simp experiment are indistinguishable.
First consider the branch b = 1 of the experiment that involves RigEnc∗ and RigDec. We can
equivalently write the branch as follows:
• Generating the challenge ciphertext: Given message (m∗1,m∗2), choose random r ← T1 and set
s = m∗1 ∗ r. Compute (ζ∗, S)← RigEncPK , and output (ζ∗, s).
• Implementation of the RigDec(ζ ′, s′) oracle: If RigExtractSK(ζ ′;S) 6= ⊥, then compute
t = s′ ∗ s−1. Then output (m∗1 ∗ t,m∗2). Otherwise, set (r′,m′2)← DecSK(ζ ′). If this decryption
fails, output ⊥; otherwise output (s′ ∗ (r′)−1,m′2).
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We have simply filled in the steps of the IND-HCCA-simp experiment, but generated the value s
slightly differently than in RigEnc∗. However, the value s is still uniform in H1, so this does not
affect the outcome of the experiment.
However, suppose we modify this branch as follows: Let ζ∗ be instead generated via
EncPK(r,m∗2); and in RigDec, we remove the condition that checks RigExtract. By the RCCA
security of E , this difference is indistinguishable, since whenever RigExtractSK(ζ ′;S) 6= ⊥ in the
RigDec algorithm above, we have that DecSK(ζ ′) = (r,m∗2) in the modified interaction, so the other
clause of RigDec will give a consistent answer.
But in this modified interaction, the challenge ciphertext is generated according to the honest
Enc∗ procedure, and RigDec is implemented exactly as Dec∗. Thus the modified experiment is exactly
the b = 0 branch of the IND-HCCA-simp experiment. We established that the two branches of the
experiment are indistinguishable, thus the scheme is HCCA secure.
6.5.2 Achieving Full Unlinkability
Our main result is a parameterized constructions which achieves both HCCA security and unlink-
able homomorphism, with respect to a wide range of transformations, under the standard DDH
assumption in two related groups.
Requirements. Our construction requires two (multiplicative) cyclic groups with a specific rela-
tionship: G of prime order p, and Ĝ of prime order q, where Ĝ is a subgroup of Z∗p. We require
the DDH assumption to hold in both groups (with respect to the same security parameter). Given a
sequence of primes q, 2q + 1, 4q + 3 (a Cunningham chain of the first kind of length 3 [2]), the two
quadratic-residue groups Ĝ = QR∗2q+1 and G = QR
∗
4q+3, in which the DDH assumption is believed
to hold, represent a suitable choice.
Notation and supported transformations. Let “∗” denote the group operation in the product
group Gn defined by (α1, . . . , αn) ∗ (β1, . . . , βn) = (α1β, . . . αnβn).
For τ ∈ Gn, define Tτ to be the “multiplication by τ” transformation in Gn; i.e., Tτ (m) = τ ∗m.
We also let Tτ (⊥) = ⊥ for simplicity. Now let H be a subgroup of Gn. Our construction provides a
scheme whose message space isGn, and whose set of allowable transformations is TH = {Tτ | τ ∈ H}.
By choosing H appropriately, we can obtain the following notable classes TH:
• The identity function alone (i.e., rerandomizable RCCA security), by setting H = {1}.
• All transformations Tτ (that is, all component-wise multiplications in Gn), by setting H = Gn.
• “Scalar multiplication” of tuples in Gn by coefficients in G, by setting H = {(s, . . . , s) | s ∈ G}.
Double-strand malleable encryption scheme. We now define a homomorphic encryption scheme
which we call the “Double-strand malleable encryption” (DSME), and which we use as a component
in our main construction.
System parameters: A cyclic multiplicative group Ĝ of prime order q. Ĝ also acts as the message
space for this scheme. Similar to above, we denote Tσ as the multiplication-by-σ transforma-
tion in Ĝ, with Tσ(⊥) = ⊥.
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Key generation (MKeyGen): Pick random generators ĝ1, ĝ2 from Ĝ, and random ~a = (a1, a2),~b =
(b1, b2) from (Zq)2. The private key is (~a,~b). The public key consists of ĝ1, ĝ2, and the following
values:
A =
∏2
j=1 ĝ
aj
j ; B =
∏2
j=1 ĝ
bj
j
Encryption (MEnc): To encrypt u ∈ Ĝ under public key (ĝ1, ĝ2, A,B), first pick random v ∈ Zq,
w ∈ Z∗q . Output
(ĝv1 , ĝ
v
2 , uA
v, Bv; ĝw1 , ĝ
w
2 , A
w, Bw).
Decryption (MDec): To decrypt U = (V1, V2, AV , BV ;W1,W2, AW , BW ) under private key (~a,~b):
First, if W1 = W2 = 1, then output ⊥. Then check the following constraints:
AW
?=
∏2
j=1W
aj
j ; BV
?=
∏2
j=1 V
bj
j ; BW
?=
∏2
j=1W
bj
j ;
If any fail, output ⊥. Otherwise, output u = AV /
∏2
j=1 V
aj
j .
Ciphertext transformation (MCTrans): To apply transformation Tσ to the ciphertext
U = (~V ,AV , BV ; ~W,AW , BW ) , choose random s ∈ Zq, t ∈ Z∗q and output
(V1W s1 , V2W
s
2 , σAVA
s
W , BVB
s
W ;W
t
1 ,W
t
2 , A
t
W , B
t
W )
It is not hard to see that if U is in the support of MEncdPK(u) (with random choices v and w), then
the MCTrans(U, Tσ) is in the support of MEncdPK(σu), corresponding to random choices v′ = v+ sw
and w′ = tw.
We emphasize that this DSME scheme does not achieve our desired definitions of a multiplicative
homomorphic scheme, because given an encryption of u and a value r ∈ Zq, one can easily
construct an encryption of ur, and exponentiation by r is not an allowed transformation. Our main
construction uses only the multiplicative transformation of DSME as a feature, although the security
analysis accounts for the fact that other types of transformation are possible.
Main construction. We now present our main construction, which uses the previous DSME scheme
as a component.
System parameters: A cyclic multiplicative group G of prime order p. A space of messages. We also
require a secure DSME scheme over a group Ĝ of prime order q, where Ĝ is also a subgroup of
Z∗p. This relationship is crucial, as the ciphertext transformation MCTrans of the DSME scheme
must coincide with multiplication in the exponent in G.
As described above, we let Gn be the message space, for any parameter n. The scheme is also
parameterized by the subgroup H of allowed transformations. For m ∈ Gn, let f(m) be an
injective encoding (say, an arbitrary representative) of the coset m ∗ H to {0, 1}∗. Let H be a
family of collision-resistant hash functions from {0, 1}∗ to Zp.9 Finally, we require any fixed
vector ~z ∈ (Zp)4, which is not a scalar multiple of the all-ones vector.
9Using the same technique as in the Cramer-Shoup scheme [30], our use of a hash can be removed, but at the expense of
longer public keys.
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Key generation (KeyGen): Run (P̂K, ŜK) ← MKeyGen for the DSME scheme in Ĝ. Pick random
generators g1, . . . , g4 from G. For i ∈ [n], choose random ~ci = (ci,1, . . . , ci,4) from (Zp)4 and
compute Ci =
∏4
j=1 g
ci,j
j . Choose random ~d = (d1, . . . , d4), ~e = (e1, . . . , e4) from (Zp)4 and
compute D =
∏4
j=1 g
dj
j and E =
∏4
j=1 g
ej
j . Choose a random hash H← H.
The private key is (ŜK,~c1, . . . ,~cn, ~d,~e). The public key is (P̂K, g1, . . . , g4, C1, . . . , Cn, D,E,H).
Encryption (Enc): To encrypt (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Gn under a public key of the preceding form, first
compute µ = H(f(m1, . . . ,mn)). Then pick random x ∈ Zp, y ∈ Z∗p and random u ∈ Ĝ, and
output
g
(x+z1)u
1 , . . . , g
(x+z4)u
4 , m1C
x
1 , . . . , mnC
x
n, (DE
µ)x;
gyu1 , . . . , g
yu
4 , C
y
1 , . . . , C
y
n, (DE
µ)y;
MEncdPK(u)
Decryption (Dec): Let ζ be a ciphertext of the preceding form, say, ζ = ( ~X, ~CX , PX ; ~Y , ~CY , PY ;U),
where
~X = (X1, . . . , X4) ~CX = (CX,1, . . . , CX,n)
~Y = (Y1, . . . , Y4) ~CY = (CY,1, . . . , CY,n)
First compute u = MDecdSK(U). If u = ⊥, output ⊥. Otherwise, strip off u and ~z from the
exponents as follows: For j = 1, . . . , 4: set Xj = X
1/u
j g
−zj
j and Y j = Y
1/u
j .
Compute the purported plaintext (m1, . . . ,mn) via mi = CX,i/
∏4
j=1X
ci,j
j , and then compute
µ = H(f(m1, . . . ,mn)). Finally, check the integrity of the ciphertext in the following way. If
Y1 = · · · = Y4 = 1 (the identity element in G), output ⊥. Check the following conditions:
PX
?=
∏4
j=1X
dj+µej
j ; CY,i
?=
∏4
j=1 Y
ci,j
j (for each i ∈ [n]);
PY
?=
∏4
j=1 Y
dj+µej
j
If any checks fail, output ⊥, otherwise output (m1, . . . ,mn).
Ciphertext transformation (CTrans): Let ζ be a ciphertext of the preceding form. To apply
transformation T(τ1,...,τn) to ζ, choose random σ ∈ Ĝ and random s ∈ Zp, t ∈ Z∗p. Output:
(X1Y s1 )
σ, . . . , (X4Y s4 )
σ, τ1CX,1C
s
Y,1, . . . , τnCX,nC
s
Y,n, PXP
s
Y ;
Y tσ1 , . . . , Y
tσ
4 , C
t
Y,1, . . . , C
t
Y,n, P
t
Y ;
MCTrans(U, Tσ)
It is not hard to see that if ζ is in the support of EncPK(m1, . . . ,mn), say, with random choices
x, y, and u, then the above ciphertext is in the support of EncPK(τ1m1, . . . , τnmn), corresponding to
random choices x′ = x+ sy, y′ = ty, and u′ = σu.
High-level overview. Disregarding ~z and u, ciphertexts in our scheme resemble those in the
original Cramer-Shoup scheme [30]. Two similar-looking “strands” are given, with only the
first one directly carrying the message. This allows us to refresh the randomness x and y and
achieve unlinkability when applying a transformation to the ciphertext. A similar “double-strand”
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paradigm was used by Golle, et al. [43], applied to the ElGamal encryption scheme to achieve a
rerandomizable and anonymous CPA-secure scheme.
Without the additional random value u appearing in the exponents of some of the ciphertext
components, the second strand’s components would be completely independent of the first strand’s.
Thus, the scheme would be malleable via an attack which combined the first strand of one ciphertext
and the second strand of another – the combination would result in a valid ciphertext if and only
if the two ciphertexts shared the same µ value. The addition of u and its encryption under MEnc
correlates the two strands, leaves u hidden from eavesdroppers, yet still allows for the random
choice of u to be refreshed.
In our “double-strand” paradigm of achieving unlinkability, x’s randomness is refreshed addi-
tively (as x + sy) and y’s multiplicatively (as ty). However, without the ~z vector perturbing the
randomness in x, there is a possible attack whereby x can be rerandomized multiplicatively and
still result in a valid ciphertext (say, by squaring each component of the first strand). By adding
~z, (intuitively) any attack that would multiply x would also multiply ~z as well. The decryption
procedure only strips away one copy of ~z, so x would remain perturbed for the Cramer-Shoup-like
integrity checks on the ciphertext. In our analysis, it is important that ~z is linearly independent of
the all-ones vector, so that an adversary would not be able to successfully compensate for additional
perturbances in the Cramer-Shoup integrity checks.
We achieve our desired level of non-malleability by a technique similar to the Cramer-Shoup
CCA-secure scheme [30]. It uses a ciphertext component of the form (DEµ)x, where D,E are parts
of the public key, x is a random value used in encryption, and µ is a hash of the ciphertext’s prefix.
The rerandomizable RCCA scheme of [83] uses the same paradigm, except that the value µ is a
direct encoding of the plaintext (in rerandomizable RCCA, ciphertexts are malleable but only in
ways which preserve the plaintext). In our HCCA-secure scheme, µ is a hash of an encoding of the
coset m ∗H. Intuitively, our scheme can therefore only be malleable in ways which preserve the H-
coset of the plaintext. A similar variation the Cramer-Shoup hashing was used in [71] to construct
an encryption scheme which is non-malleable with respect to public “tags.” In our construction,
however, the tag/invariant is a function of the (private) plaintext.
Theorem 6.14. The construction satisfies the correctness requirements, HCCA security, and unlinkable
homomorphism properties with respect to TH, for any subgroup H of Gn, under the DDH assumption in
the two cyclic groups.
The lengthy proof follows in Appendix A.1. An overview is given below:
Proof Sketch. To show HCCA security, we must demonstrate appropriate RigEnc and RigExtract
procedures. Our RigEnc encrypts a fixed dummy plaintext and uses a randomly chosen µ value
instead of one derived from the plaintext. Our RigExtract similarly checks the integrity of the
ciphertext using the same random µ value, and checks that the dummy plaintext was altered by
an allowed transformation.
To show the suitability of these procedures in the HCCA experiment, we first describe an alternate
encryption procedure which is implemented using the private key instead of the public key. When
this procedure is used in place of Enc or RigEnc to generate the challenge ciphertext ζ∗ in the HCCA
security experiment, it follows from the DDH assumption that the difference is indistinguishable to
any adversary. The ciphertexts produced by this alternate procedure are information-theoretically
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independent of the secret coin flip in the HCCA experiment, as well as some internal randomness
used to generate the ciphertext.
Next, we show that given a fixed view of an adversary in the HCCA experiment, any ciphertext
which is not in the support of EncPK(·) or CTrans(ζ∗, ·) is rejected by the decryption oracles Dec and
RigDec (i.e, they output ⊥ for such ciphertexts) with overwhelming probability over the remaining
randomness in the experiment (which is independent of the adversary’s view). This is the most
delicate part of our proof. It uses a linear-algebraic characterization of our scheme, and relies
on the fact that certain quantities in the challenge ciphertext are distributed independently of the
adversary’s view. We also show an analogous statement for the GRigExtract oracles.
From the previous observation, we may replace the Dec, RigDec, and GRigExtract oracles (which
use the secret key) with oracles that can be implemented using only information that is public to
the adversary (e.g, the public key and challenge ciphertext). These oracles are computationally
unbounded, as they exhaustively search the supports of EncPK(·) and CTrans(ζ∗, ·). Only with
negligible probability do these alternate oracles give an answer which disagrees with the original
oracles.
Finally, we conclude that with these two modifications — alternate encryption and decryption
procedures — the adversary’s entire view (the public key, challenge ciphertext and responses from
the oracles) in the HCCA security experiment is independent of the secret bit b, and so the adversary’s
advantage is zero. Furthermore, this modified experiment is indistinguishable from the original
experiment for any PPT adversary, so the HCCA security claim follows.
The correctness and unlinkable homomorphism properties are a direct consequence of the
lemmas needed to prove the HCCA security.
6.6 Opinion Polling Protocol Application
We now present an “opinion poll” protocol that elegantly illustrates the power of HCCA-secure
encryption. The protocol is motivated by the following scenario:
A pollster wishes to collect information from many respondents. However, the respondents are
concerned about the anonymity of their responses. Indeed, it is in the interest of the pollster to set
things up so that the respondents are guaranteed anonymity, especially if the subject of the poll is
sensitive personal information. To help collect responses anonymously, the pollster can enlist the
help of an external tabulator. The respondents require that the external tabulator too does not see
their responses, and that if the tabulator is honest, then responses are anonymized for the pollster
(i.e., so that he cannot link responses to respondents). The pollster, on the other hand, does not
want to trust the tabulator at all: if the tabulator tries to modify any responses, the pollster should
be able to detect this so that the poll can be invalidated.
More formally, we give a secure protocol for the UC ideal functionality FPOLL, described in
Figure 6.9, where Pclient is the pollster, Pserver is the tabulator, and P1, . . . , Pn are the respondents.
Verifiable shuffling, mix-nets, and voting. Our opinion poll functionality can be viewed as an
instantiation of verifiable shuffling (see e.g., [44, 47]). In a verifiable shuffle, a server takes in a
collection of ciphertexts and outputs a random permutation in such a way that other parties are
convinced that the shuffling server did not cheat; i.e., a shuffler cannot tamper with or omit any
input ciphertext.
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On input (SETUP, Pclient, Pserver, P1, . . . , Pn) from party Pclient:
• Give output (SETUP, Pclient, Pserver) to each party Pi.
• Give output (SETUP, Pclient, P1, . . . , Pn) to Pserver.
On input (INPUT, xi) from input party Pi:
• Give output (INPUTFROM, Pi) to Pserver, and remember xi.
On input OK from Pserver:
• If Pserver is corrupt, expect to receive from Pserver a permutation σ on {1, . . . , n}. If Pserver is
honest, choose σ at random.
• If not all P1, . . . , Pn parties have supplied an input, or if some xi = ⊥, then give output ⊥
to Pclient.
• Otherwise, give output (xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) to Pclient.
On input CANCEL from a corrupt Pserver, give output ⊥ to Pclient.
Figure 6.9: UC ideal functionality FPOLL.
Verifying a shuffle typically involves using special-purpose zero-knowledge proofs, which are
generally interactive and complicated. Even protocols whose verification is non-interactive rely on
a common reference string setup [46]. Our approach is novel in that the shuffle’s integrity can be
verified without any zero-knowledge proof mechanism. Instead we leverage the strong limitations
that the encryption scheme places on a malicious shuffler, resulting in a very efficient and simple
protocol, which is secure even in the UC framework with no setups.
Verifiable shuffles are used in mix-nets [24] and in voting protocols. However, in our setting the
shuffle is only verified to the pollster, and not to the respondents. In an election, the respondents
also have an interest in the integrity of the shuffle (to know that their votes are included in the tally).
We note that an election protocol (in which all participants receive guaranteed correct results) is not
possible in the UC framework without trusted setups, given the impossibility results of Chapter 3.
The protocol. Our protocol is described in detail in Figure 6.10. The main idea is to use an HCCA-
secure, transformation-hiding scheme, whose message space G2 (for a cyclic group G), and whose
only allowed operations are those of the form (α, β) 7→ (α, tβ). In other words, anyone can apply
the group operation to (multiply) the second plaintext component with a known value t, but the
first component is completely non-malleable, and the two components remain “tied together.” Both
of our construction from Section 6.5 can easily accommodate these requirements.
To initiate the opinion poll, the pollster generates a (multiplicative) secret sharing r1, . . . , rn of a
random secret group element R, then sends to the ith respondent a share ri. Each respondent sends
Enc(mi, ri) to the tabulator, where mi is his response to the poll. Now the tabulator can blindly
re-randomize the shares (multiply the ith share by a random si, such that
∏
i si = 1), shuffle the
resulting ciphertexts, and send them to the pollster. The pollster will ensure that the shares encode
the secret R and accept the results.
The security of the protocol is informally argued as follows. An honest pollster only sees a
random permutation of the responses, and a completely random sharing of R. There is no way
to link any responses to the ri shares he originally dealt to the respondents, either by looking
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at the new shares of R, or via the encryption scheme itself. The tabulator sees only encrypted
data, and in particular has no information about the shares ri. The only way the tabulator could
successfully generate ciphertexts whose second components are shares of R is by making exactly
one of his ciphertexts be derived from each respondent’s ciphertext. By the non-malleability of the
encryption scheme, each response mi is inextricably “tied to” the corresponding share ri and cannot
be modified, so each respondent’s response must be represented exactly once in the tabulator’s
output without tampering. Finally, observe that the responses of malicious respondents must be
independent of honest parties’ responses – by “copying” an honest respondent’s ciphertext to the
tabulator, a malicious respondent also “copies” the corresponding ri, which would cause the set of
shares to be inconsistent with overwhelming probability.
Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,CTrans) be a homomorphic encryption scheme with message space
G2. We suppose the CTrans operation accepts arguments as CTrans(C, t), where t ∈ G indicates
the transformation (α, β) 7→ (α, tβ). The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Pclient generates a key pair (SK,PK)← KeyGen and chooses random elements r1, . . . , rn ←
G, remembering R =
∏
i ri. She then broadcasts PK, sends (ri, Pserver) to each party Pi,
and sends (Pclient, P1, . . . , Pn) to Pserver.
2. Each input party Pi holds input xi (encoded into an element of G). He receives PK and
(ri, Pserver) from Pclient, then sends EncPK(xi, ri) to Pserver through a secure channel.
3. Pserver collects ciphertext Ci from each input party Pi, then chooses a random permuta-
tion σ on [n] and random s1, . . . , sn ← G subject to
∏
i si = 1. He computes C
′
i =
CTrans(Cσ(i), sσ(i)) for each i and sends (C ′1, . . . , C
′
n) to Pclient.
4. Pclient receives (C ′1, . . . , C
′
n) from Pserver and decrypts each C
′
i as (x
′
i, r
′
i) ← DecSK(C ′i). If
any decryptions fail, or if
∏
i r
′
i 6= R, she aborts. Otherwise, she outputs (x′1, . . . , x′n).
Figure 6.10: Opinion poll protocol
Theorem 6.15. If E is HCCA-secure and transformation-hiding with parameters as described above,
and |G| is superpolynomial in the security parameter, then our protocol is a secure realization of FPOLL
against static adversaries.
Proof. Given a real-world adversary A, we construct an ideal-world simulator S. We break the proof
down into 4 cases according to which parties A corrupts:
Case 1: If A corrupts neither Pserver nor Pclient, then suppose by symmetry that A corrupts some
input parties P1, . . . , Pk. Then the main task for S is to extract the inputs of each corrupt Pi and
send them to FPOLL. S simply does the following:
• On receiving (SETUP, Pclient, Pserver, P1, . . . , Pn) from FPOLL, generate (PK,SK) ← KeyGen.
Choose random r1, . . . , rk ← G and simulate that Pclient broadcast PK and sent (ri, Pserver)
to each corrupt input party Pi.
• If not all corrupt parties Pi send a ciphertext Ci to Pserver, then abort. Otherwise, set
(xi, r′i)← DecSK(Ci).
• If any of the above decryption fails, or if∏i r′i 6= ∏i ri, then send (INPUT,⊥) to FPOLL on behalf
of each corrupt input party Pi.
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• Otherwise send (INPUT, xi) to FPOLL on behalf of each corrupt input party Pi.
It is straight-forward to see that in the cases where S sends (INPUT,⊥), then by the honest behavior
of Pserver and Pclient, the protocol would have mandated that Pclient refuse the output.
Case 2: If A corrupts Pclient and (without loss of generality) input parties P1, . . . , Pk, then S does
the following:
• When corrupt Pclient broadcasts PK and sends (ri, Pserver) to each honest input party Pi, send
(SETUP, Pclient, Pserver, P1, . . . , Pn) to FPOLL on behalf of Pclient.
• When a corrupt input party Pi sends a ciphertext Ci to honest Pserver, send (INPUT, x0) to FPOLL
on behalf of Pi, where x0 is any arbitrary fixed message.
• When FPOLL gives the final output to S, remove as many x0’s from the output list as there are
corrupt input parties. Arbitrarily order the remaining outputs as xk+1, . . . , xn. For each i ∈ [n],
choose a random si such that
∏
i si = 1. Simulate that Pserver sends a random permutation of
{EncPK(xi, risi) | i > k} ∪ {CTrans(Ci, si) | i ≤ k} to Pclient.
Since Pclient is corrupt, S can legally obtain the set of honest input parties’ inputs. The only
difference therefore between the view of A in the real world and our simulation is that in the
real world, Pclient sees CTrans(EncPK(xi, ri), si) for each honest party Pi, while in the simulation,
Pclient sees EncPK(xi, risi). By the transformation-hiding property of the scheme, this difference is
indistinguishable. Also in the simulation, each xi is paired with a potentially different ri than might
be the case in the real world protocol (since the simulator receives a shuffled list of xi values).
However, the distribution of (xi, risi) pairs is independent of the initial assignments of xi’s to ri’s.
Case 3: If A corrupts Pserver and input parties P1, . . . , Pk, then S does the following:
• When FPOLL gives (SETUP, Pclient, P1, . . . , Pn) to S, generate (PK,SK)← KeyGen. Pick random
r1, . . . , rn ← G and simulate that Pclient broadcast PK and sent (ri, Pserver) to each corrupt Pi.
• When FPOLL gives (INPUTFROM, Pi) to S for an honest party (i > k), generate (Ci, Si) ←
RigEncPK and simulate that Pi sent Ci to Pserver. Remember Si.
• When Pserver sends Pclient a list of ciphertexts (C ′1, . . . , C ′n), do the following for each i:
– If DecSK(C ′i) 6= ⊥, then set (xi, r′i)← DecSK(C ′i).
– Else, if RigExtractSK(C ′i, Sj) 6= ⊥ for some j, set r′i := ri · RigExtractSK(C ′i, Sj).
– If both these operations fail, send CANCEL to FPOLL on behalf of Pserver.
If
∏
i r
′
i 6=
∏
i ri or for some j > k, there is more than one i such that RigExtractSK(C
′
i, Sj) 6= ⊥,
then send CANCEL to FPOLL on behalf of Pserver.
Otherwise, let σ be any permutation on [n] that maps each j > k to the unique i such that
RigExtractSK(C ′i, Sj) 6= ⊥. Send (INPUT, xσ(i)) to FPOLL on behalf of corrupt Pi (i ≤ k), and
then send OK to FPOLL on behalf of Pserver, with σ as the permutation that FPOLL expects.
In this case, the primary task of S is to determine whether the corrupt Pserver gives a valid list of
ciphertexts to Pclient. Applying the HCCA definition in a sequence of hybrid interactions, we see
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that the behavior of the real world interaction versus this simulation interaction is preserved when
appropriately replacing Enc/Dec with RigEnc/RigExtract.
Note that the adversary’s view is independent of rk+1, . . . , rn. If DecSK(C ′i) 6= ⊥, then the
corresponding r′i value computed by the simulator is also independent of rk+1, . . . , rn. Thus the
only way
∏
i ri =
∏
i r
′
i can be satisfied with non-negligible probability is if for each honest party
Pj , exactly one i satisfies RigExtractSK(C ′i, Sj) 6= ⊥. In this case, there will be exactly as many xi’s
as corrupt players, and the simulator can legitimately send these to FPOLL as instructed (with the
appropriate permutation).
Case 4. If A corrupts Pserver, Pclient, and input parties P1, . . . , Pk, then S can legitimately obtain
each honest input party’s input, so simulation is relatively straight-forward. More formally, S does
the following:
• Send (SETUP, Pclient, Pserver, P1, . . . , Pn) to FPOLL on behalf of Pclient.
• Send (INPUT, x0) to FPOLL on behalf of each corrupt input party Pi, where x0 is an arbitrary
fixed message.
• After receiving (INPUTFROM, Pi) for all honest input parties Pi, send OK to FPOLL on behalf of
Pserver, and give the identity permutation as σ.
• After receiving (x1, . . . , xn) as output, we know that party Pi was invoked with input xi, so we
can perfectly simulate the honest parties to A.
Boolean OR on encrypted data. Using a similar technique, we can obtain a UC-secure protocol
for a boolean-OR functionality. This functionality is identical to FPOLL except that Pserver also gets to
provide an input (i.e., we identify Pserver with P0), and instead of giving (xσ(0), . . . , xσ(n)), it gives∨
i xi as the output to Pclient.
We can achieve this new functionality with a similar protocol — this time, using an encryption
scheme that is unlinkable HCCA-secure with respect to all group operations in G2. Pclient sends
shares ri to the input parties as before. The input parties send EncPK(xi, ri) to Pserver, where xi = 1
if Pi’s input is 0, and xi is randomly chosen in G otherwise. Then, Pserver rerandomizes the ri shares
as before, and also randomizes the xi’s in the following way: Pserver multiplies each xi by si such
that
∏
i si = 1 if Pserver’s input is 0, and
∏
i si is random otherwise (Pserver can randomize both sets of
shares simultaneously using the homomorphic operation). Pclient receives the processed ciphertexts
and ensures that
∏
i r
′
i = 1. Then if
∏
i x
′
i = 1, it outputs 0, else it outputs 1.
We note that this approach to evaluating a boolean OR (where the induced distribution is a fixed
element if the result is 0, and is random if the result is 1) has previously appeared elsewhere, e.g.,
[12, 13].
6.7 Beyond Unary Transformations
Many interesting applications of homomorphic encryptions involve (at least) binary operations
— those which accept encryptions of plaintexts m0 and m1 and output a ciphertext encoding
T (m0,m1). A common example is ElGamal encryption, where T is the group operation of the
underlying cyclic group. In this section, we examine the possibility of extending our results to
schemes with binary transformations.
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Before presenting our results, we must first define appropriate extensions of our definitions to the
case of binary homomorphic operations. Developing appropriate (and succinct) indistinguishability-
style definitions appears to be a difficult task. Thus, the results in this section use security
formulations as ideal functionalities in the UC model, as in Section 6.3.3.
6.7.1 Negative Result for Binary Group Operations
For an impossibility result, we make the security requirements on the ideal functionality as weak as
possible. Throughout this subsection, we consider an ideal functionality F similar to FTHMP, with the
following properties:
• Any party may post a new handle by either providing a plaintext message, or by providing two
existing handles and a (binary) transformation T ∈ T . In the latter case, the message for the
new handle is calculated as T (m1,m2), where m1,m2 are the messages corresponding to the
given handles.
• Only the “owner” of the functionality can obtain the message corresponding to each handle.
All other parties simply receive notification that the handle was generated.
• Handles are generated by the adversary, without knowledge of the corresponding plaintext
message, or which of the two ways the handle was produced.
For simplicity, we have not considered the functionality’s behavior on handles originally posted
by the adversary (so-called “dummy” handles in the case of FTHMP). However, our impossibility results
do not depend on these details, and one may consider the weakest possible ideal functionality, which
reveals everything to the adversary when honest parties try to use dummy handles.
We can now formalize our impossibility result:
Theorem 6.16. There is no secure realization of F via a homomorphic encryption scheme, when T
contains a group operation on the message space, and the size of the message space is superpolynomial.
The main observation is that each handle (ciphertext) must have a bounded length independent
of its “history” (i.e., whether it was generated via the homomorphic reposting operation and if so,
which operations applied to which existing handles), and thus can only encode a bounded amount of
information about its history. We show that any simulator for F must be able to extract a reasonable
history from any handle output by the adversary.
However, when a group operation is an allowed transformation, there can be far more possible
histories than can be encoded in a single handle. We use this fact to construct an environment and
adversary which can distinguish between the real world and the ideal world with any simulator,
contradicting the security definition.
Proof. We will construct an environment that will distinguish between the ideal interaction with F
and the real-world protocol interaction involving any homomorphic encryption scheme. Let ⊗ be
the group operation over message spaceM.
The environment invokes an interaction with two honest parties Alice and Bob, and a dummy
adversary Carol. The environment instructs Bob to SETUP an instance of the, then chooses d random
messages m1, . . . ,md ← M, where d is a parameter to be fixed later, and instructs Alice to POST
each of them. Then, the environment chooses a random S ⊆ {1, . . . , d} and then, given the handles
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for the posted messages, internally runs the encryption scheme algorithm to obtain a ciphertext
h∗ encoding
⊗
i∈Smi. The environment can do this locally because this protocol implements
the REPOST operation via a non-interactive procedure CTrans. Finally, the environment instructs
the adversary to broadcast the resulting handle/ciphertext h∗, then instructs Bob to open it. The
environment outputs 1 if Bob outputs
⊗
i∈Smi.
Clearly in the real-world interaction, the environment outputs 1 with overwhelming probability,
by the correctness of the encryption scheme’s homomorphic operation. We will show that no
simulator can achieve the same effect in the ideal interaction.
Any simulator for this adversary must post the handle h∗ to F according to one of the “legal”
reposting features. In order to induce the correct output, the simulator must specify a legal
transformation T ′ such that T ′(m1, . . . ,md) =
⊗
i∈Smi with overwhelming probability. From the
definition of F , the simulator’s view is independent of the choice of m1, . . . ,md (the handles are
generated without knowledge of the plaintext messages). Thus the simulator must in fact specify
a legal function T ′ such that T ′(m1, . . . ,md) =
⊗
i∈Smi, with overwhelming probability over the
choice of m1, . . . ,md.
Let `(k) be a polynomial bound on the length of handles in the given encryption scheme (when
the security parameter is k); say, the running time of simulator when answering HANDLE-REQ
requests. Let us choose d = `(k)+1. Then our environment remains polynomial-time in k. However,
then the simulator’s view (namely, the ciphertext/handle h∗) contains at least 1 bit of uncertainty
about the environment’s choice of S.
However, we observe that if S 6= S′ ⊆ {1, . . . , d}, then the probability (taken over choice of
m1, . . . ,md) that
⊗
i∈Smi =
⊗
i∈S′ mi is negligible. Suppose a transformation T
′ agrees with some⊗
i∈S′ on an overwhelming fraction of inputs. Then the set S
′ is unique, since all other products in
the group disagree with it in most inputs.
Therefore, any simulator must output a transformation T ′ that with overwhelming probability
uniquely identifies the random subset S chosen by the environment. However, the simulator’s
view has one bit of uncertainty about the environment’s choice of S, so this required task is
impossible.
6.7.2 Positive Result for a Relaxation of Unlinkability
The impossibility result of the previous section leaves open the possibility of achieving a relaxation
of the unlinkability requirement. We consider a relaxation similar to Sander, Young, and Yung [92];
namely, we allow the ciphertext to leak the number of operations applied to it (i.e., the depth of
the circuit applied), but no additional information. To make this this requirement more formal,
we associate a length parameter with each ciphertext. If a length-` and a length-`′ ciphertext are
combined, then the result is a length `+ `′ ciphertext. Our security definition insists that ciphertexts
reveal (at most) their associated length parameter.
The main idea in our construction is to encode a group element m into a length-` ciphertext
as a vector
(
Enc(m1), . . . ,Enc(m`)
)
, where the mi’s are a random multiplicative sharing of m in
the group. and Enc is HCCA-secure, with respect to the group operation. To “multiply” two
such encrypted encodings, we can simply concatenate the two vectors of ciphertexts together, and
rerandomize the new set of shares (multiply the ith component by si, where
∏
i si = 1) to bind the
sets together.
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The above outline captures the main intuition, but our actual construction uses a slightly different
approach to ensure UC security. In the scheme described above, anyone can split the vector(
Enc(m1), . . . ,Enc(m`)
)
into two smaller vectors that encode two (random) elements whose product
is m. We interpret this as a violation of our desired properties, since it is a way to derive two
encodings whose values are related to a longer encoding. To avoid the problem of “breaking apart”
ciphertexts, we instead encode m as
(
Enc(α1, β1), . . . ,Enc(α`, β`)
)
, where the αi’s and βi’s form two
independently random multiplicative sharings of m. Rerandomizing these encodings is possible when
we use a scheme that is homomorphic with respect to the group operation in G2 (i.e., by setting the
parameter H = G2 in our construction). Intuitively, these encodings cannot be split up in such a
way that the first components and second components are shares of the same value. Note that it is
crucial that the (αi, βi) pairs cannot themselves be “broken apart.”
Security definition. The functionality, called FG, is given in full detail in Figure 6.11. Below we
explain and motivate the details of the definition.
The functionality keeps track of a database of records of the form (handle, `,m). Let
GetHandle(args) be a subroutine which sends (HANDLE-REQ, args) to the adversary and expects
in return a string handle. If handle is previously recorded in the database, abort; otherwise, return
handle.
Setup: On receiving a command SETUP from a party P : If a previous SETUP command has been
processed, abort. Else, send (ID-REQ, P ) to the adversary, and expect in response a string id.
Broadcast (ID-ANNOUNCE, P, id) to all other parties.
Dummy handles: On receiving a command (DUMMY, `, handle) from a corrupt party only, internally
record (handle, `,⊥) and broadcast (HANDLE-ANNOUNCE, handle) to all parties.
Posting messages: On receiving a command (POST, `,m0, handle1, . . . , handlek) from a party sender:
If any handlei is not recorded internally, or m0 6∈ G, ignore the request. Otherwise, suppose
(handlei, `i,msgi) is recorded for each i. If ` <
∑
i `i, ignore the request. Let D = {i |mi = ⊥} ⊆
[k], the indices of the dummy handles. Set m∗ = m0 ∗
∏
i 6∈Dmi, the product of known plaintexts
involved.
• If D = ∅ (no dummy handles involved): If P is corrupt, set handle∗ ←
GetHandle(sender, `,m∗); otherwise let handle∗ ← GetHandle(sender, `). Internally record
(handle∗, `,m∗) and broadcast (HANDLE-ANNOUNCE, handle∗) to all parties.
• If ` > ∑i∈D `i (not entirely derived from dummy handles): If P is corrupt, set
handle′ ← GetHandle(sender, `′,m∗), else set handle′ ← GetHandle(sender, `′). Internally
record (handle′, `′,m∗).
Set handle∗ ← GetHandle(sender, `, {handle′} ∪ {handlei | i ∈ D}). Internally record
(handle∗, `,⊥) and send (HANDLE-ANNOUNCE, handle∗) to all parties.
• Otherwise (dummy handles only), Set handle∗ ← GetHandle(sender, `,m0, {handlei |i ∈ D}).
Internally record (handle∗, `,⊥) and send [HANDLE-ANNOUNCE, handle∗] to all parties.
Message reading: On receiving a command (GET, handle) from party P (who gave the first SETUP
command): If (handle, `,msg) is recorded internally, send msg to P ; else send ⊥.
Figure 6.11: UC ideal functionality FG, parameterized by a cyclic group G.
Following our desired intuition, users can only generate new messages in two ways (for
uniformity, all handled in the same part of the functionality’s code). A user can simply post a
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message by supplying a group element m (this is the case where k = 0 in the user’s POST command).
Alternatively, a user can provide a list of existing handles along with a group element m. If all
these handles correspond to honestly-generated posts, then this has the same effect as if the user
posted the product of all the corresponding messages (though note that the user does not have to
know what these messages are to do this). We model the fact that handles reveal nothing about the
message by letting the adversary choose the actual handle string, without knowledge of the message.
The designated recipient can obtain the message by providing a handle to the functionality. Note
that there is no way (even for corrupt parties) to generate a handle derived from existing handles in
a non-approved way.
As in FTHMP, adversaries can also post dummy handles, which contain no message. When a user
posts a derived message using such a handle, the resulting handle also contains no message. When
the handle is used in a derived POST command, the adversary is informed. The adversary also gets
access to an “intermediate” handle corresponding to all the non-DUMMY handles that were combined
in the POST request. Still, the adversary learns nothing about the messages corresponding to these
handles.
The construction. Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,CTrans) be an unlinkable HCCA-secure scheme,
whose message space is G2 for a cyclic group G, and whose allowed (unary) transformations are all
group operations in G2. We suppose the CTrans operation accepts arguments as CTrans(C, (r, s)),
where r, s ∈ G specify the transformation (α, β) 7→ (rα, sβ). We abbreviate the CTrans(C, (r, s))
operation as “(r, s) ∗ C”. Thus (r, s) ∗ EncPK(α, β) is indistinguishable from EncPK(rα, sβ), in the
sense of the unlinkability definition.
The new scheme E∗ is given by the following algorithms:
Key generation (KeyGen∗): Same as KeyGen.
Encryption (Enc∗): To encrypt an element m ∈ G in a length-` ciphertext, output
C =
(
EncPK(α1, β1), . . . ,EncPK(α`, β`)
)
where αi, βi are randomly chosen in G subject to the constraint
∏
i αi =
∏
i βi = m.
Decryption (Dec∗): To decrypt a ciphertext C = (C1, . . . , C`), decrypt each Ci to get (αi, βi). If any
decryption returns ⊥, or if ∏i αi 6= ∏i βi, output ⊥. Else output ∏i αi.
Transformation operation (CTrans∗): To “multiply” two given ciphertexts C = (C1, . . . , C`) and
C ′ = (C ′1, . . . , C
′
`′), output a random permutation of:(
(r1, s1) ∗ C1, . . . , (r`, s`) ∗ C`, (r`+1, s`+1) ∗ C ′1, . . . , (r`+`′ , s`+`′) ∗ C ′`′
)
where ri, si are randomly chosen in G subject to
∏
i ri =
∏
i si = 1
To “multiply” a single given ciphertext C = (C1, . . . , C`) by a given known group element
R ∈ G (without increasing the ciphertext length), output a random permutation of:(
(r1, s1) ∗ C1, . . . , (r`, s`) ∗ C`
)
where ri, si are randomly chosen in G subject to
∏
i ri =
∏
i si = R.
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We note that the syntax of CTrans∗ can be naturally extended to support multiplying several
ciphertexts and/or a known group element at once, simply by composing the operations described
above.
Theorem 6.17. If E is unlinkable and HCCA-secure with respect to G2, where |G| is superpolynomial in
the security parameter, then E∗ (as described above) is a secure realization of FG, with respect to static
corruptions.
Proof. Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,CTrans) be the unlinkable HCCA-secure scheme used as the main
component in our construction, and let RigEnc and RigExtract be the procedures guaranteed by
HCCA security.
We proceed by constructing an ideal-world simulator for any arbitrary real-world adversary A.
The simulator S is constructed by considering a sequence of hybrid functionalities that culminate in
FG. These hybrids differ from FG only in how much they reveal in their HANDLE-REQ requests to the
adversary.
Correctness. Note that FG only makes two kinds of HANDLE-REQ requests: those containing a lone
message, and those containing a list of handles.
Let F1 be the functionality that behaves exactly as FG, except that every time it sends a
HANDLE-REQ to the simulator, it also includes the entire party’s input that triggered the HANDLE-REQ.
Define S1 to be the simulator that internally runs the adversary A, and does the following:
• When F1 gives (ID-REQ, P ) to S1, it generates a key pair (PK,SK) ← KeyGen and responds
with PK. It simulates to A that party P broadcast PK.
• When F1 gives a HANDLE-REQ to S1, it generates the handle appropriately — with either
Enc∗PK or CTrans
∗ on an existing handle, depending on the party’s original command which is
included in the HANDLE-REQ. It simulates to A that the appropriate party output the handle.
• When A broadcasts a length-` ciphertext C, S1 tries to decrypt it with Dec∗SK . If it decrypts
(say, to m), then S1 sends a (POST, `,m) command to F1 and later gives C as the handle; else
it sends (DUMMY, `, C).
S1 exactly simulates the honest parties’ behavior in the real world interaction. By the correctness
properties of E∗, the outputs of the honest ideal-world parties match that of the real world,
except with negligible probability; thus, EXEC[Z,A, E∗,FBCAST] ≈ EXEC[Z,S1, pidummy,F1] for all
environments Z.
Unlinkability. Let F2 be exactly like F1, except for the following change: For requests of the form
(HANDLE-REQ, sender, `,m), F2 does not send the handles that caused this request. That is, whereas
F1 would tell the simulator that the handle is being requested for a POST command combining some
non-dummy handles, F2 would instead act like sender had sent (POST, `,m) (that this is closer to
what FG does; internally behaving identically for such requests). Let S2 = S1, since F1 is only
sending one fewer type of HANDLE-REQ to the simulator.
By a standard hybrid argument, we can see that EXEC[Z,S1, pidummy,F1] ≈ EXEC[Z,S2, pidummy,F2]
for all environments Z. The hybrids are over the number of POST requests affected by this
change. Consecutive hybrids differ by whether a single handle was generated by Enc∗ or by
CTrans∗. The only handles that are affected here are non-DUMMY handles, and thus ciphertexts
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which decrypt successfully under SK. Thus distinguishing between consecutive hybrids can be
reduced to succeeding in the unlinkability experiment (by further hybridizing over the individual
Enc ciphertext components).
HCCA. If the owner P of the functionality is corrupt, then S2 is already a suitable simulator for FG,
and we can stop at this point.
Otherwise, the difference between FG and F2 is that FG does not reveal the message in certain
HANDLE-REQ requests. Namely, those in which the simulator receives (HANDLE-REQ, sender, `).
Let S3 be exactly like S2, except for the following changes: Each time S2 would generate a
ciphertext component via EncPK(α, β), S3 instead generates it with RigEncPK . It keeps track of
the auxiliary information S and records (S, α, β) internally. Also, whenever S2 would decrypt a
ciphertext component using DecSK , S3 instead decrypts it via:
D(C) =
(rα, sβ) if (S, α, β) is recorded s.t. (r, s)← RigExtractSK(C, S)DecSK(C) otherwise
By a straight-forward hybrid argument (in which distinguishing between adjacent hy-
brids reduces to success in a single instance of the HCCA experiment), we have that
EXEC[Z,S2, pidummy,F2] ≈ EXEC[Z,S3, pidummy,F2] for all environments Z.
We now examine when a ciphertext given by the adversary is successfully decrypted by the
simulator (and thus given to the functionality as a POST instead of as a DUMMY handle).
Given a ciphertext (sequence of HCCA ciphertexts) C = (C1, . . . , C`), S3 first decrypts each Ci to
obtain (α′i, β
′
i) = D(Ci). The overall decryption succeeds if
∏
i(α
′
i/β
′
i) = 1.
Suppose the internal records (S, α, β) are labeled as (Sj , αj , βj) for j ≥ 1. Then for some
constants r, s ∈ G and exponent p ∈ {0, 1}, we have that α′i/β′i = (r/s)(αj/βj)p. Now, let γ′i = α′i/β′i.
We denote γ′i as a linear function in a single formal variable of the form γj = αj/βj . The adversary’s
view is independent of the choice of γj ’s, except for the fact that
∏
j∈J γj = 1 for some disjoint sets
J .
Recall that the overall decryption of C is successful if
∏
i γ
′
i = 1. However, note that if is only with
negligible probability that
∏
i γ
′
i = 1 when evaluated on the simulator’s choice of γj ’s, but
∏
j γ
′
i 6= 1
as a polynomial. Thus consider a simulator S4 that sends (DUMMY, C) to the functionality whenever∏
i γ
′
i 6= 1, as a polynomial (accounting for the constraints on γj ’s). This simulator’s behavior differs
from S3 with only negligible probability.
Suppose
∏
i γ
′
i = 1 as a polynomial, and let J be such that that we have a constraint of the form∏
j γj = 1. Then for all j ∈ J , there exists nJ such that ⊥ 6= RigExtractSK(Ci, Sj) for exactly nJ
values of i. In other words, for each j ∈ J , the variable γj appears in the expansion of
∏
i γ
′
i with
the same multiplicity. Then S 4 can do the following when A outputs a ciphertext C = (C1, . . . , C`):
• If for some Ci, we have D(Ci) = ⊥, the ciphertext is invalid; send (DUMMY, C) to the
functionality.
• Otherwise, compute (α′i, β′i) = D(Ci). If
∏
i α
′
i/β
′
i 6= 1, when viewed as a polynomial in
variables αj/βj , then send (DUMMY, C) to the functionality.
• Otherwise, let I be the set of indices such that ⊥ 6= (α′i, β′i) ← DecSK(Ci). Let (ri, si) ←
RigExtractSK(Ci, Sj) for each i 6∈ I. We have that
∏
i∈I(α
′
i/β
′
i) = 1 and
∏
i 6∈I(ri/si) = 1 by the
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above argument. Then send (POST, `,m0,H) to the functionality, where m0 =
∏
i∈I αi
∏
i6∈I ri
and H contains with multiplicity nJ the handle that resulted when {(αj , βj) | j ∈ J} were
generated.
Except with negligible probability, S4 interacts identically with the functionality as S3. However,
note that S4 does not actually use the αj , βj values that are recorded for each call to RigEnc.
Thus S4 can be successfully implemented even if the functionality does not reveal m in messages
of the form (HANDLE-REQ, sender, `,m). Therefore S4 is a suitable simulator for FG itself, and
EXEC[Z,S3, pidummy,F2] ≈ EXEC[Z,S4, pidummy,FG] for all environments Z.
6.8 Conclusion & Open Problems
Improved constructions. A natural next step is to address encryption schemes whose homomor-
phic operations are more expressive. Currently, all of our constructions support homomorphic trans-
formations related to a group operation. Homomorphic operations involving other algebraic struc-
tures (ring, field, or vector space operations) may also prove useful in protocol applications.
Our construction of a transformation-hiding HCCA-secure scheme is quite efficient, having only
a small additive overhead over a comparable CCA-secure scheme. However, our unlinkable scheme
is much more impractical than the state of the art for CCA security. It may be that unlinkability can
be achieved using more generic hardness assumptions than DDH, possibly resulting in a significant
improvement in efficiency.
Anonymity. In some applications, it is useful for an encryption scheme to have the additional
property of receiver-anonymity (also known as key-privacy), as introduced by Bellare et al. [7].
Receiver-anonymity means, essentially, that in addition to hiding the underlying plaintext message,
a ciphertext does not reveal the public key under which it was encrypted. Encryption schemes
with this property are important tools in the design of many systems [37]. The special case of
rerandomizable, anonymous, RCCA-secure encryption has interesting applications in mix-nets [43]
and anonymous P2P routing [83].
The way we have defined the syntax of the CTrans feature of a homomorphic encryption scheme
(i.e, so that it does not require the “correct” public key in addition to the ciphertext), it remains a
meaningful feature even in an environment where receiver-anonymity is utilized.
To model the property of receiver-anonymity for HCCA schemes, we consider an anonymous,
multi-user variant of the FTHMP UC functionality. This variant allows multiple users to register IDs, and
senders to post messages destined for a particular ID. The functionality does not reveal the handle’s
recipient in its HANDLE-ANNOUNCE broadcasts (or in its HANDLE-REQ requests to the adversary).
Our indistinguishability-based security definitions can also be extended in a simple way to
account for receiver-anonymity. We call a homomorphic encryption scheme HCCA-anonymous if
it is HCCA secure and if the RigEnc and RigExtract procedures from the HCCA security definition can
be implemented without the public or private keys (i.e, RigEnc takes no arguments and RigExtract
takes only a ciphertext and a saved state).
We also consider an additional correctness requirement on schemes, which is natural in the con-
text of multiple users: With overwhelming probability over (PK,SK)← KeyGen and (PK ′, SK ′)←
KeyGen, we require that DecSK′(EncPK(msg)) = ⊥ for every msg ∈ M, with probability 1 over the
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randomness of Enc. In other words, ciphertexts honestly encrypted for one user do not successfully
decrypt for another user.
Via a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 6.9, it can be seen that any HCCA-anonymous,
unlinkable scheme which satisfies the additional correctness property is a secure realization of the
anonymous variant of FTHMP.
Note that this notion of anonymity is a chosen-ciphertext and not a chosen-plaintext (simple
ciphertext indistinguishability) one. Our construction does not achieve HCCA-anonymity, since it is
possible to combine a ciphertext with a public key and obtain a valid ciphertext if and only if the
original ciphertext was encrypted under that public key. We consider it an interesting and important
open problem to construct an anonymous, unlinkably homomorphic HCCA encryption scheme, for
any T .
Alternative UC security definition. For simplicity, we have defined our ideal UC functionality FTHMP
in such a way that the adversary is notified on-line every time a handle is generated. As pointed
out in [81], this paradigm does not allow the most flexibility. A more general-purpose functionality
would be one in which parties privately (i.e., without the adversary being notified) generate new
handles, and can have arbitrary control over how the handles are sent to other parties. If a handle
never reaches the adversary, the adversary should not know that it was ever generated. To model
this, the functionality can be modified so that the adversary is not notified each time a new handle
is generated; instead, following [81], the adversary supplies a handle-generating algorithm during
the set-up phase so that handles can be generated without the adversary’s intervention/notification.
To securely realize such a functionality via a homomorphic encryption scheme, we must ensure
that the scheme satisfies an additional security property; namely, that ciphertexts reveal (even to
the receiver) at most the cumulative effect of all the transformations that have been applied — in
particular, the ciphertext does not reveal which particular sequence of transformations has been
applied. This property can be specified more formally as a security experiment, where an adversary
supplies a ciphertext ζ and two transformations T1 and T2. The challenger flips a fair coin and
returns either either CTrans(ζ, T2 ◦ T1) or CTrans(CTrans(ζ, T1), T2), correspondingly. We insist that
the adversary cannot correctly guess the coin with nonnegligible advantage.
With this additional security requirement, an analog of Theorem 6.9 holds for this non-
broadcasting definition of FTHMP. Our construction does indeed satisfy this additional property, since
the two distributions CTrans(ζ, T2 ◦ T1) and CTrans(CTrans(ζ, T1), T2) are identical.
Repost-test. In FTHMP, when an honest party Alice receives a post from Bob and then another from
Carl, Alice has no way of knowing if Carl’s message was derived from Bob’s (via FTHMP ’s REPOST
feature), or via an independent POST command. In fact, the only time FTHMP informs a recipient that
a REPOST occurred is for the adversary’s dummy handles.
We can easily modify our schemes and FTHMP to provide such a feature for honest parties. We
call this feature repost-test. In this variant of FTHMP, the recipient may issue an additional command
(TEST, handle1, handle2). The functionality returns a boolean indicating whether the two handles
were the result of reposting a common handle (it keeps extra book-keeping to track the ancestor of
each REPOST-generated handle).
To realize this modified functionality, we start with a realization of FTHMP on message spaceMn+1,
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whereM has superpolynomial size. Suppose every T ∈ T always preserves the (n+1)th component
of the message. Then let T ′ be the restrictions of T ∈ T to the first n components.
We may then use FTHMP to obtain a secure realization of FT
′
HMP with repost-test feature in the
following way: To post a message (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Mn, choose a random mn+1 ← M and post
(m1, . . . ,mn+1) to FTHMP. When reading a message, ignore the last component. To perform the repost-
test on two handles, simply check whether the last components of their corresponding messages are
equal.
Non-malleability beyond encryption. Our results demonstrate that it is possible to envision non-
malleability as a precisely defined tradeoff, rather than an all-or-nothing prospect. Cryptographic
objects that are non-malleable in this way combine the best aspects of flexible computation and
integrity against malicious behavior. It is likely that this approach to non-malleability will be useful
for primitives other than encryption schemes.
For example, one may envision a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof scheme in which
the proof objects may be mauled into proofs of related statements, but only in certain ways. Indeed,
NIZK proofs are an important component in anonymous credential schemes [6], and combining such
malleability with an unlinkability feature would permit an anonymous delegation feature for the
credentials.
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APPENDIX A
Additional Proofs
A.1 Security Proof for Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
In this section, we give the full proof of Theorem 6.14, that our construction (Section 6.5.2) satisfies
the correctness properties for a homomorphic encryption scheme, is unlinkably homomorphic and
is HCCA-secure, under the DDH assumption in G and Ĝ.
The full details of the proof are carried out in the following sections. We use the notational
conventions of Section 6.5.2.
A.1.1 Rigged Encryption & Extraction
To show HCCA security, we must demonstrate RigEnc and RigExtract procedures. First, we factor
out some subroutines that are common to the “rigged” and non-rigged encryption procedures:
Ciphertext generation. GenCiphPK((m1, . . . ,mn), µ): Pick random x ∈ Zp, y ∈ Z∗p and random
u ∈ Ĝ, and output
g
(x+z1)u
1 , . . . , g
(x+z4)u
4 , m1C
x
1 , . . . , mnC
x
n, (DE
µ)x;
gyu1 , . . . , g
yu
4 , C
y
1 , . . . , C
y
n, (DE
µ)y;
MEncdPK(u)
Deriving purported plaintext. PurpMsgSK(ζ, u): Strip off u and ~z from the exponents as follows:
For j = 1, . . . , 4: set Xj = X
1/u
j g
−zj
j and Y j = Y
1/u
j . Output (m1, . . . ,mn), where
mi = CX,i/
∏4
j=1X
ci,j
j .
Checking ciphertext integrity. IntegritySK(ζ, u, µ): Strip off u and ~z from the exponents as follows:
For j = 1, . . . , 4: set Xj = X
1/u
j g
−zj
j and Y j = Y
1/u
j . If Y 1 = · · · = Y 4 = 1 (the identity
element in G), output 0. Otherwise, check the following constraints:
PX
?=
∏4
j=1X
dj+µej
j ; CY,i
?=
∏4
j=1 Y
ci,j
j (for each i ∈ [n]);
PY
?=
∏4
j=1 Y
dj+µej
j
If any fail, output 0, otherwise output 1.
We can view the scheme’s Enc and Dec routines as using these subroutines:
EncPK(m1, . . . ,mn): Output GenCiphPK((m1, . . . ,mn),H(f(m1, . . . ,mn))).
DecSK(ζ): Compute u ← MDecdSK(U). If u = ⊥, output ⊥. Otherwise, set (m1, . . . ,mn) =
PurpMsgSK(ζ, u). If IntegritySK(ζ, u,H(f(m1, . . . ,mn))) = 1, output (m1, . . . ,mn); otherwise
output ⊥.
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Now, we define the RigEnc and RigExtract procedures for use in our security proof:
RigEncPK(): Pick random µ← Zp. Generate ζ ← GenCiphPK((1, . . . , 1), µ), and output (ζ, S = µ).
RigExtractSK(ζ, S): Compute u← MDecdSK(U). If u = ⊥, output ⊥. Otherwise, set (m1, . . . ,mn) =
PurpMsgSK(ζ, u). If IntegritySK(ζ, u, S) = 1 and (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ H (i.e., T(m1,...,mn) is an
allowed transformation), then output T(m1,...,mn); otherwise output ⊥.
A.1.2 Encryption & Decryption as Linear Algebra
In this section we characterize our construction using linear algebra, which will be useful in the
security proof.
Public key constraints. First we examine what information is revealed to the adversary about the
private key by the public key.
The following constraints relate the private keys to public keys (the first equation is in the field
of order q, and the second is in the field of order p):[
~1 0
0 ~1
][
Gˆ 0
0 Gˆ
][
~a>
~b>
]
=
[
logA
logB
]
, where Gˆ =
[
log ĝ1 0
0 log ĝ2
]

~1
. . .
~1


G
. . .
G


~c>1
...
~c>n
~d>
~e>

=

logC1
...
logCn
logD
logE

, where G =

log g1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · log g4
 (A.1)
We call these constraints the public-key constraints.
Definition A.1. Let U = (~V ,AV , BV , ~W,AW , BW ) be a DSME ciphertext. The two DSME strands of
U with respect to a public key (ĝ1, ĝ2, A,B) are:
~v = (v1, v2), where vj = logbgj Vj
~w = (w1, w2), where wj = logbgj Wj
Observe that applying MCTrans(U, Tσ) gives a ciphertext whose two strands are ~v + r ~w and s~w,
for random r ∈ Zq, s ∈ Z∗q . In ciphertexts generated by MEnc, both strands are scalar multiples of
the all-ones vector.
For ciphertexts in the main scheme, we define a similar notion of strands. However, in such a
ciphertext, the first strand is “masked” by u and zi’s, and the second strand is masked by u.
Definition A.2. Let ζ = ( ~X, ~CX , PX ; ~Y , ~CY , PY ;U) be a ciphertext in the main scheme. The strands
of ζ with respect to a public key (g1, . . . , g4, . . .) and a value u ∈ Ĝ are:
~x = (x1, . . . , x4), where xi = (loggi Xi)/u− zi
~y = (y1, . . . , y4), where yi = (loggi Yi)/u
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As above, applying CTrans(ζ, T~τ ) gives a ciphertext whose two strands are ~x + r~y and s~y, for
random r ∈ Zp, s ∈ Z∗p. In ciphertexts generated by Enc, both strands are scalar multiples of the
all-ones vector.
Decryption constraints. Let ŜK = (~a,~b) be a DSME private key, let U = (~V ,AV , BV , ~W,AW , BW )
be a DSME ciphertext, and let ~v, ~w be its two strands with respect to the corresponding public key.
Then MDecdSK(U) = u 6= ⊥ if and only if ~w is a nonzero vector and the following constraints hold in
the field of order q: 
~v 0
~w 0
0 ~v
0 ~w

[
Gˆ 0
0 Gˆ
][
~a>
~b>
]
=

log(AV /u)
logAW
logBV
logBW
 (A.2)
The logarithms are with respect to any fixed generator of Ĝ.
Similarly, let SK = (ŜK,~c1, . . . ,~cn, ~d,~e) be a private key and ζ = ( ~X, ~CX , PX ; ~Y , ~CY , PY ;U) be
a ciphertext in the main scheme, such that MDecdSK(U) = u 6= ⊥. Let ~x and ~y denote the strands of
ζ∗ with respect to the public key and u.
Then PurpMsgSK(ζ, u) = (m1, . . . ,mn) and IntegritySK(ζ, u, µ) = 1 if and only if ~y is a nonzero
vector and the following constraints hold in the field of order p:
~x
. . . 0 0
~x
~y
. . . 0 0
~y
0 ~x µ~x
0 ~y µ~y


G
. . .
G


~c>1
...
~c>n
~d>
~e>

=

log(CX,1/m1)
...
log(CX,n/mn)
logCY,1
...
logCY,n
logPX
logPY

(A.3)
The logarithms are with respect to any fixed generator of G.
We call each constraint in these systems of equations the decryption constraints, and refer to them
by the name of the ciphertext component that is involved (AV , AW , PX , etc.).
The adversary receives ciphertexts throughout the HCCA experiment from GRigEnc oracles and as
the challenge ζ∗. These ciphertexts gives the adversary’s view additional constraints on the private
key.
Observation: Ciphertexts that are generated by GenCiph induce constraints that are linearly
dependent on the constraints given by the public key, because their strands are scalar multiples
of the appropriate all-ones vectors.
Lemma A.3. For all key pairs (P̂K, ŜK), all (purported) ciphertexts U , and all U ′ in the support of
MCTrans(U, Tσ), we have MDecdSK(U ′) = Tσ(MDecdSK(U)).
Proof. If ~v and ~w are the two strands of U , then the two strands of U ′ are ~v + r ~w and s~w for some
r ∈ Zq, s ∈ Z∗q . The two strands of U ′ are linear combinations of the strands of U , and the three
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values checked by a decryption constraint (BV ,AW ,BW ) are the corresponding combinations of the
values from U . Thus, a particular decryption constraint fails on U ′ if and only if it fails for U .
Furthermore, s 6= 0, so ~w is a nonzero vector if and only if s~w is a nonzero vector. Finally, it is
straight-forward to check that the purported plaintext of U ′ is σ times the purported plaintext of
U .
Lemma A.4. For all key pairs (PK,SK), all (purported) ciphertexts ζ, and all ζ ′ in the support of
CTrans(ζ, T~τ ), we have DecSK(ζ ′) = T~τ (DecSK(ζ)).
Proof. First, by the above lemma, the DSME component of ζ will fail to decrypt if and only if the
DSME component of ζ ′ fails to decrypt.
Otherwise, the two strands of ζ ′ (with respect to the decryption of its DSME component) are
linear combinations of the strands of ζ (with respect to the decryption of its DSME component). A
similar argument to above shows that a decryption check fails on ζ ′ if and only if the same check
fails on ζ; and the ratios of the purported plaintexts are ~τ .
A.1.3 Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
We now describe a more intricate indistinguishability assumption, which is implied by the standard
DDH assumption in G and Ĝ.
First, consider the following two distributions:
• DDH(G, j) distribution. Pick random elements g1, . . . , gj ← G, and pick a random v ← Zp,
where |G| = p. Output (g1, . . . , gj , gv1 , . . . , gvj ).
• Rand(G, j) distribution. Pick random elements g1, . . . , gj ← G, and pick random v1, . . . , vj ←
Zp, where |G| = p. Output (g1, . . . , gj , gv11 , . . . , gvjj ).
We will require distributions of this form with j = 2 and j = 4, in different groups. Note that for
fixed n, the standard DDH assumption in G (which is the special case of j = 2) implies that the
above distributions are indistinguishable. To see this, consider a hybrid distribution in which the
first k exponents are randomly chosen, and the remaining exponents are all equal. The standard
DDH assumption is easily seen to imply that the kth hybrid distribution is indistinguishable from the
(k + 1)st.
Now consider the following two “double-strand” distributions:
• DS-DDH(G, j) distribution. Pick random elements g1, . . . , gj ← G, and pick random v, w ←
Zp, where |G| = p. Output (g1, . . . , gj , gv1 , . . . , gvj , gw1 , . . . , gwj ).
• DS-Rand(G, j) distribution. Pick random elements g1, . . . , gj ← G, and pick random
v1, . . . , vj , w1, . . . , wj ← Zp, where |G| = p. Output (g1, . . . , gj , gv11 , . . . , gvjj , gw11 , . . . , gwjj ).
Again, a simple hybrid argument shows that if the DDH(G, j) and Rand(G, j) distributions are
indistinguishable, then so are DS-DDH(G, j) and DS-Rand(G, j). We call elements in the support
of these distributions double-strand tuples of length j.
Finally, our security proofs rely on the indistinguishability of the following two distributions:
• Pick K0 ← DS-DDH(G, 4), and pick K1 ← DDH(Ĝ, 2). Output (K0,K1).
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• Pick K0 ← DS-Rand(G, 4), and pick K1 ← Rand(Ĝ, 2). Output (K0,K1).
A final hybrid argument shows that if DS-DDH(G, 4) and DS-Rand(G, 4) are indistinguishable,
and DDH(Ĝ, 2) and Rand(Ĝ, 2) are also indistinguishable, then the above two distributions are
indistinguishable.
A.1.4 The Alternate Encryption Procedure
We now describe the alternate method of generating ciphertexts AltGenCiph. As a component, it
uses AltMEnc, an alternate encryption procedure for the DSME scheme. Both of these procedures
use the secret keys instead of the public keys to generate ciphertexts.
DSME alternate encryption: AltMEncdSK(u).
• Pick random v1, v2 ∈ Zq and w ∈ Z∗q . For j = 1, 2 let Vj = ĝvjj and Wj = ĝwj (alternatively,
in the analysis below we also consider V1, V2 as inputs instead).
• Output (~V ,AV , BV , ~W,AW , BW ), where
~V = (V1, V2) AV = u ·
∏2
j=1 V
aj
j BV =
∏2
j=1 V
bj
j
~W = (W1,W2) AW =
∏2
j=1W
aj
j BW =
∏2
j=1W
bj
j
Alternate ciphertexts: AltGenCiphSK((m1, . . . ,mn), µ).
• Pick random x1, . . . , x4, y1, . . . , y4 ∈ Zp. For j = 1, . . . , 4, set Xj = gxjj and Y j = gyjj ,
(alternatively, in the analysis below we also consider Xj , Y j as inputs instead).
• Pick random u ∈ Ĝ, set U ← AltMEncdSK(u), Compute:
Xj = (Xjg
zj
j )
u; CX,i = mi
∏4
j=1X
ci,j
j ; PX =
∏4
j=1X
dj+µej
j ;
Yj = Y
u
j ; CY,i =
∏4
j=1 Y
ci,j
j ; PY =
∏4
j=1 Y
dj+µej
j ;
• Finally, output ζ = ( ~X, ~CX , PX ; ~Y , ~CY , PY ;U)
These alternate encryption procedures differ from the normal encryption procedures in that they
generate ciphertexts whose decryption constraints are not linearly dependent on the public key
constraints. The DSME alternate encryption generates a ciphertext whose first strand is random, and
the alternate encryption generates a ciphertext whose two strands are both random. The remainder
of the ciphertexts are constructed using the private keys to ensure that the decryption constraints are
satisfied.
A hybrid HCCA experiment. Consider a variant of the HCCA experiment, where the challenge
ciphertext is generated using AltGenCiph. That is, in the challenge phase of the experiment, the
implicit call to GenCiphPK is replaced with an identical call to AltGenCiphSK .
Lemma A.5. In the hybrid HCCA experiment (where ζ∗ is generated using AltGenCiph), conditioned on
a negligible-probability event not occurring, ζ∗ is distributed independently of the randomness u, and
the bit b in the experiment, even given the public key. When b = 1, ζ∗ is also distributed independently
of the random choice of µ used in RigEnc.
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Proof. Given a DSME ciphertext from AltMEnc with first strand ~v∗, the set {~v∗,~1} forms a basis for
the space of all DSME strands, with overwhelming probability. The adversary’s view of the DSME
private key (~a,~b) is constrained by the public key constraints in Equation A.1 and the decryption
constraints given by ζ∗ in Equation A.3. The constraints involving the second strand are linearly
dependent on the public key constraints, as ~w is a scalar multiple of the all-ones vector. Combining
these constraints and removing the redundant ones, we have:
~1 0
0 ~1
~v 0
0 ~v

[
Gˆ 0
0 Gˆ
][
~a>
~b>
]
=

logA
logB
log(AV /u)
logBV
 ,
The matrix on the left-hand side of this equation is nonsingular.
Similarly, in a ciphertext from AltGenCiph, with overwhelming probability we have that for every
u ∈ Ĝ, {~x, ~y,~1, ~z} form a basis for the space of all strands, where ~x and ~y are the strands of the
challenge ciphertext with respect to u. Then the adversary’s view of the private key is constrained
as follows:

~1
. . .
~1
~x
. . .
~x
~y
. . .
~y
~x µ~x
~y µ~y


G
. . .
G


~c>1
...
~c>n
~d>
~e>

=

logC1
...
logCn
logD
logE
log(CX,1/m1)
...
log(CX,n/mn)
logCY,1
...
logCY,n
logPX
logPY

Here (m1, . . . ,mn) and µ denote the inputs to AltGenCiph.
Note that when {~1, ~x, ~y} are linearly independent, the matrix on the left-hand side of this
equation is nonsingular, for every µ ∈ Zp.
Now fix a public key and challenge ciphertext (one that avoids the event that {~1, ~x, ~y} is not
linearly independent). When b = 0 in the experiment, substitute the appropriate mi and µ values
in the previous system of equations. Then for every choice of u ∈ Ĝ, there are an equal number of
solutions for the private keys in this system of equations, as the matrix is nonsingular.
When b = 1 in the experiment, substitute (m1, . . . ,mn) = (1, . . . , 1). Then for every choice of
u ∈ Ĝ and µ ∈ Zp, there are an equal number of solutions for the private keys, as the matrix is
nonsingular.
Since the underlying randomness in the HCCA experiment is the choice of these private keys,
the choices of u, µ, and b are independent of each other and of the adversary’s view in the
experiment.
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Lemma A.6. For every PPT adversary, its advantage in the HCCA experiment is negligibly close
to its advantage in the hybrid HCCA experiment (when the challenge ciphertext is generated using
AltGenCiph), if the DDH assumption holds in G and Ĝ.
Proof. If the DDH assumption holds for Ĝ and G, then two the distributions described in Sec-
tion A.1.3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Now consider a simulation of the HCCA experiment, where the input is from one of the above
distributions. Let (ĝ1, ĝ2, V1, V2) be the sample from either DDH(Ĝ, 2) or Rand(Ĝ, 2). Set (ĝ1, ĝ2) as
the corresponding part of the DSME public key, and generate the remainder of the keypair (~a,~b)
honestly. To simulate the encryption of u∗ from the challenge ciphertext with this keypair, use
AltMEnc with the input values V1, V2.
Similarly, let (g1, . . . , g4, X1, . . . , X4, Y 1, . . . , Y 4) be the sample from either DS-DDH(G, 4) or
DS-Rand(G, 4). Set (g1, . . . , g4) as the corresponding part of the public key and generate the
remainder of the keypairs (~ci, ~d, ~e) honestly. To simulate the encryption of the challenge ciphertext,
use AltGenCiph and AltMEnc with the private keys and input values X1, . . . , X4, Y 1, . . . , Y 4.
It is straight-forward to check that when the input is sampled from the first distribution (i.e, the 2
tuples come from the appropriate DDH distributions), the ciphertext is distributed statistically close
to a “normal” encryption from GenCiph and MEnc (the distribution is identical when conditioned to
avoid the negligible-probability event that Y 1 = · · · = Y 4 = 1). If the input is sampled from the
second distribution (i.e, the 2 tuples comes from the appropriate random distributions), then the
ciphertext is distributed identically as an encryption from AltGenCiph.
The rest of this simulation of the HCCA experiment can be implemented in polynomial time.
Thus, the outcomes of the two simulations must not differ by more than a negligible amount.
A.1.5 Decryption Queries
In this section, we argue that with overwhelming probability, the only ciphertexts accepted by the
decryption oracles in the HCCA experiment are ciphertexts of the “expected” form (from the supports
of Enc or CTrans).
In this section, we let ζ∗ denote the challenge ciphertext in the hybrid HCCA experiment, which
was generated via AltGenCiph.
Our arguments in this section generally follow the same structure. Fix a set of constraints induced
by a public key and challenge ciphertext ζ∗ in the hybrid HCCA experiment. Call a query to the Dec,
GRigExtract, or RigDec oracle bad if that oracle rejects (outputs ⊥) for an overwhelming fraction of
private keys which are consistent with those constraints.
We show that any ciphertext ζ not of the “expected” form is such a bad ciphertext, while on
the other hand, ciphertexts which are of the expected form are actually rejected by none of the
consistent private keys (and all private keys yield the same response from the oracle).
The following lemma establishes the significance of classifying ciphertexts in this way.
Lemma A.7. With overwhelming probability, all bad queries are rejected in the HCCA experiment.
Proof. By definition, the response from the oracle for a non-bad query does not introduce any new
constraints on the private keys, as they all yield the same oracle response.
Consider the first bad ciphertext submitted to an oracle. At that time, from the adversary’s view,
the private key is distributed uniformly among all keys consistent with the constraints induced by ζ∗
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and the public key. Thus it is only with negligible probability that the oracle will return something
other than ⊥. Conditioned on it returning ⊥, the adversary learns that a negligible fraction of
private keys are ruled out. Let ν be a negligible upper bound for this fraction. The correct private
key remains distributed among the (1− ν) fraction of remaining keys, from the adversary’s view.
By a union bound, if the adversary makes N bad queries to this decryption oracle, at least one
of them is accepted with probability at most Nν. Since the adversary makes a polynomial (in the
security parameter) number of queries, this probability is negligible.
The simplest way a ciphertext can be bad is if it one of its decryption integrity constraints
(Equation A.2 and Equation A.3) is linearly independent of the constraints given by the public key
and challenge ciphertext.
DSME Decryption
Lemma A.8. Fix a DSME public key and challenge ciphertext U∗ in the hybrid HCCA experiment. Let
U be an additional DSME ciphertext. Suppose u∗ and u are the purported plaintexts of U∗ and U ,
respectively, as computed by MDecdSK . Then there exist fixed (with respect to the adversary’s view)
values pi = pi(U) and σ = σ(U) such that u = σ(u∗)pi.
Note that even though in the hybrid HCCA experiment, the value of u∗ is independent of the
adversary’s view, the values pi and σ are fixed.
Proof. Let ~v∗ be the first strand of U∗, and let ~v be the first strand of U . We may unambiguously
express ~v = pi~v∗ + ~1 for some pi, . Then pi and σ = AV /(A∗V )
piA are the values desired in the
statement of the lemma.
The purported ciphertext of U is:
u =
AV∏2
j=1 V
aj
j
=
AV[∏2
j=1(V
∗
j )aj
]pi [∏2
j=1(ĝ
∗
j )aj
] = AV[A∗V /u∗]pi A = σ(u∗)pi
Lemma A.9. If the second strand of U is not a (nonzero) scalar multiple of (1, 1), then MDecSK(U) =
⊥ for all but a negligible fraction of private keys consistent with the adversary’s view.
Proof. Let ~w be the second strand of U , and ~v∗ the first strand of U∗. If ~w is not in the span of ~1,
then ~w = α~v∗ + β~1 for some α 6= 0. The following constraint is checked while decrypting U :
1 ?=
AW∏2
j=1W
aj
j
=
AW[∏2
j=1(V
∗
j )aj
]α [∏2
j=1 ĝ
aj
j
]β = AW[A∗V /u∗]αAβ
The value of u∗ is independent of the adversary’s view and distributed uniformly in Ĝ, and thus so
is (u∗)α. Thus equality holds only with negligible probability. Also, if ~w is the zero vector, then U is
explicitly rejected by MDec.
Lemma A.10. Let U be a DSME ciphertext, with pi, σ as above, and suppose MDec(U) 6= ⊥ for a
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nonnegligible fraction of private keys consistent with the adversary’s view. Then
pi = 0 =⇒ U is in the support of MEncdPK(σ)
pi = 1 =⇒ U is in the support of MCTrans(U∗, Tσ)
Proof. By the previous lemma, the second strand of U must be a nonzero multiple of ~1.
If pi = 0, then the first strand of U is also a multiple of ~1. Say, ~v = v~1 and ~w = w~1, where w 6= 0.
It is trivial to check that U decrypts to σ with nonnegligible probability only if U = MEncdPK(σ; v, w).
If pi = 1, then say ~v = ~v∗ + β~1 = ~v∗ + s(~w∗) and ~w = γ~1 = t(~w∗), for some s ∈ Zq, t ∈ Z∗q ,
since ~w∗ (the second strand of U∗) is a nonzero scalar multiple of ~1. Then it is trivial to check that
U decrypts to σu∗ only if U = MCTrans(U∗, Tσ; s, t).
Decryption
Lemma A.11. Let (ζ, µ) be an input to IntegritySK . Then it is a bad query unless there exists σ ∈ Ĝ
such that one of the following cases holds:
• U is in the support of MEncdPK(σ); and there exists x ∈ Zp, y ∈ Z∗p such that Xj = g(x+zj)σj and
Yj = g
yσ
j , for j = 1, . . . , 4.
• U is in the support of MCTrans(U∗, Tσ); and there exists s ∈ Zp, t ∈ Z∗p such that Xj =
(X∗j (Y
∗
j )
s)σ and Yj = (Y ∗j )
tσ, for j = 1, . . . , 4; and µ = µ∗.
We emphasize the similarity between these forms of ciphertexts and those produced by Enc and
CTrans.
Proof. As parts of the challenge ciphertext ζ∗, the adversary is given the values: X∗j = g
(x∗j+zj)u
∗
j
and Y ∗j = g
y∗j u
∗
j , for some u
∗ corresponding to the decryption of U∗ under ŜK. These values ~X and
~Y are fixed, even though the value of u∗ is distributed independently of the adversary’s view.
Similarly, when submitting a ciphertext ζ to an oracle, the adversary supplies the values:
Xj = g
(xj+zj)u
j and Yj = g
yju
j for some u, where ~x and ~y are the strands of the ciphertext with
respect to u, and u is related to u∗ via u = σ(u∗)pi.
With overwhelming probability in the HCCA experiment, these fixed vectors {(~x∗ +
~z)u∗, ~y∗u∗, ~z,~1} span the space of all strands. Thus we can write the following unique linear
combination:
(~x+ ~z)u = α
(
(~x∗ + ~z)u∗
)
+ β(~y∗u∗) + γ~1 + δ~z (A.4)
~yu = α′
(
(~x∗ + ~z)u∗
)
+ β′(~y∗u∗) + γ′~1 + δ′~z (A.5)
Note that the coefficients of this linear combination are fixed, independent of the randomness in u∗.
Our analysis proceeds by showing that if these coefficients are not fixed in a particular way, then the
ciphertext would be rejected by Dec with overwhelming probability over the remaining randomness
in u∗ and the private key.
Let ~X be as above, and consider the decryption constraint involving the PX component of the
ciphertext. Suppose the constraint holds for a nonnegligible fraction of consistent private keys. The
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constraint that is checked by Integrity is of the following form:
[
~x µ~x
] [G
G
][
~d>
~e>
]
?=
[
logPX
]
The public key and challenge ciphertext constrain ~d and ~e as follows:
~1
~1
~x∗ µ∗~x∗
~y∗ µ∗~y∗

[
G
G
][
~d>
~e>
]
=

logD
logE
logP ∗X
logP ∗Y

We must have that [~x µ~x] is a linear combination of the above set of constraints with nonnegligible
probability (over u∗). Furthermore, the coefficients of that linear combination must be fixed with
nonnegligible probability over u∗, otherwise the “correct” value of the constraint will be distributed
randomly in a superpolynomial-size domain as u∗ varies.
Solving for ~x in the first equation and substituting, we have:
[~x µ~x] =
γ
u
[~1 µ~1] +
u∗
u
(
α[~x∗ µ~x∗] + β[~y∗ µ~y∗]
)
+
(
α
u∗
u
+
δ
u
− 1
)
[~z µ~z]
Let pi = pi(U) and σ = σ(U). We consider the following cases:
• If pi = 0: Then u = σ (independent of u∗) while u∗/u is distributed uniformly over Ĝ. We must
have α = β = 0, otherwise the coefficients of [~x∗ µ~x∗] and [~y∗ µ~y∗] are distributed randomly
with u∗/u. Furthermore, observe that [~z µ~z] is linearly independent of the constraints on the
adversary’s view for any µ, since ~z is linearly independent of {~1, ~x∗, ~y∗}. Thus, its coefficient
must be zero with nonnegligible probability. This happens only when δ = σ.
Combining everything, we must have Xj = g
(x+zi)σ
j for some x ∈ Zp.
• If pi = 1: Then u∗/u = 1/σ while u (when appearing alone) is distributed uniformly over
Ĝ. We must have γ = 0, otherwise the coefficient of [~1 µ~1] is distributed randomly with u∗.
Again, we must have the coefficient of [~z µ~z] equal to zero with nonnegligible probability.
Substituting, we get that δ = 0 and α = σ. Finally, we must have µ = µ∗, or else [~x∗ µ~x∗] is
linearly independent of [~x∗ µ∗~x∗].
Combining everything, we must have Xj = (X∗j (Y
∗
j )
s)σ for some s ∈ Zp, and that µ = µ∗.
• If pi 6∈ {0, 1}. Below (when discussing the second strand), we show that the ciphertext would
fail its integrity checks with overwhelming probability.
Similarly, we consider the second strand’s ~Y as a linear combination (Equation A.4). We then
consider the integrity check on the PY 1 component:
[
~y µ~y
]
G
[
~d>
~e>
]
?= [logPY ]
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The public key and challenge ciphertext constrain ~d and ~e in the following way:
~1
~1
~x∗ µ∗~x∗
~y∗ µ∗~y∗

[
G
G
][
~d>
~e>
]
=

logD
logE
logP ∗X
logP ∗Y

We rewrite [~y µ~y], substituting according to Equation A.4 to obtain:
[~y µ~y] =
γ′
u
[~1 µ~1] +
u∗
u
(
α′[~x∗ µ~x∗] + β′[~y∗ µ~y∗]
)
+
(
α′
u∗
u
+
δ′
u
)
[~z µ~z]
Similar to the case of the first strand, we see that the coefficient (α′u∗ + δ′)/u must be zero with
nonnegligible probability over the randomness in u∗. This is only possible with α′ = δ′ = 0. We
further consider 3 cases of pi:
• If pi = 0, then u = σ and u∗/u is uniform in Ĝ. We see that the coefficient of [~y∗ µ~y∗] is
β′u∗/u, so we must have β′ = 0. Then γ′ 6= 0, since otherwise ~y is the all-zeroes vector, and
the ciphertext would be unconditionally rejected by Integrity.
This implies that Yj = g
yσ
j for some y ∈ Z∗p.
• If pi = 1, then u∗/u = 1/σ, while u is uniform in Ĝ when appearing alone. We see that the
coefficient of [~1 µ~1] is γ′/u, so we must have γ′ = 0. Then β′ 6= 0, since otherwise ~y is the
all-zeroes vector and the ciphertext would be rejected by Integrity.
This implies that Yj = (Y ∗j )
tσ for some t ∈ Z∗p.
• pi 6∈ {0, 1}: First, observe that if µ 6= µ∗, then [~y∗ µ~y∗] is independent of the view constraints,
and we must have β′ = 0. Then α′ = β′ = δ′ = 0, and [~y µ~y] = γ′/u[~1 µ~1]. Since u is uniformly
distributed in Ĝ, we must have γ′ = 0. But then ~y is the all-zeroes vector and the ciphertext is
unconditionally rejected by Integrity.
Therefore we may assume µ = µ∗ if the ciphertext is to pass its integrity checks with nonneg-
ligible probability. We consider the following two constraints simultaneously (simplifying via
α′ = δ′ = 0):
[
logCY,1
logPY
]
?=
[
~y
~y µ~y
]G G
G

~c
>
1
~d>
~e>

=
[
γ′
u 0
β′u∗
u 0
0 γ
′
u 0
β′u∗
u
]
~1
~1 µ∗~1
~y∗
~y∗ µ∗~y∗

G G
G

~c
>
1
~d>
~e>

=
[
γ′
u 0
β′u∗
u 0
0 γ
′
u 0
β′u∗
u
]
logC1
log(DEµ
∗
)
logC∗Y,1
logP ∗Y

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If we multiply through both of these constraints and substitute according to u = σ(u∗)pi, we get
the following two polynomials in u∗, which must be simultaneously zero with nonnegligible
probability:
(σ logPY )(u∗)pi − (β′σ logP ∗Y )u∗ − (γ′ log(DEµ
∗
)) = 0
(σ logCY,1)(u∗)pi − (β′σ logC∗Y,1)u∗ − (γ′ logC1) = 0
Note that these are polynomials in u∗ of degree pi, and no terms collect together, as pi 6∈ {0, 1}.
We now argue that these two polynomials cannot be simultaneously zero with nonnegligible
probability, unless the ciphertext is degenerate and would be rejected on other grounds:
– If one of the polynomials is not identically zero but has some coefficient equal to zero,
then this polynomial is equivalent to (i.e, has the same roots as) an affine polynomial in
a single variable; either u∗ or (u∗)pi or (u∗)pi−1. Each of these variables is uniform in Ĝ,
so the equation is satisfied with only negligible probability.
– Otherwise, if the two polynomials have all nonzero coefficients and are identical up to
scalar multiplication, then the three pairs of matching coefficients have the same ratios.
In particular, we have the following equality (after cancellation):
log(DEµ
∗
)
logC1
=
logP ∗Y
logC∗Y,1
The challenge ciphertext (including the components P ∗Y and C
∗
Y,1) is generated after C1,
D, E, and µ∗ are fixed. It is only with negligible probability over the randomness of
AltGenCiph that C∗Y,1 an P
∗
Y satisfy this condition. Thus it does not affect the outcome of
our analysis to condition the entire HCCA experiment on this event not happening.
– If the two polynomials have all nonzero coefficients and are not identical up to scalar
multiplication, then some linear combination of them is affine either in the variable
u∗ or in (u∗)pi. The two original polynomial equations must have been simultaneously
satisfied with noticeable probability. When both equations hold, then so does any linear
combination of the two. But we have demonstrated a linear combination of the equations
that is affine on a single variable which is distributed uniformly over Ĝ, and thus is
satisfied with only negligible probability.
– Otherwise one polynomial is identically zero. It is only with negligible probability that
AltGenCiph generates a ciphertext with logC∗Y,1 = 0 or logPY 1
∗ = 0. Thus our analysis
may be conditioned on these events not happening. We must have β′ = 0 to make the
u∗ coefficient zero (since σ 6= 0 unconditionally). This makes a coefficient in the other
polynomial zero as well. This case overlaps with the first case unless both polynomials are
in fact identically zero. If both are identically zero, then by similar reasoning, we must
have γ′ = 0 (logC1 = 0 only with negligible probability over the key generation). But
when β′ = γ′ = 0, ~y is the all-zeroes vector and the ciphertext is rejected by Integrity.
We now characterize precisely which queries are accepted by the decryption oracles in the HCCA
experiment, to show that their outputs are independent of b.
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• RigDec when b = 0. Then RigDec is the normal Dec oracle. The challenge ciphertext ζ∗ is an
encryption of (m1, . . . ,mn) given by the adversary, and µ∗ = H(f(m1, . . . ,mn)).
– In the pi = 0 case, it is straight-forward to see that the ciphertext passes its integrity check
with µ computed from the purported plaintext only if ζ is in the support of EncPK(·).
– In the pi = 1 case, let (m′1, . . . ,m
′
n) = PurpMsgSK(ζ, u). Then we must have
H(f(m1, . . . ,mn)) = H(f(m′1, . . . ,m
′
1)). By the collision-resistance of H, this only happens
when the two plaintexts are in the same H-coset. Thus (m1, . . . ,mn) ∗ (m′1, . . . ,m′n)−1 ∈
H, and so (m′1, . . . ,m′n) is an allowed transformation of (m1, . . . ,mn). It is straight-
forward to see that the remaining components’ integrity checks succeed only if ζ is in the
support of CTrans(ζ∗, ·).
• RigDec when b = 1. Then RigDec first calls RigExtract using µ∗, which are distributed
independently of the adversary’s view.
– In the pi = 0 case, ciphertexts of this form have a unique fixed (with respect to the
adversary’s view) value µ such that IntegritySK(ζ, µ) succeeds. Since µ∗ is distributed
independently of the adversary’s view, this happens with negligible probability.
– In the pi = 1 case, RigExtract accepts only if the purported plaintext of ζ is changed from
ζ∗ via an allowed transformation, and that the integrity constraints pass with the same
µ∗ value. It is straight-forward to see that these conditions hold only if ζ is in the support
of CTrans(ζ∗, ·).
Then RigDec calls the normal Dec procedure:
– The pi = 0 case is analogous to the b = 0 case above, it is not affected by the difference in
generation of ζ∗. It accepts only if ζ is in the support of EncPK(·).
– If pi = 1, then the ciphertext’s integrity is checked using µ values derived from the
purported plaintext. The purported plaintext is information-theoretically fixed from the
adversary’s view. Only with negligible probability will µ equal the µ∗ value used to
generate ζ∗, which is necessary for Dec to accept with nonnegligible probability.
Thus, RigDec may be replaced by an (unbounded) oracle which does the following on input ζ.
• If ζ is in the support of EncPK(m1, . . . ,mn) then output m1, . . . ,mn.
• Otherwise, if ζ is in the support of CTrans(ζ∗, T ) for some T ∈ T , then output T (m∗1, . . . ,m∗n),
where m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
n is the challenge plaintext given by the adversary in the challenge phase.
By the above argument, the output of this oracle matches that of RigDec on all queries with
overwhelming probability, in both the b = 0 and b = 1 branches of the HCCA experiment. Similarly,
the argument for RigDec when b = 0 implies that we may also replace the Dec oracle given to the
adversary in Phase I with an oracle which simply checks that its input is in the support of EncPK(·).
We show a similar situation for inputs to the GRigExtract(i, ·) oracle:
• In the pi = 0 case of an input ciphertext, the given ciphertext ζ is accepted only if its purported
plaintext is an allowed transformation, and its integrity checks pass with respect to the same
154
values as ζi (the ith output of GRigEnc). It is straight-forward to see that this is only possible
for ζ from the support of CTrans(ζi, ·).
• In the pi = 1 case of inputs, we must have µ∗ equal to the µ value used to generate ζi. Note
that the µ value used to generate ζi is information-theoretically fixed given ζi and the public
key (it was created using GenCiph instead of AltGenCiph).
When b = 1, the two sets of µ values are only equal with negligible probability, as µ∗ is chosen
independently of µ.
When b = 0, the µ∗ value is computed via H(f(m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
n)), where m
∗
1, . . . ,m
∗
n is the
challenge plaintext given by the adversary. For the adversary to be given ζi and subsequently
be able to compute (m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
n) which yield the correct µ value, the adversary must be able
to compute discrete logs in G.
To see the reduction, suppose we are given a random pair g, gµ as input. Then we perform
4 randomized reductions to obtain gj , g
µ
j pairs, and generate a keypair honestly using these
gj values. We can compute a public key component E as well as the value Eµ needed to
generate ζi. For the output of GRigEnc, use this value when generating the output of RigEnc.
The distribution of this ciphertext is correct, as µ is random. When the adversary gives the
challenge plaintext, compute µ′ = H(f(m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
n)). If g
µ′ = gµ, then we have successfully
computed the discrete log. In a group where the DDH assumption holds, this can only happen
with negligible probability.
Similar to above, we may replace the GRigExtract(i, ·) oracle with an unbounded oracle that
checks whether its input is in the support of CTrans(ζi, ·), and if so outputs the transformation. Such
an oracle is clearly independent of b, and by the above discussion, all of its responses match that of
GRigExtract(i, ·), with overwhelming probability.
Lemma A.12. Our construction is HCCA secure, if the DDH assumption holds in G and Ĝ.
Proof. First, by Lemma A.6, any adversary’s advantage in the HCCA experiment changes negligibly
when GenCiph is replaced by AltGenCiph to generate the challenge ciphertext. By Lemma A.5, this
challenge ciphertext is distributed independently of b.
Next, we may replace all the oracles which use the private key with unbounded variants as
described above. The entire set of responses from these oracles coincides with the original oracles,
with overwhelming probability, so any adversary’s advantage is only negligibly affected by this
modification to the experiment. However, when these modified oracles are used, the adversary’s
entire view (public key, challenge ciphertext, and oracle responses) is independent of b. Thus the
adversary has zero advantage in this modified HCCA experiment. It follows that the adversary’s
advantage in the original experiment is negligible.
Lemma A.13. Our construction is unlinkably homomorphic.
Proof. Above, we argued that in the HCCA experiment, with overwhelming probability, the only
ciphertexts accepted by the Dec in Phase I are those which are in the support of EncPK(·). The
unlinkability experiment is a restricted special case of Phase I of the HCCA experiment where there
are no GRigEnc or GRigExtract oracles. So in the unlinkability experiment also, with overwhelming
probability, only ciphertexts in the support of EncPK(·) are accepted by the Dec. Further, observe that
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the CTrans procedure, when applied to ciphertexts in the support of EncPK(msg) and transformation
T , outputs ciphertexts distributed identically to EncPK(T (msg)). Thus the adversary has zero
advantage in the unlinkability experiment, conditioned on the overwhelming-probability event that
the correctly-decrypting ciphertext it gives is in the support of EncPK(·). The adversary’s overall
advantage in the unlinkability experiment is therefore negligible.
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